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Thesis	Abstract		Between	 1968	 and	 1971	 the	 Australian	 government,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	Prime	Minister	John	Gorton,	began	to	rethink	its	foreign	and	defence	policy:	from	one	that	had	as	 its	central	 tenet	a	strong	relationship	with	 ‘great	and	powerful	friends’	and	fighting	communism	in	Asia,	to	one	that	saw	Australia	withdraw	from	overseas	military	action	in	Vietnam	and	take	on	a	greater	degree	of	self-reliance.		This	rethink	was	thrust	on	Gorton	by	British	and	American	announcements	to	play	a	lesser	role	in	Southeast	Asian	affairs,	announcements	that	meant,	in	effect,	the	collapse	of	Australia’s	Cold	War	policy.	 	Such	changes	 in	relation	to	British	and	American	 intentions	 to	 remain	 engaged	 in	 the	 region	 prompted	 a	 wave	 of	unprecedented	national	soul-searching	in	Australia,	a	key	part	of	which	was	the	task	of	re-setting	the	coordinates	of	Australian	defence	policy	towards	a	more	self-reliant	posture.		This	 thesis	 examines	 the	way	 in	which	 Prime	Minister	 Gorton	went	 about	 re-setting	those	coordinates.		It	does	this	by	placing	his	management	of	the	alliance	in	 the	broader	context	of	Australian	Cold	War	policy	and	foreign	relations,	and	assessing	 his	 management	 of	 a	 series	 of	 crises	 that	 shook	 the	 foundations	 of	Australian	foreign	policy	almost	immediately	after	he	became	prime	minister.		It	is	argued	that	the	political	and	diplomatic	situation	Gorton	inherited	in	1968	–	and	the	 emphasis	 that	 had	 been	 placed	 on	 the	 importance	 of	maintaining	 a	 strong	relationship	with	America	in	particular	-	severely	limited	his	ability	to	manage	the	alliance	 with	 certainty	 and	 clarity	 in	 a	 time	 of	 crisis.	 	 By	 analysing	 Gorton’s	management	 of	 foreign	 relations	 and	 defence	 policy	 more	 closely	 than	 has	previously	been	done,	 the	 thesis	 sheds	 light	on	Australian	 foreign	and	defence	policy	in	the	Cold	War,	and	also	on	the	contribution	Gorton	made	to	taking	the	first	steps	towards	the	development	of	a	more	self-reliant	Australian	foreign	policy.						
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PROLOGUE		The	 late	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s	 was	 an	 unsettling	 time	 in	 Australia:	 socially,	culturally	 and	 politically.	 	 The	 staunch	 conservatism	 of	 the	 Menzies	 era	 was	drawing	 to	 a	 close,	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 Australia	 being	 the	 last	 bastion	 of	‘Britishness’	in	a	foreign	and	hostile	Asian	world,	dependent	on	powerful	allies	for	protection	and	support,	was	coming	under	question.		The	bipolar	rigidity	of	the	Cold	War	world	was	in	the	process	of	being	replaced	by	a	more	complex,	multi-polar	one	in	which	Australia	would	need	to	become	more	self-reliant	in	its	defence	and	foreign	policy.		According	to	the	Australian	public	intellectual	Donald	Horne,	the	period	from	1966	to	1972	was	“the	time	of	critical	change	in	Australian	post-war	 socio-political	history,”1	adding	 that	 “one	of	 the	major	 significances	of	 this	period	is	that	it	was	a	time	of	challenge	to	some	of	the	dominant	values	and	bodies	of	knowledge	in	Australia.”2				This	thesis	examines	developments	in	Australian	foreign	policy	during	this	period	of	 change,	 specifically	 the	 way	 in	 which	 American-Australian	 relations	 were	managed	 between	 1968	 and	 1971	 by	 Prime	 Minister	 John	 Gorton.	 	 The	management	 of	 the	 alliance	 will	 be	 assessed	 within	 the	 broader	 context	 of	Australia’s	changing	relationship	with	its	traditional	ally,	Britain,	and	the	various	attempts	to	construct	a	new,	more	self-sufficient	Australian	nationalism	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s.		As	Horne	put	it,	the	seven-year	period	between	Menzies	and	Whitlam	was	“when	some	of	the	established	common	sense	was	being	upset.”3		It	is	the	goal	of	this	thesis	to	examine	the	changes	that	took	place	to	American-Australian	relations	under	Gorton.	 				
																																																								1	Donald	Horne,	Time	of	Hope:	Australia	1966-72,	Angus	and	Robertson,	Sydney,	1980,	pp.	6-7.	2	Ibid.,	p.	4.	3	Ibid.	
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Australia	and	the	‘New	Nationalism’			As	the	Iron	Curtain	fell	across	Europe	after	World	War	Two	and	the	world	began	to	separate	into	two	rival	blocs	–	East	versus	West,	capitalism	versus	communism,	democracy	versus	dictatorship	–	Australia	sought	to	protect	itself	by	maintaining	its	relationship	with	Britain	and	developing	and	strengthening	a	defence	alliance	with	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America.	 	 As	 Bruce	 Grant	 argued,	 loyalty	 to	 and	dependence	 on	 great	 power	 protectors	 was	 “the	 central	 idea	 of	 Australian	policy.”4 		 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 the	 perceived	 threat	 against	 which	Australia	 needed	 protection	 was	 the	 spread	 of	 monolithic	 communism	 from	Moscow,	through	Maoist	China	and	then	throughout	Southeast	Asia.		Indeed,	Grant	identified	the	Cold	War	as	a	factor	that	prolonged	Australia’s	“adolescence,”	as	it	created	“global	tensions	for	which	Australia	felt	it	needed	powerful	allies.”5		While	Britain	had	 long	been	regarded	as	Australia’s	protector	and	remained	so	well	 into	 the	 1950s,	 America	 emerged	 from	 World	 War	 Two	 as	 the	 world’s	greatest	superpower,	and	shared	with	Australia	not	only	a	common	political	and	economic	system,	but	also	a	common	language	and	culture.		America	was	a	Pacific	power	well	suited	to	the	role	of	protector,	especially	after	the	pivotal	role	it	had	played	in	the	war	against	the	Japanese.		Accordingly,	Australia	actively	sought	to	develop	a	relationship	with	a	“culturally	related	great	power	to	which	Australians	looked	for	protection	against	a	 threatening	region”,6		particularly	as	 the	British	presence	in	the	region	faded.		Indeed,	Australia	had	begun	to	identify	economically	and	 culturally	 more	 with	 the	 United	 States	 than	 with	 Britain	 in	 the	 1960s.		Although	Australia	still	imported	more	from	Britain	and	Europe	in	gross	terms,	an	increase	 in	 American	 imports	 between	 1948	 and	 1970	 reflected	 Australia’s	international	realignment.		Similarly,	by	the	mid-1960s	Australia	was	increasingly	influenced	 by	American	 culture	 through	 television,	 newspapers,	 cinema,	 books																																																									4	Bruce	Grant,	The	Crisis	of	Loyalty,	A	Study	of	Australian	Foreign	Policy,	Angus	and	Robertson,	Sydney,	1972,	p.	1.	5	Ibid.,	p.	2.	6	David	McLean,	“From	British	Colony	to	American	Satellite?		Australia	and	the	USA	During	the	Cold	War”,	Australian	Journal	of	Politics	and	History,	Volume	52,	Issue	1	(2006),	pp.	64-79,	p.	73.	
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and	popular	music.7		Indeed,	much	of	the	Australian	diplomacy	of	the	1950s	and	early-	to	mid-1960s	centred	around	Australian	efforts	to	establish	a	coherent	form	of	defence	co-operation	in	Southeast	Asia	with	the	two	powers,	so	that	Australia	might	 feel	 secure	 in	 what	 was	 regarded	 as	 a	 foreign	 and	 threatening	 region	through	its	relationship	of	dependence	on	Britain	and	America.		The	essence,	then,	of	Australia’s	Cold	War	policy	was	to	keep	the	great	powers	engaged	in	the	region	to	Australia’s	north.			The	diplomacy	of	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s,	was	characterised	by	doubt	and	uncertainty,	however,	 in	which,	as	 James	Curran	and	Stuart	Ward	have	argued,	“long-nurtured	 assumptions	 about	Australia’s	 common	 cause	with	 ‘friends	 and	relations’	in	Britain	and	the	United	States	were	subjected	to	critical	scrutiny,	as	Australian	governments	moved	to	place	relations	with	both	of	these	countries	on	a	new	footing.”8		With	the	onset	of	European	decolonisation	in	Southeast	Asia	after	World	War	Two,	it	was	from	the	mid-1960s	that	Australians	were	left	to	consider	the	 implications	 of	 being	 left	 alone	 and	 isolated	 in	 a	 foreign	 environment.	 	 As	Andrea	Benvenuti	has	recently	shown,	 the	rise	of	Asian	nationalism	challenged	Britain’s	determination	to	remain	in	Southeast	Asia.		This	was	troubling	for	policy-makers	 in	 Canberra	 who,	 “no	 matter	 how	 dispassionately	 tried	 to	 weigh	 up	different	scenarios	…	could	not	but	feel	downcast	about	the	island’s	future.”9				The	British	withdrawal	was	“not	just	the	last	but	also	one	of	the	most	stressful	of	the	 Anglo-Australian	 interactions	 occasioned	 by	 the	 dissolution	 of	 Britain’s	empire.”10		 Indeed,	 the	 impact	of	 the	British	retreat	 from	 the	 region	was	great:	according	to	Country	Party	member	Ian	Allen	in	March	1968,	“Australia	felt,	for	
																																																								7	James	Harpur,	War	Without	End,	Conflict	in	Indochina	(2nd	edition),	Longman,	Melbourne,	1995,	p.	101.		8	James	Curran	and	Stuart	Ward,	The	Unknown	Nation,	Australia	after	Empire,	Melbourne	University	Press,	Melbourne,	2010,	p.	23.	9	Andrea	Benvenuti,	Cold	War	and	Decolonisation,	Australia’s	Policy	towards	
Britain’s	End	of	Empire	in	Southeast	Asia,	NUS	Press,	Singapore,	2017,	pp.	6-7.	10	David	Goldsworthy,	Losing	the	Blanket:	Australia	and	the	End	of	Britain’s	
Empire,	Melbourne	University	Press,	Melbourne,	2002,	p.	158.	
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the	 first	 time	 in	 its	history,	particularly	naked.”11		The	emotional	 ties	 to	Britain	were	not	easily	cut	and,	 “while	most	politicians	and	commentators	emphasised	the	need	to	think	harder	about	forging	a	distinctive	Australian	civic	identity	for	the	 lonely	years	ahead,	 very	 few	could	define	 precisely	what	 that	might	mean,	except	that	it	should	somehow	be	‘independent’	and	‘new’.”12		With	the	‘mother	country’	leaving	Australia	alone	in	Asia	so	that	it	could	focus	on	its	 involvement	 in	 Europe,	 how	 would	 Australians	 continue	 to	 define	 their	national	 identity,	 an	 identity	 that	was	 intimately	 linked	 to	Australia’s	 intimacy	with	Britain?		The	response	to	this	question	of	a	new	form	of	nationalism	was	not	easily	made.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 “residual	power	of	 the	British	 legacy,	 the	 lack	of	 any	alternative,	 unifying	 tradition	 which	 could	 easily	 replace	 it,	 and	 the	 failure	 of	nationalism’s	 hold	 on	 the	 public	 imagination	 meant	 that	 the	 political	 and	intellectual	leaders’	response	was	confused	and	ambiguous.”13				When	 Harold	Wilson’s	 Labour	 government	 effectively	 ended	 Britain’s	 military	world	role	by	deciding	in	1968	to	speed	up	the	withdrawal	of	British	troops	from	the	area	east	of	Suez,	it	appeared	to	contemporary	observers	that	“the	dismantling	of	one	of	 the	 last	 symbols	of	 the	Anglo-Australian	 connection	would	 inevitably	result	in	the	withering	of	Australia’s	self-consciously	British	civic	identity.”14		This	in	turn	led	to	a	degree	of	uncertainty	as	to	what	might	form	the	basis	of	Australian	civic	identity	in	the	future:	as	Jeppe	Kristensen	argued,	“although	the	withdrawal	was	 seen	 as	 a	 crucial	 and	 defining	 moment	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Australian	nationhood,	 it	 was	much	 less	 clear	 how	 the	 newly	 emergent	 nation	 should	 be	defined.” 15 		 Indeed,	 the	 British	 withdrawal	 had	 rendered	 “the	 traditional	trappings	 of	 Australian	 Britishness	 increasingly	 obsolete,	 yet	 no	 home-grown	
																																																								11		Jeppe	Kristensen,	“In	Essence	still	a	British	Country:	Britain’s	withdrawal	from	East	of	Suez,”	Australian	Journal	of	Politics	and	History:	Volume	51,	Number	1,	2005,	pp.	40-52,	p.	50.	12	Ibid.,	p.	52.	13	James	Curran,	The	Power	of	Speech:	Australian	Prime	Ministers	Defining	the	
National	Image,	Melbourne	University	Press,	Melbourne,	2002,	p.	19.	14	Kristensen,	“In	Essence	still	a	British	Country,”	op.	cit.,	p.	40.	15	Ibid.,	pp.	40-41.	
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ethno-national	myth	had	emerged	as	a	viable	substitute.”16		Having	long	regarded	Australia	-	and	accordingly	Australian	identity	–	as	intimately	bound	up	with	the	British	 Empire,	 Britain’s	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 region	 led	 to	 Australia	 being	“confronted	with	the	task	of	re-making	their	nation	in	the	wake	of	empire.”17				Importantly	for	this	thesis,	it	was	in	Australia’s	relations	with	the	outside	world	where	“a	new	set	of	post-imperial	markers	were	deemed	necessary”,	especially	in	relation	to	“finding	a	new	footing	for	the	conduct	of	Australia’s	foreign	relations.”18		Indeed,	the	phenomenon	became	known	as	“new	nationalism”,	a	term	coined	by	Donald	Horne	in	196819	when	he	described	the	political	style	of	John	Gorton.		For	Curran,	it	was	“in	the	world	of	diplomacy	that	Australians	were	most	immediately	compelled	to	adapt	to	a	post-imperial	strategic	and	cultural	inheritance.	 	In	this	new	era	they	faced	an	uncertain	future,	in	which	all	their	assumptions	about	the	world	and	the	capacity	of	great-power	protectors	to	provide	for	their	security	–	including	that	of	America’s	-	were	proving	to	be	illusory.”20		This	refashioning	of	the	national	image	did	not	represent	“the	stirring	of	a	more	‘authentically’	 Australian	 nationalism	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 relatively	 sudden	collapse	 of	 Britishness.”21		 Indeed,	 according	 to	 Curran	 and	Ward,	 the	 “urgent	problem”	 of	 Australian	 nationalism	was	 addressed	 only	when	 “older,	 imperial	emblems	were	deemed	redundant”	and	the	“threadbare	trappings	of	Australian	nationalism”	were	exposed.22		Accordingly,	 the	underlying	 rationale	of	 the	new	nationalism	was	“neither	as	self-assured,	coherent	nor	universally	welcomed	as	is	generally	 assumed.”23		 Indeed,	 for	 Curran	 and	Ward,	 closer	 examination	of	 the	new	orientation	 reveals	 a	 “pervasive	disorientation.	 	 Even	 the	most	 committed	
																																																								16	Ibid.,	p.	49.	17	Curran	and	Ward,	The	Unknown	Nation,	op.	cit.,	p.	5.	18	Ibid.	19	Ibid.	20	Ibid.,	p.	128.	21	Ibid.,	pp.	6-7.	22	Ibid.,	p.	7.	23	Ibid.	
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advocates	 of	 the	 new	 nationalism	 tended	 to	 falter	 when	 it	 came	 to	 devising	compelling,	consensual	alternatives	to	the	obsolete	civic	culture	of	empire.”24				James	Curran	analysed	the	way	in	which	Australian	prime	ministers	attempted	to	assert	various,	and	often	competing,	visions	of	Australian	nationalism	in	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century.		Though	Prime	Ministers	Curtin,	Chifley	and	Menzies	defined	Australian	nationalism	within	the	context	of	membership	of	 the	British	Empire,	Prime	Ministers	Holt	and	Gorton	were	the	first	to	try	to	define	a	new	form	of	nationalism.25		Curran	argues	that	it	was	Gorton	who	was	most	enthusiastic	to	develop	a	new	Australian	identity:	Gorton	believed	that	“the	nation	seemed	on	the	threshold	of	greatness”	and	was	impatient	“to	leave	the	past	behind,	and	he	was	certainly	not	as	half-hearted	as	Holt	in	embracing	the	new	era.”26		Indeed,	Gorton	“recognised	a	problem	of	identity	which	Curtin,	Chifley	and	Menzies	could	never	have	imagined;”27	in	September	1968	Gorton	observed			
just	recently	there	has	been	…	not	a	gradual	rate	of	change,	but	a	sudden	
explosion	in	this	nation,	an	explosion	which	has	not	yet	reached	its	height	
…		Who	would	have	thought	that	suddenly	at	this	point	in	this	nation’s	
history,	all	the	old	conceptions	would	have	to	be	taken	out,	have	to	be	re-
examined,	to	be	re-assessed	because	the	world	had	changed	and	we	had	
changed.28		It	would	be	wrong,	however,	to	suggest	that	Gorton’s	new	nationalism	brought	a	clear	break	with	the	foreign	policy	of	the	past	or	that	it	heralded	a	new	era	of	self-reliance.		Indeed,	the	period	between	1968	and	1971	was	characterised	chiefly	by	uncertainty	–	the	legacy	of	the	past	clashed	with	and	made	the	desire	for	a	new	approach	hard	to	articulate	and	realise	for	the	prime	minister.		The	foreign	policy	reassessment	Gorton	was	charged	with	was	not	an	easy	task,	and	he	seemed	to	be	caught	between	two	worlds,	especially	in	the	context	of	Australia’s	relations	with																																																									24	Ibid.	25	Curran,	Power	of	Speech,	op.	cit.,	pp.	19-57.	26	Ibid.,	pp.	46-47.	27	Ibid.,	p.	48.	28	Ibid.,	p.	52.	
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and	dependence	on	the	great	powers.		Though	he	may	have	appreciated	the	need	to	create	a	new	sense	of	Australian	 identity	 that	 fell	outside	the	confines	of	the	British	 Empire,	 that	 ‘old	 Australia’	 had	 not,	 understandably,	 “vanished	 from	Gorton’s	veins.		Though	he	brought	a	more	independent	approach	to	questions	of	identity	and	external	affairs,	he	could	not	bring	himself	to	reject	outright	all	the	nostrums	of	the	past.”29				Indeed,	though	Gorton	may	well	have	been	an	iconoclastic	‘new	nationalist’	who	wanted	 to	 introduce	a	new	and	more	 self-reliant	 foreign	and	defence	policy	 in	Australia,	it	will	be	argued	that	his	inability	to	make	a	clean	and	articulate	break	with	 the	 past	 was	 due	 not	 necessarily	 to	 personal	 deficiencies	 and	 poor	leadership,	but	rather	due	to	the	 fact	 that	he	was	caught	between	the	 legacy	of	Australian	leaders	looking	to	great	powers	for	protection	and	the	emergence	of	a	world	in	which	these	great	powers	were	retreating	into	greater	isolation.		Thus	it	will	be	argued	that	Gorton	cannot	be	understood	simply	by	analysing	his	time	as	prime	 minister;	 rather,	 to	 develop	 a	 proper	 understanding	 of	 Gorton	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 set	 his	 management	 of	 the	 alliance	 against	 the	 much	 broader	backdrop	of	Australian	foreign	and	defence	policy	from	the	end	of	World	War	Two	to	the	election	of	the	Whitlam	government	in	1972.			It	is	the	intention	of	this	work	to	 conduct	 such	 an	 analysis	 of	 Gorton	 and	 his	management	 of	 the	 Australian-American	alliance.			An	analysis	of	Gorton’s	management	of	the	alliance	will	contribute	to	knowledge	of	 and	 debate	 surrounding	 the	 nature	 of	 Australia’s	 relationship	with	America	during	 the	 Cold	War.	 	 It	 will	 develop	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 how	 Australia	responded	to	changing	trends	in	Southeast	Asia	and	moved	towards	adopting	a	more	self-reliant	approach	to	 its	place	 in	 the	region	and	the	world.	 	 It	will	also	support	the	argument	that	Whitlam,	far	from	being	the	agent	of	change	when	it	came	to	Australia’s	reliance	on	America,	was	 in	 fact	reacting	to	a	major	shift	 in	diplomacy	that	took	place	well	before	1972.	 	Both	the	American	and	Australian	governments	were,	in	this	era,	moving	towards	the	virtual	end	of	the	Cold	War	in	
																																																								29	Ibid.,	p.	49.	
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Southeast	Asia:	on	this	score	alone	this	work	will	form	another	dimension	of	the	study	 of	 how	 each	 country	 charted	 one	 of	 the	 more	 fluid	 eras	 in	 recent	international	history.				For	Horne,	Gorton	was	an	“iconoclastic	questioner	and	destroyer	of	old	ideals	who	challenged	the	sacredness	of	…	‘forward	defence’30	…	and	proclaimed	it	necessary	to	 …	 define	 more	 confidently	 an	 Australian	 national	 identity”.31 		 Surprisingly,	however,	Gorton’s	management	of	Australia’s	relationship	with	America	during	his	 time	 as	 prime	minister	 has	 not	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 an	 extensive	 academic	analysis.	 	This	 thesis	will	be	the	 first	such	work.	 	 It	seeks	neither	to	praise	nor	condemn	 his	 management	 of	 the	 alliance;	 rather,	 it	 seeks	 to	 set	 Gorton’s	management	of	the	alliance	properly	within	its	historical	context	so	as	to	better	understand	it.		As	 well	 as	 reviewing	 how	 historians	 have	 treated	 Gorton’s	 management	 of	American-Australian	 relations	 to	 date,	 Chapter	 One	 examines	 the	historiographical	context	of	Australia’s	relationship	with	Britain	and	America	in	the	 Cold	 War.	 	 It	 demonstrates	 how	 Australia	 became	 increasingly	 drawn	 to	America	 after	 World	 War	 Two,	 but	 also	 increasingly	 concerned	 that	 America	would	not	come	to	its	assistance	in	the	event	of	a	conflict	unless	the	circumstances	of	that	conflict	furthered	American	as	well	as	Australian	interests.		Chapter	Two	provides	an	intellectual	history	of	Gorton.		It	places	his	ideas	about	foreign	policy	and	Australia’s	place	in	the	world	before	becoming	prime	minister	in	the	context	of	 the	 prevailing	 beliefs	 at	 the	 time.	 	 Taking	 the	 historiographical	 context	 and	Gorton’s	own	ideas	and	beliefs	about	foreign	policy	into	account,	Chapter	Three	then	provides	an	analysis	of	how	Gorton	responded	to	several	crises	during	his	time	as	prime	minister,	as	America	wrestled	with	and	modified	its	own	policies	in																																																									30	The	origins	of	the	strategic	posture	known	as	‘forward	defence’	lay	in	the	Australian	government’s	decision	to	deploy	forces	only	in	Southeast	Asia,	rather	than	the	regions	surrounding	the	principal	Britain-Australia	routes	through	the	Mediterranean,	the	Suez	Canal	and	the	Red	Sea.		They	would	be	deployed	in	coalitions	led	by	either	Britain	or	America,	with	those	powers	providing	the	greater	military	strength.		See	Peter	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War:	
The	Essential	History,	New	South	Publishing,	Sydney,	2014,	pp.	40-41.	31	Horne,	Time	of	Hope,	op.	cit.,	p.	7.	
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relation	to	Vietnam,	Southeast	Asia	and	the	extent	 to	which	 it	was	prepared	to	come	to	the	assistance	of	its	allies.																																
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CHAPTER	ONE:	THE	HISTORIOGRAPHICAL	CONTEXT		The	election	of	Gough	Whitlam’s	Labor	government	in	December	1972	has	long	been	regarded	as	a	watershed	moment	in	American-Australian	relations.		Indeed,	Whitlam	has	long	been	viewed	as	the	harbinger	of	the	‘new	nationalism’	and	the	Australian	 leader	who	 introduced	 a	more	 independent	 approach	 to	Australia’s	management	 of	 its	 foreign	 relations.	 	 Indeed,	 just	 weeks	 after	 the	 Labor	government	was	elected	to	power	in	1972,	Whitlam	withdrew	the	last	contingent	of	Australian	troops	from	Vietnam	and	moved	quickly	to	distance	itself	from	its	American	 ally.	 	 No	 doubt,	 1972	 marked	 an	 important	 point	 in	 the	 history	 of	Australia’s	relationship	and	alliance	with	the	United	States.		Indeed,	James	Curran	cited	the	Whitlam	government’s	harsh	and	open	criticism	of	Nixon’s	decision	to	carry	out	the	1972	Christmas	bombings	as	“the	most	pungent	manifestation	of	the	divergence”	between	the	Whitlam	and	Nixon	administrations,	and	stated	that	“the	harmony	 of	 aims	 and	 interests	 that	 characterized	 the	 alliance	 during	 the	 Cold	War”	 had	 come	 to	 an	 abrupt	 and	 acrimonious	 end.” 32 		 Writing	 soon	 after	Whitlam’s	election,	Russell	Ward	pronounced	December	1972	as	“The	End	of	the	Ice	Age”.33			Prime	 minister	 from	 1968	 to	 1971,	 Gorton	 took	 leadership	 of	 a	 Liberal	government	that	had,	only	three	years	earlier,	committed	Australia	to	what	would	become	its	most	controversial	military	engagement:	the	Vietnam	War.		Australia	had	been	involved	in	the	conflict	alongside	the	United	States	since	1962,	when	it	sent	the	first	group	of	military	advisers	to	Saigon.		In	1965	Menzies	committed	the	first	battalion	of	combat	troops	to	the	war.		Joint	involvement	in	Vietnam	saw	the	diplomatic	relationship	between	the	two	nations	reach	the	height	of	its	strength	in	1966	and	1967.	 	 Indeed,	by	early	1968	8,300	Australians	were	 fighting	with	American	 troops	 in	 south	 Vietnam.	 	 Maintaining	 an	 American	 presence	 on	Southeast	Asia	had	been	the	chief	objective	of	Australian	foreign	policy	since	the	
																																																								32	James	Curran,	“The	Dilemmas	of	Divergence:	The	Crisis	in	American-Australian	Relations,	1972-1975,”	Diplomatic	History,	Volume	38,	Issue	2,	1	April	2014,	pp.	377-408,	p.	1.	33	Russell	Ward,	“The	End	of	the	Ice	Age”,	Meanjin	32,	no.	1	(March	1973).	
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signing	of	the	Australia	New	Zealand	United	States	Treaty	(ANZUS)	in	1951,	and	at	the	start	of	1968	America	was	well	and	truly	engaged	in	the	region.		This	was	about	to	change,	however,	and	it	was	under	Gorton’s	leadership	that	these	changes	would	take	place.					A	 number	 of	 events	 occurring	 between	 1968	 and	 1969	 resulted	 in	 profound	changes	to	the	nature	of	America’s	involvement	in	Vietnam	and,	accordingly,	the	alliance.	 	 The	Tet	Offensive	 in	 January	 1968	 shook	America’s	 (and	Australia’s)	confidence	in	the	struggle	against	communism	in	Vietnam.		As	a	result,	American	President	Lyndon	Baines	Johnson,	who	had	enjoyed	a	close	working	relationship	with	Australian	Prime	Minister	Harold	Holt	in	1966	and	1967,	chose	not	to	run	for	a	second	term	as	President.		In	his	address	to	the	public	on	31	March	1968	Johnson	said	“so	tonight,	in	the	hope	that	this	action	will	lead	to	early	talks,	I	am	taking	the	first	step	to	de-escalate	the	conflict.		We	are	reducing	–	substantially	reducing	–	the	present	levels	of	hostilities.		And	we	are	doing	so	unilaterally	at	once”.34				This	shift	in	policy	was	made	without	any	genuine	consultation	with	Gorton	–	by	that	 time	 the	 prime	 minister	 -	 or	 the	 Australian	 government.	 	 Johnson	 was	replaced	by	Republican	candidate	Richard	Nixon,	who	became	President	on	20	January	 1969.	 	 Rather	 than	 aggressively	 pursuing	 the	war	 and	maintaining	 an	American	 presence	 in	 Vietnam,	 Nixon	moved	 immediately	 to	 seek	 ‘peace	with	honour’	and	introduced	the	policy	of	‘Vietnamisation’,	a	policy	that	would	see	the	South	 Vietnamese	 army	 take	 greater	 responsibility	 for	 the	 war	 against	communism	as	America	gradually	withdrew	 from	 the	 country	and	 the	 conflict.		The	‘Vietnamisation’	of	the	war	would	“enable	the	United	States	to	pull	its	combat	troops	 out	 of	 Vietnam	 by	 transferring	 responsibility	 for	 the	 war	 to	 the	 South	Vietnamese”.35				Alliance	dynamics	between	Australia	and	the	United	States	were	also	jolted	when	in	July	1969,	Nixon	announced	the	Guam	-	or	Nixon	–	doctrine,	an	announcement	that	signaled	the	United	States’	intention	never	again	to	become	involved	in	a	war																																																									34	Lyndon	Baines	Johnson,	quoted	in	Harpur,	War	Without	End,	op.	cit.,	p.	71.	35	Stanley	Karnow,	Vietnam:	A	History,	Penguin	Books,	New	York,	1983,	p.	593.	
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on	the	Asian	mainland.		As	Nixon	put	it	when	announcing	the	doctrine,	as	far	as	the	 problems	 of	 internal	 security	 and	 the	military	 defence	 of	 Southeast	 Asian	nations	was	concerned,	“except	for	the	threat	of	a	major	power	involving	nuclear	weapons,	the	United	States	is	going	to	encourage,	and	has	a	right	to	expect	that	the	problem	will	be	increasingly	handled	by,	and	the	responsibility	for	it	taken	by	the	Asian	 nations	 themselves.”36		 The	 Nixon	 doctrine	 had	 serious	 implications	 for	Australian	defence	policy,	which	had	 for	 so	 long	made	 its	 central	 tenet	 a	 close	relationship	with	 –	 and	 arguably	 dependence	 on	 –	America’s	 presence	 in	Asia.		Indeed,	“the	supreme	irony	of	Australia’s	dependence	on	the	United	States	became	fully	apparent	…	with	the	enunciation	of	the	Guam	Doctrine	in	July	1969	…	such	a	redefinition	 of	 strategy,	 however	 logical	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 United	States,	could	not	be	easily	absorbed	or	accommodated	by	a	junior	ally,	which	had	for	nearly	twenty	years	identified	communism,	and	particularly	Maoist	China,	as	the	principal	threat	to	Australian	security.”37				This	turned	the	basis	of	Australian	defence	policy	–	a	close	and	strong	relationship	with	the	United	States	–	on	its	head.	 	The	Australian	government	was	forced	to	reassess	the	meaning	of	the	alliance.	 	It	fell	on	Gorton,	in	this	context	of	change	and	uncertainty,	to	attempt	to	make	this	assessment.		Gorton	was	operating	in	a	world	 that	 was	 rapidly	 changing.	 	 The	 threat	 of	 a	 monolithic	 form	 of	 Asian	communism	 was	 becoming	 less	 relevant.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 Cold	 War	 world	 was	changing.		According	to	Norman	Harper,	“the	moves	for	disengagement	in	Vietnam	were	made	in	the	context	of	a	changing	global	balance	of	power;	the	replacement	of	a	two-superpower	balance	by	an	equilibrium	involving	China	and	Japan	as	well	as	 the	United	States	and	 the	Soviet	Union.	 	The	 cold	war	was	 thawing,	 and	 the	apparently	 monolithic	 Communist	 world	 began	 to	 disintegrate	 with	 the	confrontation	 between	 Moscow	 and	 Peking.”38 		 	 How	 did	 Gorton	 manage	 the	
																																																								36	Richard	Nixon,	quoted	in	Coral	Bell,	Dependent	Ally:	A	Study	in	Australian	
Foreign	Policy,	Oxford	University	Press,	Melbourne,	1988,	p.	105.	37	Joseph	Camilleri,	American-Australian	Relations:	The	Web	of	Dependence,	Macmillan,	Sydney,	1980,	pp.	15-16.	38	Norman	Harper,	A	Great	and	Powerful	Friend:	A	Study	of	Australian	American	
Relations	Between	1900	and	1975,	University	of	Queensland	Press,	St	Lucia,	1987,	p.	332.	
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challenges	 these	 changes	 in	 the	 geo-political	 situation	 posed	 to	 Australia’s	relationship	with	the	United	States?		The	significance	of	America’s	recalibration	of	its	Asia	policy	for	Australia	has	been	noted	by	historians	of	 the	American-Australian	alliance.	 	Those	historians	have	not,	however,	properly	taken	the	true	extent	to	which	Gorton’s	management	of	the	alliance	was	affected	by	it	into	account.		Indeed,	the	difficulties	Gorton	faced	have	not	been	fully	appreciated	by	historians	who	have	assessed	his	management	of	the	alliance.		Instead,	they	have	looked	at	Gorton	in	a	vacuum,	failing	to	take	the	challenging	 context	 in	which	he	was	operating	 into	account.	 	Most	works	have	referred	 to	his	 ideas	about	a	new,	more	self-reliant	defence	policy	only	briefly,	before	 moving	 on	 to	 the	 election	 of	 Gough	Whitlam	 in	 1972	 as	 the	 pivotal	 in	American-Australian	relations.		There	are	good	reasons	for	putting	Whitlam	as	the	harbinger	of	greater	self-reliance.		Gorton,	however	-	though	a	transitional	figure	grappling	with	old	and	new	worlds	-	remains	a	significant	subject	for	scholars	of	Australian	foreign	relations,	as	it	was	during	his	time	as	prime	minister	that	the	first	steps	towards	a	more	self-reliant	defence	policy	were	taken.		It	has	become	commonplace	for	scholars	to	breeze	quickly	past	the	Gorton	period.		Camilleri	stated	that	America	did	not	reciprocate	Australia’s	faithfulness	during	the	Vietnam	War	and	did	not	consult	with	Australia	during	the	troop	withdrawal,	and	 that	 Australia’s	 withdrawal	 from	 Vietnam	 was	 done	 with	 a	 “clumsy	 and	confused	 diplomatic	 subservience”	 to	 America.39 		 Camilleri	 then	 moved	 on	 to	discuss	 the	 Whitlam	 era	 as	 the	 period	 in	 which	 Australia’s	 relationship	 with	America	 changed.	 	 Neville	Meaney	 argued	 that	 Gorton	 had	 little	 choice	 but	 to	introduce	 a	 policy	 of	 withdrawal	 after	 America’s	 announced	 a	 policy	 of	withdrawal, 40 	as	 did	 TB	 Millar,	 who	 argued	 that	 Australia’s	 response	 to	 the	American	withdrawal	from	Vietnam	was	nothing	more	than	the	blind	adoption	of	American	policy	by	Australia.41		Similarly	to	Camilleri,	Millar	identified	Whitlam’s																																																									39	Camilleri,	American-Australian	Relations,	op.	cit.,	p.	12.	40	Neville	Meaney,	“The	United	States”,	in	Australia	in	World	Affairs	1971-1975	(edited	by	WJ	Hudson),	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	Sydney,	1980,	p.	165.	41	TB	Millar,	Australia	in	Peace	and	War:	External	Relations	1788-1977,	Australian	National	University	Press,	Canberra,	1978,	op.	cit.,	p.	218.	
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Labor	government	as	the	one	that	was	“catch	the	new	wave	of	détente”	after	the	Nixon	 Doctrine	 was	 announced,	 noting	 only	 that	 the	 Australian	 conservatives	were	“bewildered”.42		Certainly,	the	Liberal	party	was	unable	to	set	aside	its	core	assumptions	about	 the	world	at	 this	 time:	 it	was	not	an	easy	thing	to	do	when	circumstances	 were	 changing	 so	 quickly	 when	 for	 so	 long	 successive	 Liberal	government	had	regarded	reliance	on	America	as	the	cornerstone	of	its	defence	policy.			Philip	 Bell	 and	 Roger	Bell	 drew	 a	 similar	 conclusion:	 it	 was	 not	 any	 action	 of	Gorton	that	led	to	changes	in	Australian	foreign	policy;	rather,	it	was	the	result	of	a	 reluctant	 acceptance	 of	 changes	 in	 American	 policy.	 	 As	Bell	 and	 Bell	 put	 it,	“however	 reluctantly,	 as	 ANZUS	 came	 under	 unprecedented	 strain	 Australian	policy	did	acquire	a	degree	of	 independence.	 	 Indeed,	 after	America’s	defeat	 in	Vietnam	and	promulgation	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine,	Australia	grudgingly	accepted	that	it	must	take	greater	responsibility	for	its	own	defence”.43		Similarly,	though	Norman	 Harper	 recognised	 that	 “some”	 reassessment	 of	 Australian-American	relations	was	taking	place	when	he	became	prime	minister,	Gorton	“recognised	the	harsh	realities	of	any	alliance”	and	was	forced	to	accept	American	changes	in	policy	towards	Vietnam.44		Indeed,	for	Harper,	a	full	reassessment	of	the	alliance	only	“became	possible	when	the	ALP	won	its	first	federal	election	for	twenty-three	years	 on	 2	 December	 1972”.45		 Though	 these	 assessments	 are	 not	 necessarily	inaccurate,	they	fail	to	pay	any	really	attention	to	the	context	in	which	Gorton	was	operating,	 the	 problems	 he	 faced	 and	 any	 developments	 in	 Australian	 foreign	policy	that	did	occur	during	his	time	as	prime	minister.		
																																																								42	TB	Millar,	“Vietnam”,	in	Carl	Bridge	(eds),	Munich	to	Vietnam:	Australia’s	
Relations	with	Britain	and	the	United	States	since	the	1930s,	Melbourne	University	Press,	Melbourne,	1991,	p.	192.	43	Philip	Bell	and	Roger	Bell,	Implicated:	The	United	States	in	Australia,	Oxford	University	Press,	Melbourne,	1993,	p.	153.	44	Norman	Harper,	“Australia	and	the	United	States”,	in	Australia	in	World	Affairs,	
1966-1970,	edited	by	Gordon	Greenwood	and	Norman	Harper,	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	Vancouver,	1974,	pp.	316-317.	45	Harper,	A	Great	and	Powerful	Friend,	op	cit.,	p.	335.	
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For	Meaney,	Millar	and	Harper,	then,	Gorton	had	no	choice	but	to	adopt	a	more	self-reliant	approach	to	Australia’s	defence	policy	after	1968.		For	Millar,	Gorton	did	not	even	warrant	a	mention;	rather,	all	that	needed	to	be	said	about	Australia’s	response	to	the	American	withdrawal	from	Southeast	Asia	was	that	“Australia	was	not	quick	to	see	the	nature	or	implications	of	these	changes”.46		Millar	had	it	that	Australia	simply	had	no	choice	but	to	adopt	a	more	self-reliant	approach	to	the	alliance:	 “with	 neither	 of	 her	 ‘powerful	 and	 willing	 friends’	 willing	 to	 deploy	power	 in	 her	 Asian	 neighbourhood,	 Australia	 eventually	 saw	 that	 it	 had	 no	alternative	 to	adopting	a	 similar	policy.”47		 Indeed,	Gerard	Henderson	and	Paul	Hasluck	criticised	Gorton	for	 lacking	any	central	policy	direction.	 	According	to	Henderson,	“the	Gorton	government’s	central	foreign	policy	problem	was	that	it	did	not	have	an	unequivocal	position.		As	prime	minister,	John	Gorton	was	not	sure	whether	Australian	 forces	should	remain	 in	Vietnam	or	be	withdrawn.”48		 	And	Hasluck,	writing	 in	1970,	did	not	 think	Gorton	could	be	a	great	prime	minister	because	“he	seems	to	be	lacking	a	clear	purpose.”49		There	is	a	measure	of	truth	to	these	observations.	 	However,	it	is	in	the	transition	that	we	can	divine	a	deeper	significance	of	the	period	and	of	Gorton:	though	he	may	not	have	been	the	prime	minister	to	break	with	the	past	and	usher	in	a	new	period	of	Australian	foreign	policy,	Australia	had	to	go	through	this	sorting	process	under	Gorton	before	the	Whitlamite	revolution	could	take	place.		There	 is	 nothing	 fundamentally	 wrong	 with	 the	 assessments	 made	 by	 these	historians.	 	However,	 they	haven’t	spent	much	time	discussing	Gorton	the	man	and	the	context	in	which	he	was	operating,	which	is	necessary	to	come	to	a	more	complete	understanding	of	his	management	of	the	American-Australian	alliance.		This	 is	precisely	what	 this	 thesis	seeks	to	do.	 	The	purpose	of	 this	thesis	 is	not	necessarily	 to	 ‘set	 straight’	 those	who	see	Gorton	 as	 a	 ditherer;	 rather,	 it	 is	 to	
																																																								46	Millar,	Australia	in	Peace	and	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	218.	47	Ibid.	48	Gerard	Henderson,	“Sir	John	Grey	Gorton”,	in	Australian	Prime	Ministers,	Michelle	Grattan	(eds),	New	Holland	Publishers	(Australia)	Pty	Ltd,	Sydney,	2000,	p.	310.	49	Paul	Hasluck,	The	Chance	of	Politics,	The	Text	Publishing	Company,	Melbourne,	1997,	p.	179.	
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understand	 the	 impact	 these	 profoundly	 unsettling	 circumstances	 had	 on	 his	management	 of	 the	 alliance	 and,	 in	 doing	 so,	 come	 to	 a	 more	 complete	understanding	of	how	he	went	about	trying	to	understand,	resolve	and	reconcile	them.		Some	historians	have	paid	more	attention	to	Gorton’s	management	of	the	alliance.		According	 to	 Peter	 Edwards,	 Gorton	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 problems	 he	 faced	 in	relation	to	reliance	on	America	for	Australia’s	national	security	–	he	realised	there	was	a	need	for	a	strategic	rethink.		He	may	not	have	had	the	political	tools	to	carry	out	such	a	rethink,	but	he	certainly	recognised	the	need	for	one.	 	For	Edwards,	Gorton’s	 prime	ministership	was	 characterised	 by	 uncertainty	 due	 to	 his	 own	background	 and	 beliefs,	 his	 lack	 of	 political	 skill	 and	 authority	 and	 the	 lack	 of	support	from	his	colleagues.		As	Edwards	had	it,	“Gorton	could	see	the	weaknesses	in	the	current	policies	but	did	not	have	the	political	authority	or	skill	to	chart	a	new	 course	 with	 the	 support	 of	 his	 colleagues.	 	 Uncertainty	 would	 remain	 a	principle	 characteristic	 of	 the	 Australian	 government’s	 policy	 for	 the	 next	 five	years”.50			Edwards	 recognised	 the	difficulties	he	 faced,	 stating	 that	Gorton	 suffered	 from	“policy	paralysis”	and	felt	trapped	by	the	nature	of	the	commitment	of	troops	to	Vietnam	 by	 Menzies	 and	 Holt,	 and	 that	 he	 found	 it	 impossible	 to	 disentangle	Australia	 from	 Vietnam	 “because	 of	 the	 incautious	 way	 in	 which	 the	 initial	commitments	 had	 been	 made	 and	 escalated	 under	 the	 Menzies	 and	 Holt	governments”. 51 		 Gorton	 tried	 to	 maintain	 a	 balance	 between	 making	 a	commitment	to	the	alliance	while	at	the	same	time	fostering	a	sense	of	Australian	independence:	“Gorton	faced	a	profound	dilemma	over	Vietnam	policy,	created	to	a	large	extent	by	the	open-ended	way	in	which	Menzies	and	Holt	had	handled	the	commitment	and	its	escalation.”		For	Edwards,	Gorton	wanted	to	find	a	way	out	of	the	commitment	but	without	damaging	the	alliance	relationship	with	the	United	States.52																																																											50	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	196.	51	Ibid.,	p.	286.	52	Ibid.,	p.	19.	
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	Along	with	Edwards,	Coral	Bell,	Glen	St	J	Barclay,	James	Curran,	Stuart	Ward	and	Gorton’s	biographers	Ian	Hancock	and	Alan	Trengrove53	are	the	few	who	seem	to	have	 taken	 Gorton’s	 management	 of	 the	 alliance	 seriously.	 	 Bell	 has,	 to	 date,	provided	the	most	detailed	analysis	of	Gorton’s	management	of	the	alliance	(even	if	done	so	without	access	to	the	archival	record).		Rather	than	passing	Gorton	off	as	a	ditherer,	Bell	took	the	impact	of	his	background	and	political	circumstances	in	his	management	of	the	alliance	into	account.		Gorton’s	experience	as	a	fighter-pilot	in	World	War	Two	who	narrowly	escaped	Japanese	capture	in	Singapore	may	have	led	to	his	“apparent	ambivalence	about	the	notion	of	‘forward	defence.’”		Bell	also	made	mention	of	Gorton’s	promotion	of	‘continental	defence’,	an	alternative	to	 forward	 defence	 that	 proposed	 that	 Australian	 forces	 should	 be	 trained,	equipped,	and	deployed	primarily	 to	 fend	off	 threats	 to	Australia’s	own	shores,	and	should	expect	to	operate	chiefly	from	Australian	bases	rather	than	abroad.	54					Bell	also	cited	Gorton’s	own	political	background	and	rise	to	power.		Having	never	held	any	of	the	principal	Cabinet	portfolios	and	being	appointed	prime	minister	directly	from	the	Senate,	Gorton	did	not	enjoy	party	dominance,	either	within	the	Cabinet	or	within	the	party.55		She	also	appreciated	the	difficult	situation	in	which	Gorton	was	 placed	 after	 President	 Johnson’s	 decision	 to	 not	 again	 contest	 the	presidency,	 creating	 a	 period	 in	 which	 Australia	 would	 have	 to	 wait	 “for	 the	incumbent	and	whatever	he	could	produce	in	the	way	of	a	revised	US	diplomatic	and	military	strategy.”		Indeed,	“policymakers	in	Canberra	could	do	nothing	about	
																																																								53	One	other	biography	has	been	written	on	Gorton:	Alan	Reid’s	The	Gorton	
Experiment	(Shakespeare	Head	Press,	Sydney,	1971).		While	it	provides	a	running	account	of	the	day-to-day	domestic	events	of	his	time	as	prime	minister	and	recognises	that	Gorton	inherited	a	changing	world	(“the	world	Menzies	and	Holt	had	lived	in	politically	was	not	the	word	with	which	Gorton	had	to	contend	as	Prime	Minister,”	p.	141),	it	provides	no	sustained	historical	analysis	of	his	management	of	the	American	alliance,	beyond	stating	that	it	was	Gorton	who,	on	2	February	1968,	ruled	out	further	Australian	troop	commitments	to	Vietnam	(p.	332),	he	preferred	a	policy	of	continental	as	opposed	to	forward	defence	(p.	190),	and	that	Gorton’s	working	knowledge	of	the	applicability	of	ANZUS	left	much	to	be	desired	(p.	57).	54	Bell,	Dependent	Ally,	op.	cit.,	p.	94.	55	Ibid.,	p.	96.	
	 22	
this	except	put	as	good	a	face	on	it	as	they	could	manage	…		It	was	hardly	surprising	that	they	did	not	manage	anything	very	gracefully	or	convincingly.”56		It	was	also	simple	lack	of	consultation	and	failure	on	the	part	of	America	to	provide	him	with	adequate	 warning	 of	 departures	 on	 policy	 that	 led	 to	 Gorton’s	 dilemma.	 	 For	example,	Gorton	heard	of	Johnson’s	March	turnabout	on	a	Sunday	afternoon	only	hours	 before	 the	 announcement.	 	 Barclay	 also	 acknowledged	 the	 trying	circumstances	of	Gorton’s	time	as	prime	minister,	stating	that	“it	was	not	a	good	time	to	become	prime	minister	of	Australia	and	leader	of	the	Liberal	Party,”57	and	that	Gorton	“seemed	to	be	contemplating	the	total	breakdown	of	the	Australian-American	security	relationship.”58		In	analysing	American-Australian	relations	through	the	lens	of	new	nationalism,	Curran	and	Ward	appreciated	the	difficulties	facing	Gorton	and	endeavoured	to	give	 reasons	 for	 the	 dither,	 rather	 than	 simply	 criticising	 Gorton	 for	 it. 59	Recognising	 that	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 Nixon	 doctrine	 “only	 intensified	Australian	anxieties”	about	America’s	willingness	to	protect	Australia,	Curran	and	Ward	noted	how	 the	new	nationalist	Gorton	put	 the	 impact	of	 the	doctrine	on	Australia	 bluntly:	 Gorton	 stated	 that	 “America	 is	 going	 to	 be	 less	 and	 less	interested	in	this	part	of	the	world	…		We	need	to	be	able	to	defend	ourselves.”60		For	 Curran	 and	 Ward,	 “a	 new	 perspective	 was	 shaping	 the	 American	 policy	prescriptions	for	dealing	with	a	more	assertive,	yet	more	insecure,	Australia.”61		Being	more	assertive	yet	more	 insecure	was	 the	 result	of	Gorton	being	 caught	between	 two	competing	 interests	–	 that	of	self-reliance	on	 the	one	hand	and	a	legacy	 of	 dependence	 on	 American	 assistance	 which	 for	 decades	 had	 not	necessarily	been	forthcoming.		
																																																								56	Ibid.,	pp.	101-102.	57	Glen	St	J	Barclay,	Friends	in	High	Places,	Australian-American	diplomatic	
relations	since	1945,	Oxford	University	Press,	London,	1985,	p.	163.	58	Ibid.,	pp.	165-166.	59		Curran	and	Ward,	The	Unknown	Nation,	op.	cit.,	pp.	143-146.	60	John	Gorton,	quoted	in	Ibid.,	p.	145.	61	Ibid.,	p.	145	
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Ian	Hancock	 also	understood	 that	Gorton	had	 inherited	a	difficult	political	 and	diplomatic	 situation	 after	 the	 Tet	 Offensive	 and	 that	 he	 found	 himself	 “caught	between	 competing	 interests	 and	 pressures.”62		Whereas	most	 historians	 have	focused	on	 the	 idea	 that	 “contradictions	and	 inconsistencies	assailed	his	policy	pronouncements,”63	Hancock	 explained	 this	 by	 acknowledging	 the	 fact	 that	 he	found	 himself	 in	 “a	 situation	 where	 he	 was	 obliged	 to	 pull	 in	 different	directions”.64	Like	Bell,	Hancock	acknowledged	that	Gorton	“inherited	obligations	that	ran	counter	to	his	instincts”,	and	that,	due	to	the	pressures	of	his	own	party	and	the	DLP	he	was	forced	to	try	to	“reconcile	the	irreconcilable.”65		It	was	this	that	 led	 to	 Gorton	 being	 criticised	 for	 “failing	 to	 develop	 an	 unequivocal	 and	decisive	approach	to	defence	and	foreign	policy.”66		Hancock	also	acknowledged	the	fluidity	and	complexity	of	the	period	in	which	Gorton	was	operating.		Whereas	“Menzies	and	Holt	had	seemed	so	much	easier	to	understand,”	for	journalists	of	the	day,	Gorton,	on	account	of	his	attempts	to	adapt	to	the	changes	taking	place,	was	difficult	to	pin	down.67		According	to	Hancock,	Gorton’s	actions	and	pronouncements	need	to	be	assessed	separately	and	individually,	a	task	that	this	thesis	takes	on	with	relish.		Only	then	will	 it	 be	 understood	 that,	 rather	 than	 being	 inconsistent	 and	 unpredictable,	Gorton	 “behaved	 predictably	 in	 individual	 situations,	 even	 if	 he	 appeared	inconsistent	 across	 them	 collectively.”68 		 For	 example,	 Hancock	 demonstrated	how,	 in	his	dealings	with	America,	Gorton	oscillated	between	playing	the	“ally”	who	 supported	 the	 United	 States	 in	 accordance	 with	 ANZUS	 (and	 sought	assurances	of	reciprocation	by	America	as	well	as	being	furious	when	Australia	was	 not	 consulted	 before	 America	 announced	 important	 policy	 decisions	 in	relation	to	Vietnam),	and	the	“nationalist”	who	sought	to	do	so	without	intruding																																																									62	Ian	Hancock,	John	Gorton,	He	Did	It	His	Way,	Hodder	Headline	Australia	Pty	Limited,	Sydney,	2002,	p.	180.	63	Paul	Ham,	Vietnam,	The	Australian	War,	Harper	Collins	Publishers,	Sydney,	2007,	p.	436.	64	Hancock,	John	Gorton,	op.	cit.,	p.	180.	65	Ibid.,	pp.	156-157.	66	Ibid.,	p.	157.	67	Ibid.,	pp.	199-200.	68	Ibid.,	p.	180.	
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on	Australia’s	own	foreign	and	defence	policy	decisions	(declaring	in	a	perhaps	drunken	moment	 to	Geraldine	Willesee,	 the	daughter	of	 Senator	Don	Willesee,	that	he	wanted	to	withdraw	Australian	troops	from	Vietnam	but	was	prevented	by	 party	 policy	 from	doing	 so).69		 	 “A	 nationalist	 above	 all	 else,”70	Gorton	was	keeping	his	options	open	so	as	to	be	able	to	further	Australian	interests,	a	position	which,	given	the	uncertainty	about	the	post-Vietnam	period	in	Asia,	“made	a	great	deal	of	sense.”71					Journalist	 Alan	 Trengrove	 provided	 the	 most	 positive	 assessment	 of	 Gorton,	regarding	him	as	a	man	who	“had	no	intention	of	accepting	the	shibboleths	of	the	past,”72	and	a	leader	who	was	trying	to	keep	his	options	open	in	uncertain	times.		According	 to	 Trengrove,	 Gorton	 took	 a	 more	 balanced	 approach	 to	 what	Australian	defence	policy	would	look	like	in	the	1970s:	rather	than	simply	relying	on	the	principle	of	forward	defence	and	reliance	on	superpower	allies,	“the	trend	of	Gorton’s	 thinking	seemed	 to	be	 that	Australia	 should	hasten	 to	build	up	her	industrial	and	technological	strength	while	trying	for	as	long	as	possible	to	keep	the	Americans	committed	to	defend	the	country.”73		Thus,	Gorton	did	not	oscillate	between	an	independent	Australia	on	the	one	hand	and	a	subservient	ally	on	the	other;	rather,	Gorton	was	trying	to	balance	the	two	options,	as	both	seemed	to	be	in	 Australia’s	 national	 interests.	 	 As	 Trengrove	 put	 it,	 “in	 effect,	 he	 staged	 a	delaying	action	in	1968	in	an	endeavor	to	keep	his	options	open.		His	attitude	was	that	it	would	be	wiser	to	defer	coming	to	any	firm	conclusions	until	the	situation	was	clearer.”74		Though	Edwards,	Bell,	 Curran,	Ward,	Hancock	 and	Trengrove	 have	 gone	 some	way	in	setting	Gorton’s	management	of	the	American	alliance	within	its	historical	context	and	explaining	the	reasons	for	the	‘dither’,	more	work	needs	to	be	done	to	
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ensure	his	management	of	American-Australian	relations	in	the	period	is	properly	understood.		This	will	be	the	first	study	dedicated	to	doing	this.		The	fact	that	so	many	historians	have	passed	over	Gorton	has	created	a	gap	in	our	understanding	of	how	Australia	managed	its	alliance	with	America	during	the	Cold	War	and	took	its	 first	 steps	 towards	 a	 self-reliant	 foreign	 and	 defence	 policy.	 	 It	 has	 also	reinforced	 the	 tendency	 of	 historians	 to	 view	 Australian	 history	 in	 somewhat	simplistic	‘chunks’,	such	as	the	‘Menzies	era’	or	‘Whitlam	era’.		This	work	aims	at	creating	 a	 more	 multi-dimensional	 and	 less	 fragmented	 picture	 of	 Australian	history	from	1966	to	1972	than	we	currently	have.		It	is	important	to	develop	a	better	understanding	of	the	period	between	these	two	prime	ministers,	especially	considering	that	this	was,	as	Horne	had	put	it,	the	time	of	critical	change.				Accordingly,	the	question	remains:	to	what	extent	did	changing	American	policy	in	Vietnam	undermine	long-held	assumptions	about	the	American	alliance?		It	will	be	 argued	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 that	 to	 properly	 understand	 Gorton’s	management	 of	 the	 alliance	 during	 this	 period,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 properly	understand	the	broader	context	within	which	he	was	operating.		To	do	this	it	is	necessary	to	review	Australian	foreign	policy	goals	and	concerns	in	Southeast	Asia	in	the	two	decades	proceeding	the	signing	of	ANZUS.		 Australian	foreign	policy:	goals	and	concerns	in	Southeast	Asia,	1951-1965		The	Anglo-Australian	defence	relationship	in	Southeast	Asia	remained	extremely	close	 well	 into	 the	 1950s.	 	 The	 standardisation	 of	 equipment	 and	 military	procedures,	for	example,	between	Australia	and	Britain	remained	in	effect	until	the	late	1950s	and	the	Anglo	New	Zealand	Malaya	Australia	Agreement	provided	the	 framework	 for	 defence	 cooperation	 between	 Australia,	 New	 Zealand	 and	Britain.	 	In	1955	Australian	troops	began	joint	operations	with	British	and	New	Zealand	 troops	 in	Malaya,	operations	 that	provided	 the	Australian	government	with	some	comfort.		Not	only	was	Britain	engaged	in	Asia,	but	it	was	also	working	towards	preserving	a	British	territory	against	communist	expansion.		According	to	 David	 Goldsworthy,	 these	 arrangements	 served	 “both	 to	 help	 subdue	subversion	in	a	British	dependent	territory	and	give	substance	to	the	Australian	
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security	doctrine	of	forward	defence.”75		The	three	Commonwealth	nations	hoped	that	America	could	be	linked	to	their	defence	planning,	however,	as	Edwards	put	it,	quadripartite	planning	became	“a	holy	grail	for	Australian	policy-makers	for	the	next	decade.”76		Though	the	signing	of	the	Australia	New	Zealand	United	States	Treaty	(ANZUS)	in	1951	served	to	provide	Australia	with	the	support	of	another	powerful	ally	in	Asia,	the	problem	for	Australia	was	that,	as	Goldsworthy	put	it,	“British	and	American	strategic	 plans	 for	 Southeast	 Asia	 were	 diverging.”77		 Rather	 than	 having	 two	superpowers	engaged	in	Southeast	Asia	with	a	common	objective	that	benefitted	Australian	defence	interests,	American	strategy	envisioned	the	greater	part	of	the	Southeast	 Asian	 region,	 whereas	 the	 British	 “were	 determined	 to	 commit	resources	 only	 to	 the	 defence	 of	 their	 own	 colonial	 territories.”78 		 When	 the	Menzies	government	learned	in	July	1955	that	Washington	would	not	tolerate	a	line	 of	 thinking	 that	 committed	 ground	 forces	 to	 the	 internal	 defence	 of	 one	country,	namely	Malaya,	as	opposed	to	one	that	saw	the	development	of	a	mobile	striking	power	that	could	serve	to	defend	Southeast	Asia	as	a	whole,	Canberra	was	warned	that	Australia	would	be	“unlikely	to	receive	American	military	aid	unless	it	tailored	its	Southeast	Asian	strategy	to	America’s.”79		In	 fact,	 the	 Menzies	 government	 had	 already	 started	 thinking	 about	 how	 to	strengthen	 its	 relationship	with	America.	 	 Indeed,	 this	was	well	understood	by	Washington.	 	 In	April	1950	the	US	State	Department	recorded	that,	 though	the	previous	 Labor	 government	 “tended	 to	 neglect	 United	 States	 –	 Australian	relations,	or	 in	 any	 case,	 subordinate	 them	 to	 a	 foreign	 policy	which	 found	 its	primary	 expression	 in	 the	 United	 Nations”,	 the	 government	 of	 Prime	Minister	Menzies	made	 “the	 achievement	 of	 close	 relations	with	 the	 United	 States	 as	 a	cardinal	point	of	Australian	foreign	policy.		Leading	members	of	the	government	have	 repeatedly	 stated	 that	 it	 is	 essential	 for	 Australia	 to	 maintain	 the	 best																																																									75	Goldsworthy,	Losing	the	Blanket,	op.	cit.,	p.	140.	76	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	53.	77	Goldsworthy,	Losing	the	Blanket,	op.	cit.,	p.	140.	78	Ibid.	79	Ibid.	
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possible	relations	with	the	United	States	and,	in	so	far	as	possible,	to	initiate	and	carry	out	Pacific	policies	in	co-operation	with	the	country”.80		Though	Washington	may	 have	 underestimated	 the	 desire	 of	 previous	 Australian	 governments	 to	develop	a	strong	relationship	with	America,	it	certainly	did	appreciate	the	Menzies	government’s	desire	to	do	this.		According	to	Goldsworthy,	given	that	Australia’s	military	 planners	 were	 already	 moving	 to	 the	 view	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	American	 approach	 would	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 develop	 the	 depth	 of	 Australia’s	defence	and	more	likely	to	generate	support	if	Australia	came	under	direct	threat,	Canberra	made	 its	 choice	and,	 “by	degrees	between	mid-1955	and	early	1957,	Australia	turned	towards	the	United	States	for	its	major	strategic	alliance	in	the	region.”81		Though	Anglo-Australian	 defence	 co-operation	was	 arguably	 at	 its	 peak	 in	 the	mid-1950s,	the	tempo	of	Britain’s	decolonisation	in	Asia	increased	from	July	1955	onward,	a	fact	that	served	to	encourage	Australia’s	decision	to	turn	towards	the	United	States.	 	Britain’s	“now	manifest	plan”	 to	push	for	“quick	decolonisation”	and	 to	 conclude	 a	 new	defence	 agreement	with	 an	 independent	Malaya	was	 a	cause	for	concern	for	the	Australian	government.82		Also,	Britain’s	move	towards	a	more	 nuclear-based	 defence	 strategy	 gave	 rise	 to	 Australian	 concerns	 about	possible	cutbacks	 in	British	conventional	 forces	 in	 the	region	east	of	Suez.	 	For	Goldsworthy,	 “these	 fears	helped	to	reinforce	the	movement	 in	Australia’s	own	policy	towards	strategic	association	with	the	United	States.”83		As	Donald	Horne	put	 it,	 as	 a	 strong	 relationship	 with	 the	 United	 States	 became	 arguably	 more	important	 than	 a	 strong	 relationship	 with	 Britain	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 Australian	diplomats,	“a	new	rhetoric	of	‘alliance’	was	developed	to	sustain	the	new	faith”.84			As	Menzies	would	 later	 say	of	ANZUS	 in	1964,	 it	was	a	 contract	based	on	 “the	
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utmost	goodwill,	the	utmost	good	faith	and	unqualified	friendship.		Each	of	us	will	stand	by	it.”85		Though	 the	 new	 rhetoric	of	 alliance	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	1950s	 and	1960s,	America	had	presented	itself	as	Australia’s	logical	ally	since	the	half-way	point	of	the	Second	World	War:	as	Percy	Spender	observed	in	1969,	after	the	collapse	of	Malaya,	Burma,	Singapore	and	Indonesia	 in	1942,	 the	 Japanese	conquest	of	 the	Philippines	 and	 their	 penetration	of	New	Guinea,	 Australians	 realised	 the	 true	nature	of	their	isolation	and	vulnerability,	and	that	“the	destiny	of	their	country	was	intertwined	with	that	of	the	U.S.A.”86		Though	the	ties	that	bound	Australia	to	Britain	were	“deep”	and	“profound”	and	would	remain	“close,”	it	was	clear	that	“the	future	security	of	Australia	was	not	only	bound	up	with	world	security;	it	was	dependent	 upon	 a	 close	 defence	 arrangement	 to	 which	 both	 the	 U.S.A.	 and	Australia	were	parties.”87				Even	the	Anglophile	Menzies	appreciated	the	need	to	develop	relations	with	the	United	States.	 	After	stating	on	20	April	1955	that	there	was	“no	country	in	the	world	more	completely	British	than	Australia”,	and	that	“we	are	a	proud	member	of	a	Crown	Commonwealth,	and	will	ever	continue	to	be	so,”		he	then	went	on	to	claim	 that,	 given	 the	 United	 States	 had	 become	 a	 global	 power	 with	 a	 vast	population	and	supreme	industrial	power,	and	had	become	“vital	to	the	existence	of	 the	 free	world”,	 it	would	 be	 strange	 if	 “we,	 the	British	 people,	 regarded	 the	citizens	of	the	United	States	as	being	in	a	true	sense	foreigners.”88		Indeed,	Menzies	appreciated	 the	 geo-political	 shift	 taking	 place:	 “it	 would	 be	 hard	 to	 find	 any	Australian	of	 this	generation	who	did	not	recognise	that	 the	 friendship	and	co-operation	of	the	United	States	are	vital	to	our	own	safety.”89		
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Despite	 his	 sentimental	 connection	 to	 the	 British	 Empire,	 Menzies	 took	 a	pragmatic	 approach	 to	 Australian	 defence	 policy	 and	 in	 1959	 advocated	 the	American	alliance	as	the	foundation	for	a	new	defence	programme.		According	to	Menzies,	it	was	clear	that	“in	the	event	of	war	we	will	be	fighting	side	by	side	with	the	United	States.		Particularly	in	the	event	of	a	‘global’	war,	it	would	be	manifestly	difficult	for	the	United	Kingdom	to	maintain	a	line	of	supply,	in	South-East	Asia,	though	the	United	States	undoubtedly	could.		Common	sense	dictates	that	under	these	circumstances,	we	should	pay	considerable	attention	to	the	logistic	aspect	of	war,	and	standardise	so	 far	as	we	can	with	the	Americans.	 	Though	this	 is	a	wholeheartedly	British	nation	this	is	not	a	heresy.		It	merely	recognises	the	facts	of	war”.90		The	 fostering	of	 a	 close	relationship	with	America	under	 the	ANZUS	Treaty	was	clearly	the	primary	concern	of	the	Australian	government.		Indeed,	the	Australian	government’s	response	to	the	Laotian	crises	between	1959	and	1962	demonstrated	Australia’s	increasing	shift	towards	America.		With	Laos	becoming	a	proxy	war	between	Hanoi	and	Washington	in	the	1950s,	Presidents	Eisenhower	and	Kennedy	moved	to	strengthen	the	Royal	Lao	government	and	its	army	 as	 it	 fought	 for	 control	 of	 the	 country	 against	 the	 communist	 supported	Pathet	 Lao.	 	 While	 France	 had	 no	 desire	 to	 return	 to	 Indochina	 after	 the	humiliation	 of	 Dien	 Bien	 Phu	 and	 the	 First	 Indochina	 War,	 Britain	 sought	diplomatic	rather	than	military	solution	to	crises	in	Indochina,	citing	its	role	as	co-chairman	 of	 the	 Geneva	 Conference	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 not	 becoming	 involved	 in	military	 planning. 91 		 Regarding	 the	 fate	 of	 Laos	 as	 being	 directly	 linked	 to	Australia’s	 security	 interests,	 the	Australian	Cabinet	decided	on	 three	 separate	occasions	between	1959	and	1961	that	it	would	be	willing	to	support	an	American	intervention	 there.	 	 Though	 Cabinet	 preferred	 that	 any	 intervention	 should	include	Britain,	it	decided	that	it	would	be	willing	to	act	alongside	America	even	if	that	 condition	 could	 not	 be	met.92		 Though	 the	 decision	 to	 support	 the	United	States	never	had	to	be	implemented,	Australia’s	preparedness	to	do	so	“reinforced	
																																																								90	Robert	Menzies,	quoted	in	ibid.	91	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	70.	92	Ibid.,	pp.	70-71.	
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the	lesson	that	Australia	had	become	much	closer	to	the	United	States	than	Britain	on	policy	towards	Southeast	Asia”.93		
Australian	security:	looking	to	America	and	ANZUS		Though	ANZUS	was	signed	while	Menzies	was	 in	power,	 it	did	not	 represent	a	purely	 Menzian	 desire	 to	 commit	 America	 to	 Australia’s	 defence.	 	 Indeed,	 as	McLean	stated,	the	creation	of	ANZUS	should	not	be	interpreted	simply	in	the	light	of	Australian	preoccupations	in	1950	and	1951,	but	rather,	“ANZUS	represented	the	realization	of	long-standing	hopes	by	Australian	political	leaders	of	drawing	the	United	States	into	Australia’s	defence,”94	including	Deakin,	Lyons,	Chifley	and	Evatt.		Indeed,	Meaney	has	shown	that	concerns	for	Australia’s	regional	security	played	a	key	role	during	Chifley’s	time	as	prime	minister:	“the	Chifley	government,	though	it	made	adherence	to	the	United	Nations	the	first	principle	of	their	foreign	policy,	 made	 the	 protection	 of	 Australia	 …	 the	 chief	 objective	 of	 their	 foreign	policy.”95		This	objective	was	seen	to	be	ultimately	dependent	on	“the	support	of	the	Western	super-power,	the	United	States”.96		Though	the	wisdom	on	ANZUS	since	the	time	of	 its	signing	until	 the	1980s	had	been	 that	 a	 reluctant	United	 States	 had	 been	 drawn	 into	 signing	 the	 treaty	 by	effective	 negotiation	 and	 diplomacy	 by	 Minister	 for	 External	 Affairs	 Percy	Spender,	David	McLean	has	shown	that	this	is	not	necessarily	correct.97		In	fact,	pointing	to	events	that	occurred	in	the	period	1949-1950	such	as	the	Communist	victory	in	China,	the	Berlin	blockade,	Russia’s	acquisition	of	atomic	weapons	and	the	outbreak	of	the	Korean	War,	McLean	demonstrated	that	America	was	in	fact	enthusiastic	 about	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 Pacific	 alliance. 98 		 However,	 ANZUS	 still																																																									93	Ibid.,	p.	70.	94	McLean	“From	British	Colony”,	op.	cit.,	p.	68.	95	Neville	Meaney,	“Australia,	the	Great	Powers	and	the	Coming	of	the	Cold	War”,	
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created	an	alliance	the	true	extent	of	which	was	uncertain.		For	McLean,	this	was	the	result	not	of	any	reluctance	on	America’s	part,	but	Spender’s	preconceptions.		According	 to	 McLean,	 the	 fact	 that	 Spender	 and	 his	 colleagues	 “assumed	 an	American	 reluctance	 to	 entertain	 any	 form	of	 Pacific	 alliance	 says	more	 about	Australian	 preconceptions	 than	 American	 predilections.” 99 		 Indeed,	 Spender’s	assumption	that	the	United	States	would	be	reluctant	to	enter	into	a	defence	treaty	was	the	product	of	a	mistrust	of	the	great	powers	that	was	rooted	in	the	1930s	and	 1940s,	 when	 London	 and	 Washington	 had	 repeatedly	 “failed	 to	 consult	Canberra	 on	 decisions	 which	 crucially	 affected	 Australia,	 involving	 the	deployment	and	command	of	Australian	forces	and	the	post-war	settlement.”100		Assumptions	of	American	reluctance	reflected	“not	only	the	frustrating	record	of	Australian	attempts	to	gain	an	American	security	guarantee	but,	more	broadly,	the	whole	experience	of	 relations	with	 its	 great-power	protectors,	both	 the	United	States	and	Britain.”101		As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 assumptions,	 ANZUS	 had	 limitations	 from	 the	 outset	 that	would	prove	to	have	a	major	impact	on	American-Australian	relations	from	1951	to	 1972	 and	 beyond.	 	 Certainly,	 concessions	 were	 made	 by	 Australia	 in	 the	negotiation	of	 the	 treaty,	 for	example,	on	 the	question	of	 alliance	membership.		Canberra	 would	 not	 brook	 either	 Philippines	 or	 Indonesian	 membership,	 for	example.	 	 Also,	 in	 order	 to	 persuade	 Washington	 that	 Australia	 would	 be	 a	valuable	ally,	Australia	sent	troops	to	Korea	and	followed	the	American	policy	of	non-recognition	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	and	opposition	to	its	admission	to	the	United	Nations	Organisation.102		Accordingly,	so	went	Australian	diplomatic	thinking	after	1951:			
																																																								99	Ibid.,	p.	69.	100	Ibid.,	p.	75.		Other	factors	McLean	refers	to	are	America’s	failure	to	consult	during	the	Korean	War,	American	collusion	with	Japan	at	Australia’s	expense,	Anglo-American	failure	to	include	Australia	in	talks	on	the	future	of	Dutch	New	Guinea,	defence	talks	in	Southeast	Asia	and	defence	planning	for	the	Middle	East.		101	Ibid.,	p.	74.	102	Ibid.,	pp.	80-81.	
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if	Australia	had	to	make	concessions	in	order	to	create	ANZUS,	would	it	
not	 be	 just	 as	 necessary,	 after	 the	 alliance	 had	 been	 established,	 for	
Australia	to	continue	to	do	so	in	the	hope	of	gaining	American	support	
for	Australian	policies?		And	would	not	these	concessions	in	themselves	
jeopardise	 the	 distinctive	 Australian	 interests	 that	 the	 alliance	 was	
designed	to	protect?103		For	 post-war	 Australian	 governments	 then,	 confirming	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	America’s	obligations	under	ANZUS	was	 fraught	with	difficulty,	 frustration	and	anguish.		Indeed,	Article	IV	of	the	ANZUS	Treaty	was	somewhat	ambiguous.		While	it	stated	“Each	Party	recognises	that	an	armed	attack	in	the	Pacific	Area	on	any	of	the	Parties	would	be	dangerous	to	its	own	peace	and	safety	and	declares	that	it	would	 act	 to	 meet	 the	 common	 danger	 in	 accordance	 with	 its	 constitutional	processes”, 104 	what	 acting	 to	 meet	 the	 common	 danger	 exactly	 meant	 was	ambiguous.		As	Toohey	and	Pinwill	wrote,	ANZUS	“committed	none	of	the	three	partners	to	the	military	defence	of	the	others,	and	even	the	definition	of	the	area	it	covered	became	a	subject	of	argument	between	Canberra	and	Washington.”105		Therefore,	 due	 chiefly	 to	 the	 treaty’s	 ambiguity	 and	Australian	 preconceptions	about	America’s	willingness	to	act	in	Australia’s	best	interests,	ANZUS	created	an	environment	in	which	successive	Australian	governments	would	feel	the	need	to	ensure	circumstances	existed	whereby	America	would	believe	it	to	be	in	its	best	interests	 to	 assist	 Australia.	 	 Although	 Australian	 leaders	 saw	 ANZUS	 as	 “a	concrete	manifestation	of	a	special	relationship	with	the	US,	for	Washington	it	was	merely	one	component	in	an	alliance	structure	for	the	Asia-Pacific	region,	which	was	itself	only	one	component	in	a	global	alliance	structure,	in	which	the	South	Pacific	was	a	relatively	unimportant	area”,106	and	it	would	become	the	mission	of	
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Australian	 governments	 to	 render	 the	 Pacific	 region	 an	 important	 one	 for	America.		Indeed,	even	before	Australia	became	militarily	involved	in	Vietnam,	the	Australian	Department	of	External	Affairs	 commissioned	a	 report	on	American	foreign	policy	and	its	implications	for	Australian	security	in	Asia,	stating	that			
we	must	do	our	best	to	act	as	a	brake	on	any	withdrawals	from	Asia	of	
American	 power.	 	 Assuming	 that	 the	 United	 States	 would	 move	 only	
cautiously	and	with	careful	preparation,	there	may	in	fact	be	occasion	
when	we	 could	 influence	 that	manner	 of	 any	withdrawal	 in	 a	way	 to	
mitigate	its	disadvantages.107		Indeed,	ANZUS	would	play	a	central	role	in	Australia’s	foreign	policy	outlook	in	the	 1950s	 and	 1960s.	 	 It	 held	 up	 American	 protection	 as	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	Australian	foreign	policy,	and	as	a	result	of	this	ultimate	goal,	Australian	leaders	were	“not	required	to	ask	whether	there	might	be	approaches	to	the	region	other	than	dependence	on	the	United	States,	or	to	make	the	intellectual	adjustments	that	might	have	led	to	a	more	sophisticated	assessment	of	what	was	happening	in	Asia	than	that	derived	from	the	domino	theory.”108		Accordingly,	“the	problem	of	how	Australia	 might	 adjust	 to	 the	 region	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 British	 or	 American	hegemony	was	merely	postponed,”109	as	opposed	to	being	resolved,	and	arguably,	this	did	not	take	place	until	a	new	Labor	government	was	elected	in	1972.		
ANZUS	Uncertainty:	West	New	Guinea		Events	 in	 the	 late	1950s	and	early	1960s	cast	 further	doubt	over	the	nature	of	ANZUS,	and	did	little	to	assure	Australia	that	America	would	indeed	provide	the	support	it	was	hoping	for	from	its	great	power	ally.		In	fact,	events	in	Southeast	Asia	 had	 the	 opposite	 effect,	 and	 only	 served	 to	 heighten	 the	 anxieties	 felt	 by	politicians	like	Spender.		As	Meaney	put	it,	the	Australia	government	found	that																																																									107	“United	States	Foreign	Policies	as	They	Affect	Australia,”	MR	Booker,	submitted	in	response	to	a	request	from	the	Minister	for	External	Affairs	dated	23	September	1964,	Part	7,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	108	McLean,	“Anzus	Origins”,	op.	cit.,	p.	81.	109	Ibid.	
	 34	
the	Americans	 “did	not	pay	proper	attention	 to	Australia’s	needs,	did	not	 fully	share	Australia’s	 anxieties,	 and	often	acted	 from	a	different	 set	of	 geo-political	calculations.”110		 Australia’s	 fears	 of	 Indonesian	 expansion	 figured	 foremost	 in	Australia’s	motives	 for	seeking	a	security	pact	with	the	United	States,111	and	as	Peter	Phelps	had	it,	America’s	refusal	to	come	to	Australia’s	aid	when	the	Menzies	government	rejected	Indonesia’s	annexation	of	West	New	Guinea	led	to	Australian	officials	drawing	the	conclusion	that	 the	superpower	would	not	be	prepared	to	come	to	Australia’s	aid	in	the	event	of	war.112				Less	than	a	decade	after	having	signed	ANZUS,	Australia’s	major	focus	of	concern	in	Southeast	Asia	was	Indonesia’s	campaign	to	gain	control	of	the	western	half	of	the	 island	 of	 New	 Guinea. 113 		 West	 New	 Guinea	 had	 been	 excluded	 from	Indonesia’s	territory	after	securing	their	independence	from	the	Dutch	in	1949,	and	by	the	late	1950s	President	Sukarno	insisted	they	should	incorporate	this	last	part	of	the	former	Netherlands	East	Indies	into	Indonesia.		Sukarno	had	become	“increasingly	dictatorial”,	and	many	Australians	became	“increasingly	troubled	by	his	anti-Western	rhetoric	and	growing	links	with	the	Soviet	Union	and	China”.114		Australia	had	a	United	Nations	mandate	to	protect	the	eastern	half	of	the	island	and	policy-makers	feared	that,	if	the	Indonesian	campaign	to	take	possession	of	West	New	Guinea	was	 successful,	 “Australia	 could	 find	 itself	sharing	an	almost	indefensible	land	border	with	a	potentially	hostile	and	pro-communist	power	in	an	area	crucial	to	Australia’s	defence”.115			The	matter	was	resolved	 in	1959	when	Australian	Minister	 for	External	Affairs	Richard	 Casey	 and	 Indonesian	 foreign	 minister	 Dr	 Subandrio	 issued	 a	communiqué	that	Australia	would	not	oppose	a	transfer	of	sovereignty	from	the																																																									110	Meaney,	“Australia,	the	Great	Powers	and	the	Coming	of	the	Cold	War”,	op.	cit.,	p.	318.	111	David	McLean,	“Australia	in	the	Cold	War:	A	Historiographical	Review”,	The	
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Dutch	to	Indonesia	if	achieved	by	political	means.		However,	the	crisis	had	exposed	just	how	ambiguous	the	obligations	provided	by	ANZUS	were.		It	was	America’s	concern	for	its	own	interests	in	the	Pacific	region	–	at	the	expense	of	Australia’s	-	that	alarmed	Australia.	 	The	underlying	problem	for	the	Australian	government	was	the	sympathy	shown	by	the	United	States	 to	 the	argument	put	 forward	by	Subandrio	and	other	non-communist	Indonesians	–	that	West	New	Guinea	might,	in	effect,	be	 the	price	 to	pay	 for	keeping	 Indonesia	 in	 friendly,	non-communist	hands.		As	Edwards	put	it,	“despite	the	growing	strength	of	the	PKI,	the	Americans	argued	that	Western	interests	would	be	best	served	by	supporting	Sukarno	and	facilitating	his	takeover	of	West	New	Guinea	while	developing	close	links	with	the	Indonesian	armed	forces”.116			This	divergence	between	American	and	Australian	policies	on	Indonesia	and	West	New	 Guinea	 was	 “particularly	 troubling”,	 especially	 considering	 that	 Australia	was	trying	to	move	closer	to	the	United	States	in	defence	matters.117		The	whole	episode	 confirmed	 Australia’s	 fear	 that,	 as	 America’s	 main	 concerns	 were	perceived	threats	from	China	and	Japan,	and	not	Indonesia,	it	would	be	reluctant	to	come	to	the	assistance	of	Australia	in	the	event	of	a	conflict	with	Indonesia.118		However,	 Australia’s	 response	 to	 this	 dilemma	 was	 not	 to	 move	 away	 from	reliance	on	America	and	develop	a	more	self-reliant	approach	to	defence	policy:	a	close	 relationship	 with	 America	 would	 remain	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 Australia’s	foreign	 policy.	 	 In	 1959	 Australia’s	 Defence	 Committee	 submitted	 a	 new	assessment	 of	 strategic	 policy,	 referring	 to	 the	 possibility	 that	 Australia	might	have	to	act	independently	of	its	allies	in	situations	such	as	conflict	with	Indonesia	over	West	New	Guinea	while	American	and	other	forces	were	engaged	elsewhere.		Cabinet	rejected	the	recommendation	that	Australian	forces	develop	the	capacity	to	act	independently.		For	Cabinet,	“Australian	defence	forces	would	be	designed	to	 act	 closely	 with	 allies,	 principally	 the	 United	 States,	 in	 collective	 defence	arrangements”.119	
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	However,	 episodes	 like	 the	West	 New	 Guinea	 crisis	 did	 not	 fill	 the	 Australian	government	with	confidence	when	it	came	to	the	superpower’s	willingness	to	act	in	favour	of	Australian	interests.		The	divergent	policies	of	the	United	States	and	Australia	 toward	 West	 New	 Guinea	 established	 “a	 major	 concern,	 seldom	expressed	publicly,	for	the	Australian	government.		Australian	defence	policy	was	based	 on	 close	 cooperation	 with	 the	 United	 States	 in	 Southeast	 Asia	 but	 the	Americans	were	taking	a	different	stance	on	an	area	of	extreme	sensitivity	to	the	Australians.”	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 the	 Australians	 were	 determined	 to	 do	“everything	possible	both	to	keep	the	United	States	committed	to	Southeast	Asian	security	 in	 general	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	 American	 policies	 supported	 Australian	interests	and	aspirations	with	respect	to	both	Indonesia	and	Indochina”.120		
Further	Uncertainty:	Indonesia’s	Confrontation	of	Malaysia		Confrontation	was	 arguably	 a	 greater	 blow	 to	Australian	 hopes	 of	 superpower	support	in	Southeast	Asia.		Far	from	demonstrating	that	Britain,	the	United	States	and	Australia	were	united	in	their	approach	to	security	in	the	region,	the	hostilities	between	Indonesia	and	the	newly	 formed	federation	of	Malayan	states	 that	ran	from	1963	to	1966	demonstrated	that,	unsurprisingly,	America	and	Britain	did	not	consider	Australian	security	interests	as	inextricably	linked	to	their	own.		For	Britain	 it	was	the	last	 item	of	business	 in	 their	withdrawal	 from	the	region;	 for	America	 it	was	part	 of	 the	wider	 Cold	War	 struggle	 at	 a	 time	when	 they	were	already	getting	more	deeply	involved	in	Vietnam.		Britain	supported	the	creation	of	Malaysia	in	1963,	seeing	the	new	federation	as	“the	means	by	which	Britain	could	end	its	remaining	colonial	responsibilities	and	costly	defence	obligations	in	the	region,	with	a	good	chance	of	leaving	behind	a	stable	and	friendly	government”.121		Sukarno	opposed	the	federation	and	claimed	it	was	the	product	of	neo-colonialism	-	“a	neo-colonialist	plot	by	the	British”122	–																																																									120	Ibid.,	pp.	65-66.	121	Ibid.,	pp.	81-82.	122	Ibid.,	p.	82.	
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and	adopted	a	policy	of	Confrontation.	 	As	 “a	principal	 aim	of	 forward	defence	strategy	 was	 to	 encourage	 Britain,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 United	 States,	 to	 remain	committed	to	the	security	of	Southeast	Asia,”123	Australia	supported	the	British	position	and	was	happy	to	see	the	great	power	supporting	the	creation	of	what	was	hoped	to	be	a	stable	 federation	that	would	bring	Malaya,	Singapore,	North	Borneo,	Brunei	 and	Sarawak	 into	a	 form	of	political	 and	economic	 cooperation	which	would,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 limit	 the	 influence	 the	 communism	 in	 the	region.	 	 Indeed,	 “Indonesia’s	 Confrontation	 policy	 brought	 about	 the	‘quadripartite	talks’	between	the	United	States,	Britain,	Australia	and	New	Zealand	for	which	the	Australian	government	had	long	hoped”.124		However,	 even	 Confrontation	 and	 the	 four-power	 talks	 failed	 to	 provide	 the	Australian	 government	 with	 the	 sense	 of	 security	 it	 so	 hoped	 for.	 The	quadripartite	 talks	 “provided	 little	 comfort	 to	policy-makers	 in	 Canberra”	 and,	indeed,	made	it	clear	that	“the	United	States	and	Britain	had	conflicting	priorities	in	 their	 Southeast	 Asian	 policies”.125		 Though	 Britain	 favoured	 the	 creation	 of	Malaysia	 and	 therefore	 wanted	 to	 take	 a	 hard-line	 approach	 to	 Indonesian	President	 Sukarno’s	 campaign	 of	 Confrontation,	 the	 United	 States	 wanted	 to	maintain	 long-term	 relations	 with	 Indonesia	 and	 not	 push	 it	 toward	 the	communist	bloc.	 	To	 this	 end,	 the	United	States	government	even	continued	 to	provide	 aid	 to	 Indonesia,	 much	 to	 the	 displeasure	 of	 Britain.126 		 Accordingly,	though	America	would	support	the	creation	of	Malaysia,	it	saw	Confrontation	as	a	matter	“primarily	for	Britain	and	secondarily	for	Australia	and	New	Zealand”	and	refused	to	pledge	military	support.127				Already	 facing	 what	 the	 Kennedy	 administration	 regarded	 as	 the	 two	 major	threats	to	the	United	States’	interests	in	the	region	–	Communist	China’s	perceived	
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drive	 for	 domination	 in	 Asia	 and	 the	 poverty,	 backwardness,	 disunity	 and	emerging	 nationalism	 associated	with	 developing	 countries	 in	 Asia	 –	Kennedy	feared	 the	 consequences	 of	 taking	 a	 hard-line	 approach	 towards	 Indonesia.128		The	United	States	government	anticipated	that	escalation	of	Confrontation	would	oblige	American	 involvement,	either	to	bail	out	 the	British	or	due	to	Australian	demands	for	military	assistance	under	ANZUS.129		Kennedy	wanted	to	avoid	being	drawn	into	another	Southeast	Asian	conflict	while	also	supporting	South	Vietnam	so	as	 to	avoid	being	 stretched	economically	and	militarily,	 and	also	because	of	domestic	political	concerns;	indeed,	the	President	sought	to	avoid	the	politically	damaging	situation	in	the	lead	up	to	the	following	year’s	elections.130		John	Subritzky	has	shown	how,	in	the	latter	half	of	1963,	ANZUS	was	interpreted	and	negotiated	by	the	American	government	in	such	a	way	that	“severely	limited	the	circumstances	under	which	Washington	would	offer	 its	assistance”	so	as	 to	avoid	American	involvement	in	Confrontation.131		Menzies	was	disappointed	after	his	visits	to	Washington	to	seek	assurances	regarding	the	application	of	ANZUS	to	Confrontation.		In	early	July	President	Kennedy	refused	to	confirm	that	American	assistance	would	be	forthcoming	in	the	event	that	Australian	forces	were	attacked	by	Indonesia,132	and	further	talks	between	Minister	for	External	Affairs	Garfield	Barwick	 and	 Kennedy	 in	 October	 were	 one-sided,	 confirming	 that,	 though	America	conceded	that	ANZUS	did	cover	Australian	forces	in	Malaysia,	limited	the	extent	of	any	future	intervention	by	American	forces:	American	assistance	would	be	limited	to	air	and	sea	forces	and	the	provision	of	logistical	support,	and	the	use	of	 ground	 forces	 was	 expressly	 excluded.	 	 Furthermore,	 American	 military	intervention	would	only	be	available	if	there	was	an	overt	attack,	and	even	then	it	would	be	conditional	on	Congressional	approval.133		
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Confrontation	 therefore	 provided	 neither	 a	 coherent	 policy	 nor	 clarity	 for	Australia	in	relation	to	America’s	understanding	of	its	ANZUS	obligations.		Nor	did	it	assuage	Australian	fears	of	being	left	alone	and	isolated	in	Southeast	Asia.		This	led	to	“a	nagging	uncertainty	among	some	(Australian)	policy	makers	as	to	how	full-blooded	 the	 American	 commitment	 to	 support	 Australia	 under	 ANZUS	actually	was.”134		It	was,	indeed,	all	too	easy	to	imagine	how	Australia	might	seem	remote	and	even	expendable	from	the	perspective	of	Washington	in	any	situation	not	directly	involving	the	security	of	the	United	States	itself.”135		Indeed,	in	1964	the	Department	of	External	Affairs	reported	 to	Hasluck	 that	 “in	 spite	of	 all	our	efforts	 to	 keep	 abreast	 of	 American	 thinking	we	 are	 still	 sometimes	 taken	 by	surprise…	 the	 American	 government	 has	 developed	 the	 protective	 habit	 of	keeping	even	from	its	friends	advance	notice	of	policy	changes	which	they	have	reason	 to	 believe	 will	 be	 unwelcome.” 136 		 The	 concern	 about	 the	 level	 of	consultation	that	would	exist	in	fact	between	Australia	and	America	would	plague	the	Menzies,	Holt	and	Gorton	governments	and	lead	to	a	sense	of	deep	insecurity	as	to	the	real	closeness	of	the	two	countries	under	the	ANZUS	Treaty.		Even	with	both	allies	engaged	in	Asia,	then,	“the	longstanding	Australian	hope	that	Britain,	 the	 United	 States,	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 could	 coordinate	 their	military	 and	 political	 efforts	 in	 the	 region	 continued	 to	 be	 frustrated”. 137		Operations	were	not	coordinated:	Britain	focussed	on	Confrontation	in	Malaysia;	the	 United	 States	 focussed	 on	 Vietnam	 and	 did	 not	 offer	 equivocal	 support	 to	Australia.	 	 Indeed,	 discussions	 with	 Washington	 were	 “frustrating,	 as	 the	Australians	received	vague,	confused	and	often	contradictory	responses	to	their	questions	about	American	policy”.138				
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Australian	faith	in	ANZUS	was	so	shaken	that	the	Defence	Committee	continued	to	press	the	government	that,	in	a	crisis	with	Indonesia,	“Australia	might	find	that	the	United	States	was	exercising	 its	diplomatic	 influence	 in	 Indonesia’s	 favour.		Australia	therefore	needed	to	boost	its	independent	military	capacity,	rather	than	to	 rely	 on	 American	 help	 under	 the	 SEATO	 and	 ANZUS	 treaties”.139 		 	 Indeed,	Confrontation	demonstrated	effectively	that	America	was	involved	in	Southeast	Asia	for	its	own	reasons	and	that,	even	with	ANZUS	and	SEATO,	Australia	could	not	 rely	 on	 the	 superpower	 completely.	 	 Still,	 the	 Defence	 Committee’s	recommendations	 were	 not	 taken	 up.	 	 Rather	 than	 boosting	 Australia’s	independent	military	capacity,	it	became	even	more	imperative	in	the	eyes	of	the	government	 to	 create	 a	 set	 of	 circumstances	 in	 Southeast	 Asia	which	 brought	American	and	Australian	security	interests	in	line	with	each	other.		The	 end	 of	 Confrontation	 in	 1966	 did	 not	 allay	 Australian	 fears	 of	 Indonesia;	rather,	Australian	authorities	 continued	 to	watch	events	 in	 Indonesia	 carefully,	and	“long	retained	the	fear	that	Indonesia	might	revert	to	the	aggressive	policies”	of	‘Konfrontasi’.140		Though	much	of	the	motivation	for	Australia’s	involvement	in	Vietnam	–	that	of	keeping	America	engaged	 in	Southeast	Asia	so	 it	could	assist	Australia	if	Confrontation	became	a	major	conflict	–	had	therefore	come	to	an	end	by	 1966,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 coup	 and	 counter-coup	 that	 had	 taken	 place	 in	Indonesia	to	end	the	conflict	only	underlined	the	“unpredictability	and	danger	of	politics	in	South	and	Southeast	Asia”.		In	that	environment,	“Australia	continued	to	 seek	 the	 closest	 possible	 relations	 with	 its	 ultimate	 protector,	 the	 United	States”.141		
ANZUS	Uncertainty	Compounded:	The	British	Withdrawal		Australian	 fears	 of	 being	 left	 isolated	 and	 without	 superpower	 support	 in	Southeast	 Asia	 were	 compounded	 by	 Britain’s	 strategic	 withdrawal	 from	 the	region.		As	well	as	being	uncertain	about	the	exact	nature	of	its	relationship	with																																																									139	Ibid.,	p.	85.	140	Ibid.,	p.	133.	141	Ibid.	
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America,	 Australia	 was	 unsure	 as	 to	 whether	 Britain’s	 presence	 in	 the	 region	would	 continue.	 These	 fears	 were	 confirmed	 when	 Britain	 announced	 its	withdrawal	 from	 the	 region.	 	 Britain	 in	 the	 1960s	 made	 a	 “major	 effort	 to	reconstruct	 its	world	role	…	 in	matters	of	 empire	and	Commonwealth,	 and	the	weakening	of	various	links	with	Australia	was	essentially	one	of	the	by-products	of	 this	process.”142	If	 the	ambiguity	surrounding	ANZUS	frustrated	and	worried	the	Australian	government,	the	British	decision	to	quit	East	of	Suez	and	focus	on	its	role	in	Europe	did	nothing	do	ease	the	government’s	concerns.		Indeed,	as	Coral	Bell	put	it,	“the	late	1960s	constituted	almost	as	traumatic	a	period	for	Australia’s	strategic	policymakers	as	the	early	1940s	had	done.”143				The	 first	 cause	 of	 Australian	 anxiety	 came	 in	 1961	 when	 Britain	 declared	 its	intention	to	explore	the	possibility	of	joining	the	European	Economic	Community.		As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 declaration	 Australia’s	 Department	 of	 External	 Affairs	 was	charged	with	preparing	an	appreciation	of	the	political	implications	for	Australia.		The	essence	of	the	Department’s	analysis	was	that	Britain	would	likely	feel	obliged	to	prove	itself	to	be	a	good	European	state	and,	accordingly,	its	entry	into	Europe	would	accelerate	tendencies	“towards	the	transformation	of	the	United	Kingdom	into	 a	 European	 rather	 than	 a	 world	 power	 and	 towards	 a	 decline	 in	 its	commitments	 beyond	 Suez;	 and	 towards	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	Commonwealth	 into	a	 looser	group.”144		 Interpreted	 in	a	Cold	War	context,	 this	acceleration	“could	reduce	the	prospects	for	Australia	of	getting	effective	action	against	 the	various	 forms	of	Communist	 expansion,	 and	Chinese	or	 Indonesian	aggression,	in	Australia’s	North.”145		The	 second	 cause	 of	 anxiety	 came	 from	 Britain’s	 military	 withdrawal	 from	Southeast	Asia.146		Britain	had	been	“extremely	reluctant	to	become	involved	in	any	military	commitment	in	Southeast	Asia	other	than	in	direct	defence	of	its	own	
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interests	 in	 Malaya	 and	 Borneo” 147 	during	 the	 1950s,	 and	 ever	 since	 Britain	pledged	its	support	in	October	1961	to	Malayan	president	Tunku	Abdul	Rahman’s	proposed	Malaysian	federation,	the	Australian	government	had	started	to	suspect	Britain’s	withdrawal	 from	 the	 region.	 	 Indeed,	Bell	has	argued	 that	 “the	British	decision	to	quit	East	of	Suez	went	through	its	crucial	phase	in	Holt’s	brief	term	in	office.”148		According	 to	Bell,	 though	Britain	had	considered	keeping	a	 stand-by	base	in	north-west	Australia	to	conduct	a	study	into	the	nature	of	their	presence	in	Singapore	in	1966,	Holt	had	done	little	to	encourage	this	chiefly	due	to	the	fact	that	 the	 period	 of	 his	 prime	 ministership	 was	 consumed	 by	 an	 increasing	commitment	to	and	escalation	of	involvement	in	Vietnam	and	was	the	period	of	peak	dependence	on	America.	 	Also,	Holt	believed	any	British	study	undertaken	would	speed	up	their	decision	to	withdraw,	not	encourage	them	to	stay.149		According	 to	 Goldsworthy,	 “large-scale	 British	 withdrawal	 was	 not	 yet	 under	discussion,	but	 the	Australians	already	had	 their	 suspicions	about	British	 long-term	intentions”.150		British	officials	were	not	ignorant	of	this	suspicion.	 	As	the	British	High	Commissioner	reported	in	April	1963,	the	Australians	“suspect	that	in	the	long	term	we	will	withdraw	from	South-East	Asia	and	leave	them,	with	New	Zealand,	 to	 hold	 the	 baby.”151		 The	 increasing	 probability	 of	 the	 separation	 of	Singapore	from	Malaysia	cast	further	doubts	on	the	future	of	the	British	defence	establishments	in	Singapore,	and	Singapore’s	eventual	eviction	from	Malaysia	in	August	 1965	 –	 despite	 vigorous	 efforts	 by	 British	 and	 Australian	 diplomats	 –	struck	a	blow	to	one	of	the	fundamental	aims	of	forward	defence.152		As	 Goldsworthy	 has	 shown,	 the	 election	 of	 a	 Labour	 government	 in	Britain	 in	October	1964	and	a	 series	of	 financial	 and	economic	 crises	–	and	not	 least	 the	devaluation	crisis	of	November	1967	-	as	well	as	heavy	domestic	pressure	from	the	 pro-Europeans,	 the	 Labour	 left	 and	 spending	ministries	 and	 the	 ending	 of																																																									147	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	71.	148	Bell,	Dependent	Ally,	op.	cit.,	p.	88.	149	Ibid,	p.	93.	150	Goldsworthy,	Losing	the	Blanket,	op.	cit.,	pp.	143-144.	151	Ibid.,	p.	144.	152	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	pp.	130-131.	
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Confrontation	in	1966,	led	to	the	acceleration	of	the	British	withdrawal	from	East	of	Suez.153		Between	late	1964	and	1968	it	became	“cruelly	apparent	that,	far	from	being	 able	 to	 afford	 to	 relinquish	 its	 world	 role,	 Britain	 could	 not	 afford	 to	maintain	it.”154		In	 January	1968	the	plan	for	withdrawal	that	had	been	devised	only	six	months	earlier,	which	had	provided	for	a	50	per	cent	reduction	in	British	forces	in	Singapore	and	Malaysia	by	1971	and	complete	withdrawal	by	the	mid-1970s,	was	brought	forward:	Britain	would	withdraw	completely	by	1971.			
Vietnam		As	David	McLean	has	shown	in	his	historiographical	review	of	Australia	in	the	Cold	War,	 the	 major	 scholarly	 debate	 surrounding	 the	 signing	 of	 ANZUS	 and	 the	American	alliance	in	the	Cold	War	was	whether	the	erosion	of	traditional	ties	to	Britain	after	1945	led	to	a	new	“national	self-reliance	and	a	distinctive	Australian	voice	 in	 the	world”,	 or	whether	 it	was	 followed	 by	 “a	 new	dependence	 on	 the	USA.”155		This	debate	has	been	most	prominent	in	relation	to	Australia’s	entry	into	the	Vietnam	War.		As	McLean	had	it,	the	first	scholarly	interpretations	of	the	alliance	were	borne	out	of	political	divisions	at	the	time.		There	was	the	left	wing	-	or	‘radical	nationalist’	-	view	 that,	 prior	 to	 1951,	 Labor	 governments	 had	 followed	 an	 independent	Australian	 foreign	 policy	 and	 that	 it	was	Menzies’	 Liberal	 government	 and	 the	signing	of	ANZUS	that	saw	Australia	become	a	servant	to	the	United	States.		Then	there	were	the	conservative	writers,	whose	views	were	similar	to	that	of	Menzies’	governmental	 view:	 Australia	 depended	 on	 powerful	 friends	 for	 security,	 and	skilful	diplomacy	was	needed	to	persuade	the	United	States	to	protect	Australia.156		Australia	had	not	become	a	servant	to	America;	rather	Australia	used	dependence	on	the	United	States	to	further	its	own	interests.		Accordingly,	there	emerged	two	dominant	 perspectives	 on	 the	 alliance:	 the	 ‘radical	 nationalists’	 believed	 that	
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Australia	had	jeopardised	its	national	interests	by	going	out	of	its	way	to	be	loyal	to	 the	 United	 States	 and	 America	 would	 not	 necessarily	 honour	 its	 ANZUS	obligations,	 whereas	 the	 conservatives	 believed	 more	 optimistically	 that,	 as	 a	result	of	ANZUS,	the	United	States	would	feel	obliged	to	act	in	Australia’s	interests	out	of	a	sense	of	loyalty	to	Australia.157		The	 radical	 nationalists	 -	 those	 historians	 who	 claim	 that	 central	 dynamic	 in	Australian	history	is	the	teleological	progression	from	‘colony’	to	‘nation’	-	claimed	that	 Australia	was	merely	 a	 subservient	 ally	 of	 America’s,	 and	 that	 Australian	foreign	policy	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	was	the	result	of	an	uncritical	absorption	of	American	perceptions	of	the	threat	of	communism	in	Asia.		They	argued	that,	as	a	result	of	 this	 subservience,	 a	 true	 and	more	 authentically	 independent	 or	 self-sufficient	Australian	nationalism	was	‘thwarted’.	 	According	to	Philip	and	Roger	Bell,	 “much	 less	 nationalist	 and	 reformist	 than	 its	 predecessors,	 the	 Menzies	government	 substituted	 an	 uncritical	 dependence	 on	 its	 so-called	 ‘great	 and	powerful	 friends’	 for	 the	 assertive	 independence	 in	 international	 affairs	 that	Labor	had	pursued,	however	successfully,	from	1941	to	1949.”		They	also	stated	“the	 new	 Australian	 government	 became	 increasingly	 receptive	 to	 American	definitions	of	international	threat,	as	it	did	to	American	interpretations	of	security	issues	and	international	politics	more	generally”.158		For	LG	Churchward	Australia	became	 “an	 American	 satellite” 159 	in	 the	 Menzies	 years,	 and	 for	 Humphrey	McQueen,	Australia	“switched	from	British	sycophant	to	American	lickspittle”.160		For	 Joseph	 Camilleri,	 ANZUS	 and	 the	 American	 alliance	 demonstrated	 the	“readiness	 of	 Australian	 governments	 to	 comply	 with	 American	 policies	 and	perceptions,	often	with	little	or	no	thought	to	their	consequences	for	Australia	or	the	region”.161			
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As	has	been	 shown,	much	of	 the	diplomacy	 that	 took	place	after	1951	centred	around	ensuring	the	United	States	would	 indeed	honour	 its	ANZUS	obligations.		After	 the	 disappointments	 of	 the	 West	 New	 Guinea	 crisis	 and	 Confrontation,	Vietnam,	 a	 war	 that	 saw	 America	 and	 Australia	 take	 joint	 military	 action	 in	Southeast	Asia,	provided	Australia	with	the	opportunity	to	do	just	this.		If	America	and	Australia	were	 jointly	 involved	 in	 fighting	against	a	common	enemy	on	the	Asian	 mainland,	 it	 followed	 that	 America	 would	 regard	 Australia’s	 security	 as	intimately	linked	to	its	own,	and	would	therefore	be	willing	to	come	to	Australia’s	aid	 if	 and	when	 required.	 	 Indeed,	 on	 3	 September	 1964,	 eight	months	 before	Australia	committed	combat	troops	to	South	Vietnam,	Paul	Hasluck,	the	Minister	for	External	Affairs,	stated	the	government’s	attitude	towards	South	Vietnam:			
our	plain	national	interest	is	to	have	a	Government	in	South	Viet	Nam	
that	will	continue	to	fight	Viet	Cong,	to	oppose	North	Viet	Nam	and	to	
give	some	prospect	of	eventually	unifying	the	country	behind	a	stable	and	
non-Communist	and	preferably	anti-Communist	Government	which	will	
still	provide	the	local	circumstances	to	enable	the	United	States	to	keep	
a	foothold	in	South-East	Asia.162				Clearly,	Australia’s	chief	concern	regarding	involvement	in	Vietnam	for	Australia	was	creating	the	circumstances	that	would	guarantee	the	continued	presence	of	America	in	Asia.		For	 the	 radical	 nationalists,	 Australia’s	 involvement	 in	 Vietnam	 was	 another	example	of	subservience:	Australia	was	blindly	and	obediently	following	its	ally	to	war.	 	On	the	other	hand,	some	historians	argued	that,	after	signing	ANZUS,	 the	Australian	 government	 felt	 obliged	 to	 pay	 ‘insurance	 premiums’	 to	America	 in	return	 for	 the	 promise	 of	protection.	 	 For	 these	 historians,	 Australia	 sought	 to	achieve	such	a	habitual	closeness	with	America	that,	in	its	time	of	need,	America	would	 have	 no	 option	 but	 to	 come	 to	 Australia’s	 aid.	 	 Accordingly,	 Australian	involvement	in	Vietnam	was	the	unavoidable	result	of	international	and	regional																																																									162	Cable:	Hasluck	to	all	Australian	Embassies,	3	September	1964,	in	Harpur,	War	
Without	End,	op.	cit.,	p.	105.	
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circumstances	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.		For	Norman	Harper,	Australian	political	leaders	and	diplomats	regarded	Australian	military	involvement	in	Vietnam	as	“an	insurance	premium	for	the	defence	of	Australia	in	the	event	of	attack.”163		This	was	born	 out	 of	 “a	 feeling	 of	 obligation	 to	 the	 United	 States	 and	 a	 belief	 that	 the	preservation	 of	 an	 American	 presence	 in	 South-East	 Asia	 was	 an	 important	insurance	policy,	especially	in	view	of	the	British	threat	to	withdraw	from	east	of	Suez.”164				TB	Millar	had	it	that	the	main	reason	for	Australian	involvement	in	Vietnam	was	“to	show	the	United	States	that	Australia	was	a	willing	ally,	one	that	stood	up	to	be	counted	and	thus	deserved	to	be	stood	up	for	if	necessary.”		For	Millar,	Australia	“paid	its	overseas	premiums	to	the	American	insurance	policy”	in	Vietnam,165	and	in	return	gained	the	intangible	benefit	of	a	“sense	of	assurance	of	help	in	future	danger”.166		 Gregory	 Pemberton	wrote	 that	Australia’s	 involvement	 in	 Vietnam	“was	the	necessary	price	to	secure	a	large	US	commitment	to	Southeast	Asia”.167		Peter	 Edwards	 took	 a	 similar	 approach,	 arguing	 that,	 “conscious	 of	 its	 own	military	weakness	 after	 years	 of	 severely	 constrained	 expenditure	 on	 defence,	Australia	had	to	demonstrate	that	it	was	willing	to	do	everything	it	could	to	ensure	that	the	United	States	would	continue	to	commit	its	military	and	diplomatic	power	to	ensuring	the	security	of	non-communist	regimes	 in	Southeast	Asia”.168		 	Less	extreme	 in	 their	 approach	 than	 the	 radical	 nationalists,	 these	 historians	 still	believed	 the	 American	 alliance	 left	 Australia	 with	 little	 room	 for	 flexibility	 in	forming	its	own	foreign	policy.			McMahon	 Ball,	 who	 was	 sceptical	 of	 the	 optimistic	 assumption	 that	 America	would	come	to	Australia’s	aid	in	its	hour	of	need,	made	the	point	in	1968	that	any	goodwill	earned	by	Australia	in	Vietnam	might	count	for	nothing	if	the	Johnson	
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administration	was	replaced	by	another	that	changed	American	policy	towards	Vietnam	 and	 withdrew	 its	 military	 presence	 from	 Asia. 169 		 The	 prospect	 of	American	failure	in	Vietnam	was	real,	and	one	that	had	been	raised	well	before	1968.		In	1964	Under	Secretary	of	State	George	Ball,	who	opposed	sending	ground	forces	 to	 Vietnam,	 advised	 Johnson	 “a	 long,	 protracted	war	 in	 Vietnam	would	demonstrate	the	weakness,	not	the	strength,	of	the	United	States”.170		Ball	sent	a	prescient	memorandum	to	Johnson	on	1	July:			
no	one	can	assure	you	that	we	can	beat	the	Viet	Cong	or	even	force	them	
to	 the	 conference	 table	 on	 our	 terms	 no	 matter	 how	 many	 hundred	
thousand	white	foreign	(US)	troops	we	deploy	…		Once	large	numbers	of	
US	troops	are	committed	to	direct	combat	they	will	begin	to	take	heavy	
casualties	in	a	war	they	are	ill-equipped	to	fight	in	a	non-cooperative	if	
downright	hostile	countryside.	 	Once	we	suffer	large	casualties	we	will	
have	started	a	well-nigh	irreversible	process.		Our	involvement	will	be	so	
great	 that	 we	 cannot	 –	 without	 national	 humiliation	 –	 stop	 short	 of	
achieving	 our	 objectives.	 	 Of	 the	 two	 possibilities	 I	 think	 humiliation	
would	be	more	likely	than	the	achievement	of	our	objectives	–	even	after	
we	have	paid	terrible	costs.171				Indeed,	 this	 is	 precisely	 what	 happened,	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 this	 on	 American-Australian	relations	is	precisely	the	focus	of	this	thesis.				More	recent	scholarship	in	the	field	has	challenged	the	notion	of	 ‘subservience’.		These	historians,	especially	Neville	Meaney	and	David	McLean,	have	argued	that	Australia,	 far	 from	 being	 a	 mere	 ‘satellite’	 that	 blindly	 followed	 America	 into	Vietnam,	or	a	nation	paying	its	insurance	premiums	for	the	promise	of	protection,	used	 the	alliance	 to	 serve	 its	own	national	 security	 interests	 in	Southeast	Asia.		According	to	McLean,	decisions	made	by	the	Australian	government	were	not	the	
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result	of	blind	obedience	or	the	unavoidable	reaction	to	events;	“rather,	they	arose	from	 the	 interaction	 of	 circumstances	with	 attitudes	 and	 beliefs	which	 in	 part	reflected	generally	accepted	Western	views	of	Communism’s	 threat	 to	 the	 free	world,	but	also	owed	much	to	Australians’	understanding	of	their	nation’s	past”.172		McLean	went	further,	stating	that	“dependence	on	the	United	States	was	not	the	result	of	‘colonial	mentality’	or	‘national	immaturity’,	and	did	not	take	the	form	of	docile	subservience;	rather,	Australia	tried	to	persuade,	cajole	or	shame	Britain	and	America	into	throwing	their	weight	behind	Australia’s	regional	interests”.173				Michael	Sexton	argued	that	Australian	diplomats	in	Washington	and	Canberra,	far	from	 being	 dragged	 into	 the	 Vietnam	 War,	 actively	 encouraged	 America	 to	escalate	its	involvement	in	Vietnam	to	further	Australia’s	own	national	security	interests.		According	to	Sexton,	it	was	put	forward	as	the	Department	of	External	Affairs’	“central	proposition	that	locking	the	Americans	into	the	Vietnam	conflict	could	 keep	 them	 in	 South-East	 Asia	 and	 maximise	 their	 role	 as	 Australia’s	protector”. 174 		 If	 America	 was	 supported	 by	 Australia	 in	 its	 fight	 against	communism	 in	Vietnam,	 it	 followed	 that	 the	 superpower	would	 feel	obliged	 to	assist	Australia	“should	it	be	threatened	from	any	source	in	or	out	of	the	South-East	Asian	region”.175				Glen	St	J	Barclay	went	as	far	as	saying	Americans	might	not	have	been	in	Vietnam	“if	 the	Australians	 had	 not	 been	 there	 too.”176		 Barclay	 argued	 that	 “Australian	pressure	 was	 exercised	 in	 pursuit	 of	 a	 wholly	 independent	 perception	 of	Australian	national	interests,	arrived	at	by	the	Australian	government	without	the	benefit	of	advice	from	anybody	else,”	and	that	“there	was	no	question	of	Australia	obsequiously	 following	 the	 guidance	 of	 great	 and	 powerful	 friends”. 177 		 For																																																									172	McLean,	“Australia	in	the	Cold	War”,	op.	cit.,	p.	321.	173	McLean,	“From	British	Colony”,	op.	cit.,	p.	78.	174	Michael	Sexton,	War	for	the	Asking:	Australia’s	Vietnam	Secrets,	Penguin	Books,	Ringwood,	1981,	p.	120.	175	Ibid.,	p.	2.	176	Glen	St	J	Barclay,	A	Very	Small	Insurance	Policy:	The	Politics	of	Australian	
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Barclay,	ensuring	the	engagement	of	America	in	Vietnam	was	“a	purely	Australian	solution	 to	 an	 Australian	 problem	 based	 on	 Australian	 perceptions”. 178 		 For	McLean,	Australia	did	not	 just	respond	 to	American	 intervention	 in	Vietnam	 in	1965,	rather,	it	egged	the	United	States	on	into	making	a	military	commitment	and	then	 risked	 the	displeasure	of	 America	 by	 the	 “half-hearted”	 nature	 of	 its	 own	contribution. 179 		 Casting	 doubt	 on	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 insurance	 premium	argument,	McLean	correctly	observed	that	Australia’s	‘half-hearted’	contribution	to	Vietnam	was	“a	curious	way	of	securing	US	gratitude”.180				As	Coral	Bell	summised,	“it	is	clearly	misleading,	on	the	evidence,	to	represent	the	Vietnam	episode	as	one	 in	which	a	minor	power	was	dragooned	 into	 reluctant	participation	in	war	against	its	better	judgment	by	an	overbearing	great-power	ally.”181		For	Bell,	this	was	an	interpretation	originally	popular	in	circles	“looking	for	a	case	against	the	American	alliance.”182			Neither	was	Australia’s	involvement	in	Vietnam	an	episode	in	which	“reactionary	militarists	involved	the	country	for	their	 own	 bad	 reasons,	 until	 forced	 to	 desist	 by	 the	 pressures	 of	 morally	enlightened	mass	 protest.”183		 Australia’s	 involvement	 in	 Vietnam	was	 not	 the	result	of	 subservience	or	 ‘reactionary	militarists,’	 rather,	 it	was	a	 key	 factor	 in	Australia’s	national	security	and	defence	policy	–	a	decision	designed	to	keep	the	United	States	engaged	in	Asia	and	close	to	Australia.		With	Australia	and	America	committed	to	a	joint	military	effort	in	Vietnam,	it	is	arguable	that	the	period	in	which	the	Australian	government	felt	most	secure	in	its	relationship	with	the	United	States	was	between	1965	and	1967.		The	United	States	was	engaged	in	Southeast	Asia	through	its	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War.		The	 relationship	between	Australian	Prime	Minister	Harold	Holt	 and	American	president	 Lyndon	 Johnson	was	 at	 its	 strongest,	 seen	most	 visibly	 in	 Johnson’s	1966	 visit	 to	 Australia.	 	 Indeed,	 “following	 President	 Lyndon	 Johnson’s	 highly																																																									178	Ibid.,	p.	169.	179	McLean,	“Australia	in	the	Cold	War”,	op.	cit.,	p.	313.	180	Ibid.,	p.	313.	181	Bell,	Dependent	Ally,	op.	cit.,	p.	79.	182	Ibid.	183	Ibid.	
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successful	visit	to	Australia	in	October	1966,	widely	regarded	as	the	high	point	of	alliance	intimacy	to	that	time,	the	American	Embassy	in	Canberra	saw	Australia’s	rock-solid	support	for	Washington’s	role	in	South	East	Asia	as	evidence	of	‘what	almost	 amounts	 to	 a	 bi-national	 US-Australian	 foreign	 policy	 in	 Asia’	 and	 a	‘reaffirmed	and	nearly	total	commitment	to	the	alliance’”.184		Indeed,	for	Barclay,	even	Holt’s	statement	that	Australia	would	go	‘all	the	way	with	LBJ’	in	Vietnam	was	not	in	any	sense	a	declaration	of	subservience.		Rather,	it	was	a	recognition	of	the	 fact	 that	 LBJ’s	 administration	 was	 going	 exactly	 where	 the	 Australian	government	wanted	it	to	go.		As	Barclay	put	it,	a	“shield	of	United	States	military	power	had	been	interposed	between	Australia	and	any	possible	threat	from	the	north.	 	 The	 ultimate	 national	 security	 goal	 of	 Australian	 governments	 since	federation	 seemed	 to	 have	 been	 attained.	 	 Harold	 Holt	 could	 feel	 that	 he	 had	achieved	what	Alfred	Deakin	had	sought	without	success.”185				As	 Sexton	 has	 shown,	 however,	 the	 Australian	 commitment	 to	 Vietnam	 was	somewhat	open-ended.		The	long-term	consequences	of	military	involvement	had	not	been	fully	considered.		In	the	case	of	Vietnam	it	appears	that	the	Department	of	External	Affairs	failed	to	consider	the	“long-term	consequences	of	the	American	military	 effort	 in	 Vietnam.” 186 		 Indeed,	 there	 was	 “no	 evidence	 that	 the	Department	raised	the	possibility	of	military	failure	by	the	American	and	South	Vietnamese	forces,	with	the	result	that	the	United	States	might	withdraw	its	land	forces	 altogether	 from	 South-East	 Asia	 and	 suffer	 a	 serious	 loss	 of	 global	influence.”187		By	1967	Australia’s	key	diplomatic	goal	since	1951	–	to	strengthen	its	 relationship	 with	 the	 United	 States	 and	 keep	 the	 superpower	 engaged	 in	Southeast	Asia	 -	had	been	achieved.	 	How	did	the	Australian	government	react,	then,	when	America	began	to	withdraw	its	troops	from	Vietnam	and	scale	back	its	military	involvement	in	the	region	the	following	year?																																																											184	United	States	Annual	Policy	Assessment:	Australia,	January	20,	1967,	in	Curran,	“The	Dilemmas	of	Divergence”,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.	185	Barclay,	A	Very	Small	Insurance	Policy,	op.	cit.,	p.	167.	186	Sexton,	War	for	the	Asking,	op.	cit.,	p.	120.	187	Ibid.	
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The	Nixon	Doctrine:	Recalibration	of	American	policy	in	Asia		1968	 saw	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 end	 of	 a	 period	 of	 close	 defence	 co-operation	between	America	and	Australia.		More	than	a	decade	before,	in	1954,	it	had	been	put	to	Cabinet	in	‘A	Strategic	Basis	of	Defence	Policy’	that	“Indo-China	is	the	key	to	the	 defence	 of	 South-East	 Asia”	 and	 “the	 danger	 of	 the	 US	 withdrawing	 to	isolationism	 should	 not	 be	 discounted.”188 		 This	 was	 now	 precisely	 what	 was	happening.	 	 Indeed,	 the	American	and	British	withdrawal	 from	Asia	 “meant,	 in	effect,	 the	 collapse	 of	 Australia’s	 Cold	 War	 policy	 –	 the	 desire	 to	 keep	 the	Americans	and	the	British	engaged	 in	the	region	to	Australia’s	north.”	189		 	This	collapse	brought	with	it	much	consternation	within	the	Liberal	government,	due	to	the	fact	that	it	required	the	re-setting	of	Australian	foreign	and	defence	policy	in	a	new	and	uncertain	era.		Whereas	previously	Australia	had	been	able	to	look	to	 its	 powerful	 friends	 for	 protection,	 it	 now	 appeared	 that	 both	 Britain	 and	America	were	less	likely	to	come	to	Australia’s	aid	in	a	time	of	crisis.		Accordingly,	a	new	formulation	of	defence	policy	was	required.		George	Ball’s	earlier	predictions	about	US	humiliation	in	Vietnam	–	and	McMahon	Ball’s	 earlier	 fears	about	Australia’s	 reliance	on	America	–	had	been	prophetic.		Five	 years	 after	 Johnson	 ‘Americanised’	 the	 war,	 Nixon	 now	 planned	 to	‘Vietnamise’	it:	to	end	the	war	by	strengthening	the	South	Vietnamese	forces	while	American	forces	were	gradually	withdrawn.		By	31	December,	US	troop	numbers	had	 reached	 a	maximum	 of	 536,100.	 	 Throughout	 1969	 Nixon	 announced	 the	gradual	withdrawal	of	105,000	troops	and	a	similar	number	the	following	year,	so	that	by	1970,	335,000	soldiers	remained.		The	withdrawal	program	continued,	so	that	by	December	1972,	27,000	troops	remained	and	on	29	March	1973	the	last	US	troops	left	Vietnam.190			
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The	 Nixon	 doctrine,	 according	 to	 Peter	 Edwards,	 created	 considerable	nervousness	in	the	capitals	of	America’s	allies,	not	least	Saigon	and	Canberra”.191		This	nervousness	was	no	doubt	exacerbated	by	the	shock	of	America’s	defeat	in	and	withdrawal	from	Vietnam.		As	Coral	Bell	put	it,	“to	argue	that	the	USA,	then	undoubtedly	the	predominant	military	power	of	the	world,	might	not	prevail	in	combat	with	a	small	Asian	society	of	peasant	subsistence-farmers	seemed	like	an	exercise	 in	 fantasy	 to	 many	 well-informed	 analysts	 until	 1968.”192 		 America’s	withdrawal	 from	 Vietnam	 would	 see	 its	 status	 as	 a	 prestigious	 world	 power	questioned.		Indeed,	on	28	January	1973,	journalist	M.	Marder	of	the	Washington	
Post	wrote	“the	credibility	of	the	US	government	was	progressively	crippled	as	the	rationale	 for	 the	 war	 shifted	 from	 checkmating	 world	 Communism	 to	 ‘self-determination’	for	South	Vietnam,	to	protecting	American	commitments	to	saving	American	 prestige,	 to	 averting	 ‘humiliation’,	 to	 defending	 the	 presidency,	 to	rescuing	prisoners.	 	Ultimately,	ending	the	war	became	the	objective	of	the	war	itself”.193		The	basis	of	Australian	foreign	and	defence	policy	for	more	than	twenty	years	was	falling	apart.			Not	 surprisingly,	 the	 collapse	 of	 Cold	 War	 policy	 forced	 many	 in	 Australia	 to	question	 long	 standing	 beliefs	 and	 assumptions	 about	 the	 alliance	 and	 its	importance	for	Australia’s	defence	policy.		Far	from	going	to	show	the	intimacy	of	the	 American-Australian	 relationship,	 America’s	 withdrawal	 from	 Vietnam	without	any	real	consultation	with	Australia	went	to	show	how	fragile	it	now	was.		According	to	Curran,	“all	major	decisions	relating	to	the	withdrawal	of	troops	from	Vietnam	and	its	efforts	to	reach	terms	with	the	enemy	were	carried	out	without	any	 prior	 discussions	with	 the	 Australians.	 	 It	 provoked	 yet	 another	 round	 of	introspection	 in	 Canberra	 as	 to	 the	meaning	of	 the	 alliance”.194		 In	April	 1968,	when	 Johnson	 decided	 to	 scale	 down	America’s	 involvement	 in	 the	war,	 Peter	Howson	stated,	“to	my	mind	it’s	the	first	step	of	the	Americans	moving	out	of	South	East	Asia	…	within	a	few	years,	there’ll	be	no	white	faces	on	the	Asian	mainland	…	
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from	 now	 on,	 and	 to	 a	 much	 greater	 extent,	 we	 shall	 be	 isolated	 and	 on	 our	own”.195		The	question	was	asked	in	The	Economist:	“the	desire	of	most	Australians	to	keep	America	actively	involved	in	Asia	is	strong.		But	…	who	stays	in	the	posse	when	the	marshal	decides	to	get	out	of	town?”196		Keith	Waller,	Ambassador	to	the	United	States	from	1964-1970,	wrote	a	“sombre	report”	 on	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 Nixon	 doctrine:	 the	 United	 States	 had	downgraded	 the	 threat	 of	 communist	 inspired	 expansion	 in	 Asia	 and,	 as	 a	consequence,	 military	 and	 economic	 involvement	 in	 the	 region	 would	 be	downgraded.	 	The	 “US	retreat	 from	Asia”,	meant	not	only	 the	withdrawal	 from	Vietnam,	but	a	“major	withdrawal	from	the	whole	area	west	of	Hawaii”.197		The	phrase	‘west	of	Hawaii’	echoed	the	phrase	‘East	of	Suez’,	a	phrase	that,	in	January	1968,	had	filled	Gorton	and	his	colleagues	with	“anxiety	and	dismay.”198		As	Millar	put	it,	the	Nixon	doctrine	was	far	more	than	a	withdrawal	from	Vietnam	-	it	was	“the	end	of	the	attempt	to	contain	by	military	means	communist-nationalist	forces	in	South-east	Asia”.199		What	the	Nixon	doctrine	symbolized	above	all	else	was	that	the	US	was	abandoning	the	world	wide	struggle	against	Communism,	and	more	particularly	that	it	could	no	longer	play	the	role	of	global	policeman.		America’s	call	on	its	allies	to	take	on	greater	responsibility	for	their	own	defence	called	for	Australia	to	make	a	major	adjustment	in	its	approach	to	foreign	policy	and	its	relationship	with	the	United	States.		This	was	an	adjustment	that	would	not	be	made	easily.		According	to	McLean,	“the	intellectual	adjustment	necessary	for	a	clear	view	of	the	alternative	to	ANZUS	as	the	cornerstone	of	Australia’s	defence	and	foreign	policy	was	 forced	on	Australians	by	the	US	and	British	withdrawal	from	mainland	to	Asia	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s”.200		The	Nixon	doctrine	wound	the	developments	that	had	been	made	in	defence	policy	during	the	1960s	
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back	 several	 years:	 the	 effect	 of	 it	was	 to	 revive	 long-standing	 fears	 about	 the	American	commitment	to	the	defence	of	the	region,	and	whether	the	United	States	would	stand	by	its	ANZUS	obligations.				Indeed,	 the	 Nixon	 doctrine	 was	 “all	 the	 more	 alarming	 to	 Australian	 leaders	because	 without	 the	 presence	 of	 US	 troops	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 Southeast	 Asia,	Australia	 was	 back	 to	 where	 it	 had	 been	 prior	 to	 the	 Vietnam	 war:	 Namely	profoundly	uncertain	about	what	kind	of	protection	ANZUS	afforded	it”.201			A	host	of	Australian	politicians	responded	to	the	crisis	by	seeking	assurances	from	their	ally,	 just	as	 they	had	done	during	Confrontation.	 	 Indeed,	as	Curran	had	 it,	 “the	lingering	 doubts	 about	 future	 American	 policy	 in	 Asia	 took	 shape	 not	 in	 a	declaration	 of	 greater	 Australian	 independence	 from	 the	 alliance	 or	 concerted	effort	 to	 build	 up	 its	 own	 defense,	 but	 in	 the	 continual	 seeking	 of	 yet	 more	American	reassurances	about	its	ANZUS	obligations.”202		It	also	revived	fears	that	America	would	–	after	Australia	had	for	years	sought	a	habitual	closeness	to	the	power	–	fail	to	consult	Australia	in	its	Southeast	Asian	policy-making.	 	 According	 to	 McLean,	 the	 most	 important	 part	 of	 the	 ANZUS	Treaty	was	not	Article	4,	under	which	each	party	was	obliged	to	respond	to	armed	attack	on	either	of	the	others,	but	the	provision	for	a	council	of	foreign	ministers	or	 their	 deputies.	 Australian	 leaders	 hoped	 this	would	 “provide	 the	means	 for	effective	consultation	on	a	continuing	basis,	military	as	well	as	political.”203		The	importance	of	consultative	machinery	lay	“in	the	promise	of	a	direct	Australian	voice	 in	 Washington,	 more	 adequate	 information	 on	 United	 States	 policies	affecting	Australia,	and	Australian	influence	on	the	making	of	those	policies.”204		The	 announcement	 of	 the	 Nixon	 doctrine	 without	 prior	 consultation	 with	Australia	 showed	 how	 this	 policy	 objective	 had	 completely	 failed.	 	 Indeed,	America’s	failure	to	consult	its	Australian	ally	over	the	announcement	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine	 and	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Vietnam	 War	 in	 general	 “rocked	 Australia’s	
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confidence	 in	 the	 alliance.	 	 These	 decisions,	 seemingly	 taken	 without	 any	consideration	of	what	it	might	mean	for	one	of	America’s	most	loyal	allies	in	the	war	 in	 Vietnam,	 only	 added	 to	 the	 pressing	 need	 for	 a	 new	 assessment	 of	 the	relationship.”205																												
																																																								205	Curran	and	Ward,	The	Unknown	Nation,	op.	cit.,	p.	146.	
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CHAPTER	TWO:	JOHN	GORTON	–	AN	INTELLECTUAL	HISTORY		It	 fell	 on	 Gorton	 then,	 to	make	 this	 new	 assessment	 of	 the	 relationship.	 	 This	chapter	 seeks	 to	understand	how	 John	Gorton’s	 ideas	about	 foreign	policy	and	Australia’s	place	in	the	world	took	shape	before	he	became	prime	minister.		It	will	outline	his	ideas	and	beliefs	about	Australia’s	role	in	the	world,	his	understanding	of	 international	 relations	 and	 his	 perspective	 on	 the	 major	 foreign	 policy	questions	 of	 his	 time,	 and	 set	 them	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	 major	contemporary	 themes	 in	 Australian	 political	 history.	 	 Though	 Ian	 Hancock	provided	 an	 overview	 of	 Gorton’s	 worldview	 in	 his	 biography,	 a	 thorough	intellectual	history	that	places	Gorton	properly	within	his	historical	context	has	not	yet	been	written.		Doing	so	will	ground	the	analysis	of	his	actions	and	decision-making	as	prime	minister	properly	within	 the	 context	of	 the	 central	 ideas	and	beliefs	that	underpinned	them.		Gorton	and	his	generation	 lived	 through	a	period	 that	 saw	 the	emergence	 and	impact	of	extremist	political	parties	on	the	rest	of	the	world.		Having	lived	through	the	hardships	of	the	Depression,	Gorton	and	his	contemporaries	lived	in	a	world	that	saw	the	rise	of	militant	nationalism	in	Europe	and	Asia,	most	notably	under	Adolf	Hitler	 in	Germany	and	Emperor	Hirohito	 in	 Japan.	 	Both	nations	pursued	aggressive	and	expansionist	foreign	policies	in	the	1930s	that	led	to	the	outbreak	of	World	War	Two.		As	had	many	other	post-war	parliamentarians,	Gorton	served	in	World	War	Two,	most	notably	as	an	air	force	pilot	in	Singapore,	where	he	was	forced	to	make	a	crash	landing	in	the	South	China	Sea	in	January	1942,	just	days	before	 the	 fall	 of	 Singapore.	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 his	 evacuation	 after	 the	 crash	 he	narrowly	escaped	capture	by	the	Japanese,	the	fate	of	many	of	his	contemporaries	who	were	not	evacuated.	 	This,	along	with	the	legacy	of	totalitarianism	and	the	failure	of	appeasement	in	the	1930s,	had	a	major	influence	on	Gorton’s	ideas	and	beliefs	as	the	Cold	War	developed	after	World	War	Two.	 	Accordingly,	Gorton’s	ideas	did	not	demonstrate	or	give	voice	to	a	distinctive	view	on	foreign	policy	and	international	relations	in	the	1950s	and	1960s;	rather,	they	reflected	views	that	were	common	at	the	time.		The	historian	will	search	in	vain,	therefore,	for	anything	resembling	a	coherent	Gorton	‘doctrine’	or	set	of	beliefs	about	world	affairs.	
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	 World	War	Two:	The	Legacy	of	Appeasement	and	Great	Power	Relations		
The	Legacy	of	Appeasement		Gorton	had	been	profoundly	shaped	by	his	observations	of	Hitler’s	rise	to	power	and	 own	war	 time	 experience.	 	 Both	were	 extremely	 influential	 in	 forming	his	beliefs	about	foreign	affairs	and	defence	policy.		As	a	student	at	Oxford,	Gorton	had	been	exposed	to	the	rise	Nazism	in	Germany.		Though	Hitler	“hadn’t	quite	started	on	the	Jews	and	things,”	he	“had	the	brown	shirts	out	and	I	was	very	much	against	what	he	was	doing.”206		For	Gorton,	seeing	the	rise	of	totalitarianism	in	Germany	in	 the	 1930s	while	 at	 Oxford	was	 “the	main	…	 political	 experience	 that	 I	 had	there.”207			Gorton’s	own	war	time	service	–	as	well	as	the	legacy	of	the	Australian	nation’s	-	left	with	him	a	strong	resolve	to	urge	his	fellow	citizens	to	protect	the	freedoms	fought	for	in	that	conflict.		As	a	member	of	the	Kerang	Shire	Council	he	made	an	emotive	 appeal	 to	 the	 people	 of	 Mystic	 Park	 at	 a	 welcome	 home	 dinner	 for	returned	servicemen	on	3	April	1946.		In	a	tribute	to	Bob	Davey,	a	resident	who	had	not	returned	from	the	war,	Gorton	asked	the	people	to			
call	on	your	imaginations.		I	want	you	to	forget	it	is	I	who	am	standing	
here.		And	I	want	you	to	see	instead	Bob	Davey.		And	behind	him	I	want	
you	to	see	an	army;	regiment	on	regiment	of	young	men,	dead.		They	say	
to	 you,	 ‘Burning	 in	 tanks	 and	 aeroplanes,	 drowning	 in	 submarines,	
shattered	 and	 broken	 by	 high	 explosive	 shells,	 we	 gave	 the	 last	 full	
measure	of	devotion.	 	We	bought	your	freedom	with	our	lives.	 	So	take	
this	freedom.		Guard	it	as	we	have	guarded	it,	use	it	as	we	can	no	longer	
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use	it,	and	with	it	as	a	foundation,	build.		Build	a	world	in	which	meanness	
and	poverty,	tyranny	and	hate,	have	no	existence.208		This	approach	was	typical	of	Gorton’s	generation.		Ernest	May	has	shown	how	the	legacy	of	World	War	Two	influenced	the	formation	of	Cold	War	policy	in	America.		According	to	May,	the	Truman	administration	came	to	see	early	Soviet	expansion	as	analogous	to	the	events	of	the	1930s.		It	was	generally	thought	as	the	Cold	War	developed	that	“the	American	government	had	been	wrong	to	regard	the	Fascists	and	Nazi	 actions	 as	 not	 affecting	 the	 security	of	 the	United	 States.”209		 Indeed,	World	War	Two	had	been	made	inevitable,	ran	the	conventional	wisdom,	because	the	Western	democracies	“had	not	recognised	early	enough	the	menace	to	them	of	 the	 expansionist	 drive	 of	 Fascism	 and	 had	 not	 resisted	 its	 initial	manifestations.”210			This	‘lesson’	of	appeasement	led	to	Truman	adopting	a	more	aggressive	Cold	War	policy:	 “once	Truman	and	 the	men	around	him	perceived	developments	of	 the	 1940s	 as	parallel	 to	 those	 of	 the	1930s,	 they	 applied	 this	moral	and	hence	resolved	to	behave	towards	the	Soviet	Union	as	 they	believed	their	predecessors	should	have	behaved	toward	the	expansionist	states	of	their	time.”211		This	was	also	the	case	in	Australia.		Paul	Twomey	has	shown	that,	though	many	Australian	politicians,	including	Richard	Casey	who	was	at	the	time	a	member	of	the	Lyons	government,	had	favoured	the	appeasement	of	Hitler,212	this	came	to	an	end	after	the	Munich	agreement:	“with	German	demands	for	Danzig	and	the	Polish	corridor	becoming	more	 insistent,	 there	was	an	appreciation	 in	Menzies’s	new	government	 (Lyons	 died	 in	 April)	 that	 there	 should	 be	 no	 more	 Munich-style	
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agreements.” 213 		 	 This	 appreciation	 flowed	 into	 the	 foreign	 policy	 outlook	 of	conservative	Australian	governments	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.214		The	ministers	making	up	Menzies’	first	cabinet	were	likely	to	respond	to	a	crisis	with	reference	to	the	Second	World	War:	ten	of	Menzies’	seventeen	colleagues	in	his	first	cabinet	had	held	ministerial	positions	between	1939	and	1941,	and	three	had	served	in	the	armed	 forces.215		Menzies	himself	 insisted	on	 the	 “rubric	of	war,	 and,	more	than	 most,	 he	 conceptualised	 the	 Cold	 War	 by	 reflecting	 on	 Australia’s	involvement	in	the	Second	World	War.”216		As	American	historian	Allan	Bullock	put	 it,	 “this	was	 a	 generation	 for	whom	war	 and	 occupation	were	 not	 remote	hypotheses	but	recent	and	terrible	experiences”.217				After	being	elected	to	the	Senate	in	1950,	Gorton	encouraged	Australia	to	be	ready	to	mobilise	against	communism.		In	his	maiden	speech	on	1	March	1950	he	warned	Australia	of	the	danger	of	finding	itself	in	a	position	by	which	it	was	unprepared	to	meet	a	communist	threat	from	China.		Labelling	Labor’s	attitude	to	Australian	defence	as	“extremely	dangerous”,218	he	went	on	to	state	that	“having	served	in	the	last	war,	I	say	that	we	cannot	be	sure	that	the	conditions	which	obtained	then	would	be	repeated	in	the	event	of	another	war.”219				Referring	directly	to	the	spread	of	communism	into	Asia,	he	stated	that	“it	may	well	 be	 that	 the	 ominous	 shadow	which	 is	 now	 creeping	down	 through	China,	threatening	Malaya	 and	 Indonesia	 and	 coming	 closer	 to	 the	 near	 north	of	 this	country,	will	 reach	us	without	warning.”220		The	 legacy	of	World	War	Two	and	Australia’s	 undoubted	 unpreparedness	 for	 that	 conflict	 was	 fresh	 in	 Gorton’s																																																									213	Ibid.,	p.	34.	214	According	to	David	Lowe,	“imagining	another	world	war	was	something	Liberal	and	Country	Party	members	were	much	more	inclined	to	do	than	were	their	Labor	counterparts.”		David	Lowe,	Menzies	and	the	Great	World	Struggle:	
Australia’s	Cold	War,	1948-1954,	University	of	New	South	Wales	Press,	Sydney,	1999,	p.	21.	215	Ibid.,	p.	49.	216	Ibid.,	p.	73.	217	Ibid.,	p.	7.	218	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	1	March	1950,	pp.	180-181.	219	Ibid.,	p.	205.	220	Ibid.	
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mind.	 	Likely	as	a	direct	result	of	his	own	experience	of	 the	 fall	of	Singapore	 in	1942,	 Gorton	 also	 foresaw	 Britain’s	 inability	 (or	 unwillingness)	 to	 come	 to	Australia’s	aid	in	a	future	conflict,	stating	that	“we	shall	not	have	those	months	of	preparation	which	last	time	were	bought	for	us	by	the	suffering	and	sacrifices	of	our	kinsfolk	in	Britain.”221				
Great	Power	Relations		To	achieve	the	ultimate	foreign	policy	goal	of	securing	a	peaceful	world,	or	at	least	one	in	which	there	was	no	actual	armed	conflict,	Gorton	acknowledged	that	“one	of	 the	 fundamental	 factors	 to	which	Australia	clings	 in	seeking	that	result	 is	 its	firm,	 irrevocable	 and	 eternal	 position	 as	 part	 of	 the	 British	 Commonwealth	 of	Nations.”222		 Indeed,	when	 discussing	Australia’s	 involvement	 in	Malaya	 on	 28	April	1955,	he	referred	to	the	happy	situation	in	which	both	Australia	and	Great	Britain	were	working	to	achieve	their	joint	interests	in	Southeast	Asia:	the	defeat	of	communist	forces	there	and	the	preservation	of	a	non-communist	government.		According	to	Gorton,	“that	is	what	the	United	Kingdom	is	working	for,	and	that	is	what	Australia	will	be	working	for,	if	it	assists	the	United	Kingdom.”223		For	Gorton,	the	only	way	to	prevent	communist	nations	from	“putting	their	beliefs	to	the	test	is	to	build	up	our	strength	by	alliances	and	by	military	power.”224			Still,	 Gorton	 regarded	 it	 as	 essential	 for	 Australia	 to	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 make	diverging	policy	when	required.		Australia	was	part	of	the	Commonwealth,	“but	it	is	a	part	of	that	British	Commonwealth	situated	in	Asia	and	in	the	Pacific.		Because	Australia	is	so	situated,	it	will	inevitably	have	to	follow	its	own	policy	from	time	to	time.		That	policy	may	differ	from	that	followed	by	the	United	Kingdom.”225		Britain	could	play	a	role	in	strengthening	Australian	security,	but	Australia	could	not	rely	on	this	relationship	alone	for	this,	and	indeed	had	to	be	prepared	and	ready	to	act	in	a	self-reliant	fashion	to	achieve	this	if	necessary.		This	is	a	point	of	view	that	no																																																									221	Ibid.	222	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	7	October	1953,	p.	402.	223	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	28	April	1955,	p.	128.	224	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	27	June	1951,	pp.	475-476.	225	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	7	October	1953,	p.	402.	
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doubt	 developed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Britain’s	 perceived	 failure	 to	 act	 as	 Australia’s	protector	in	the	Pacific	in	World	War	Two.		Indeed,	the	Fall	of	Singapore	developed	in	Gorton	a	great	mistrust	of	placing	too	great	an	emphasis	on	superpower	allies.		As	Hancock	put	it,	his	cynicism	and	suspicion	of	other	nations	“flourished	after	he	had	seen	at	first	hand	the	wartime	collapse	of	Singapore,	the	disintegration	of	a	whole	defence	concept	based	on	an	erroneous	premise.”226		According	to	Gorton,	Britain	had	three	spheres	of	interest:	Europe	primarily,	the	Mediterranean	and	the	Middle	East	secondarily,	and	then	India.		Speaking	to	the	legacy	of	World	War	Two,	it	was	“only	after	all	those	matters	have	been	dealt	with”	that	 Britain	 was	 able	 to	 “give	 its	 interest	 to	 the	 Pacific	 and	 the	 Far	 East.” 227		Australia’s	key	sphere	of	interest	after	World	War	Two	for	Gorton	was	Southeast	Asia.		Though	Great	Britain	understandably	had	to	act	according	to	its	three	key	spheres	of	interest,	Gorton	claimed	that	“we	do	not.	 	Our	urgent	and	immediate	interests	lie	in	the	Pacific	and	the	countries	of	Asia	that	are	contiguous	to	us.”228		Accordingly,	it	was	only	natural	for	Gorton	that	Australia	should	have	policies	that	differed	 from	 those	 of	 Great	 Britain’s:	 “from	 time	 to	 time	 there	 must	 be	 a	difference	 between	 Australia	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 on	 matters	 of	 policy,	emphasis	on	policy	or	priority	of	policy.”229			Gorton	grasped	the	reality	of	a	changing	post-war	world,	and	especially	Britain’s	decreasing	influence	as	a	global	power	and	Australia’s	need	to	rely	increasingly	on	itself	and	America	to	protect	its	interests	in	Southeast	Asia.		On	11	August	1954	he	said,	 after	 noting	 the	decreasing	 influence	 of	Britain	 and	 the	British	 navy,	 that	“American	power	can	help	to	restore	the	balance.”230		Indeed,	on	27	June	1951	he	stated	that	a	Pacific	Pact	with	America	was	the	best	way	of	ensuring	Australian	security.		In	the	context	of	preventing	Japanese	rearmament,	Gorton	declared	that	Australia	had	found	“the	best	method	in	that	Pacific	Pact	which	has	grown	out	of	
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	 62	
the	 projected	 peace	 treaty.”231		 It	 had	 been	 America,	 and	 not	 Britain,	 that	 had	‘saved’	Australia	in	World	War	Two,	and	Gorton	took	this	lesson	with	him,	as	did	other	conservatives,	into	the	Cold	War.232		The	 identification	 of	 the	 Pacific	 region	 as	 fundamental	 to	 Australian	 security	interests	was	not	new	to	Australian	diplomacy.		Neither	was	the	desire	to	look	to	America	and	the	formation	of	a	Pacific	Pact	to	achieve	this.		In	1911	Alfred	Deakin	had	asserted	that,	due	to	“British	indifference”	Australia	must	have	a	Pacific	policy	of	 its	own.233		According	 to	Meaney,	Australians	 turned	 to	America	 in	 the	early	twentieth	century	to	“shield	them	against	the	‘Yellow	Peril,’”	and	then	in	the	Cold	War	years	America	took	its	place	alongside	Britain	“as	one	of	Australia’s	‘great	and	powerful	 friends.’”234		 In	1939,	on	 the	eve	of	 a	 another	European	war,	Menzies	informed	 the	 British	 that	 his	 government	 would	 appoint	 its	 own	 diplomatic	representatives	to	the	major	Pacific	powers	because	Australia	ran	the	prime	risks	and	bore	the	major	responsibilities	for	the	British	Empire	in	that	area;235	indeed,	as	Menzies	put	it,	“what	Great	Britain	calls	the	Far	East	is	to	us	the	near	North.”236		And	at	 the	end	of	1941,	 as	 Japan	entered	 the	war	and	 it	became	clear	 that	 the	British	base	in	Singapore	would	not	hold	against	Japanese	advances,	Labor	Prime	Minister	John	Curtin	stated	that	“free	from	any	pangs	as	to	our	traditional	links	or																																																									231	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	27	June	1951,	p.	474.	232	Gorton	viewed	the	alliance	through	a	lens	of	what	best	served	Australia’s	own	national	interests	and	was	particularly	enthusiastic	about	standardising	military	equipment	with	America.		On	8	May	1957	he	voiced	his	pleasure	with	Menzies’	indications	to	standardise	with	the	United	States	in	respect	of	“small	arms,	aircraft,	gun	howitzers	and	the	ammunition	they	will	use.”		Referring	to	Menzies’	comments,	Gorton	stated	that	“I	have	advocated	such	steps	in	the	Senate	for	two	or	three	years,	because	it	seems	to	be	plain	that	our	commitments	under	the	ANZUS	Pact,	and	under	the	SEATO	Pact,	if	we	are	called	upon	to	fulfill	them,	will	find	us	side	by	side	either	with	Americans	or	with	the	troops	of	other	nations	who	are	equipped	entirely	with	American	equipment.”		Commonwealth	
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kinship	with	the	United	Kingdom,”	Australia	would	look	to	the	United	States	for	help.”237		Though	this	statement	never	amounted	to	a	wholesale	shift	in	Australian	foreign	policy,238	reliance	on	the	British	by	this	stage	was	“no	longer	seen	as	an	adequate	basis	for	Australian	security.”239				The	focus	on	the	Pacific	and	turn	to	America	continued	to	develop	after	the	Second	World	War,	the	very	period	in	which	Gorton	began	to	play	a	role	in	federal	politics.		As	 the	Cold	War	 took	 shape	 in	1948	and	1949,	 the	need	 for	a	 Pacific-focussed	arrangement	 with	 America	 developed	 in	 urgency. 240 		 Spender	 had	 been	enthusiastic	about	a	Pacific	Pact	with	the	United	States	since	the	late	1930s,	and	in	February	1949	stated	that	the	security	of	the	Pacific	rested	“almost	solely	with	the	United	States”,	calling	for	“a	Pacific	Pact	similar	to	the	Atlantic	Pact.”241		The	election	of	Menzies	and	developments	in	the	1950s	brought	the	focus	on	Southeast	Asia	 and	 reliance	 on	 alliances	 to	 the	 forefront	 of	 Australian	 diplomacy	 and	security:	the	“logic	of	history	and	inherited	ideas	about	the	nature	of	Australian	foreign	policy”	were	 restored	 to	 their	 rightful	prominence,	namely	 from	a	dual	focus	on	the	Middle	East	and	the	local	region,	to	a	more	exclusive	concentration	on	 Southeast	 Asia,	 but	 all	 was	 encompassed	 within	 the	 norms	 of	 alliance	patterns.”242				It	was	in	this	context	that	Gorton	operated	in	the	Senate	in	the	1950s.		Accordingly,	Gorton	was	no	doubt	heavily	influenced	by	discussions	about	Australia’s	status	as	a	middle	power	and	the	importance	of	a	strong	alliance	with	America.		The	part	America	had	played	in	the	Pacific	during	World	War	Two	had	demonstrated	it	was																																																									237	Meaney,	“Australia,	the	Great	Powers	and	the	Coming	of	the	Cold	War”,	op.	cit.,	p.	319.	238	See	Curran,	James,	Curtin’s	Empire,	Cambridge	University	Press,	New	York,	2011.	239	Meaney,	“Australia,	the	Great	Powers	and	the	Coming	of	the	Cold	War”,	op.	cit.,	p.	319.	240	Ibid.,	p.	329.	241	Meaney,	Under	New	Heavens,	op.	cit.,	p.	426.	242	David	Lowe,	“Divining	a	Labor	Line:	Conservative	Construction	of	Labor’s	Foreign	Policy,	1944-49”,	in	David	Lee	and	Christopher	Walters	(eds),	Evatt	to	
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the	only	power	that	had	the	capacity	 to	defend	Australia.	 	Gorton	called	on	the	Senate	to	“remember	that	during	World	War	Two	the	United	States	of	America	gave	to	the	Pacific	the	precedence	and	importance	equal	at	least	to	that	given	to	Europe	and	greater	than	that	which	any	other	country	could	give	to	it.”243		Gorton	described	America	as	“the	greatest	power	in	the	world	today,”244	and	regarded	its	support	as	“the	most	effective	guarantee	for	a	Pacific	power	against	attack	from	the	north.”245				This	did	not	mean,	however,	that	he	sought	security	by	blindly	following	or	was	prepared	to	be	beholden	to	either	of	them.		Indeed,	though	he	saw	the	benefits	of	a	relationship	with	such	powers,	he	also	appreciated	Australia’s	need	to	be	able	to	act	independently	of	them	if	Australia’s	own	unique	interests	required	it	to	do	so.		He	was	concerned	that	the	forward	defence	posture	made	Australia	appear	too	subservient	 to	 Britain	 and	 America,	 a	 favourite	 theme	 of	 the	 Labor	 Party,	especially	 its	 left	 wing.	 	 Gorton	 did	 not	 approve	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 stationing	Australian	forces	in	Southeast	Asia,	preferring	to	have	forces	based	in	Australia	that	would	be	equipped	and	prepared	to	fight	in	Southeast	Asia,	if	necessary.246		According	to	Gorton,	 “we	must,	as	Australians,	because	we	do	 live	here,	decide	what	we	think	is	best	for	us	in	this	part	of	the	world,	and,	no	matter	with	whom	we	are	in	agreement	or	disagreements,	put	our	views,	not	brashly	or	noisily,	but	firmly	to	the	great	powers	under	whose	protection	we	live,	the	United	States	of	America	and	Great	Britain.”247				Indeed,	Australia’s	relationship	with	America	in	itself	was	not	the	primary	goal	of	Australian	foreign	policy	for	Gorton.		As	he	had	said	in	the	Senate	on	11	August	1954,	“we	must	 try	to	assess	 the	position	of	Australia	 in	 the	world	today	 in	an	endeavor	to	foresee	what	may	happen	that	will	affect	this	country.		We	must	then	try	to	decide	what	we	can	do,	or	try	to	do,	if	we	are	so	affected.”248		Gorton	still																																																									243	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	7	October	1953,	p.	403.	244	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	27	June	1951,	pp.	474-475.	245Ibid.,	p.	475.	246	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	193.	247	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	11	August	1954,	p.	150.	248	Ibid.,	pp.	149-150.	
	 65	
wanted	Australia	to	be	able	to	put	its	views,	‘not	brashly	or	noisily,	but	firmly’	to	its	 American	 ally.	 	 If	 it	 did	 this,	 as	 Gorton	wanted	 it	 to	 do,	 there	would	 be	 no	question	 for	 Gorton	 of	 “falling	 under	 the	 domination	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	America,	as	some	critics	outside	the	Parliament	say.”249		Accordingly,	though	Gorton	regarded	America	as	“the	greatest	ally	we	have	in	this	part	of	the	world,”250	he	did	not	want	the	relationship	with	America	to	become	one	characterised	by	Australian	subservience.	 	Indeed,	he	did	not	see	why	the	mere	fact	Australian	and	American	interests	and	therefore	policy	might	be	in	unison	at	times	 should	 lead	 to	allegations	of	 subservience.	 	 For	Gorton,	 as	Australia	was	primarily	interested	in	what	happened	in	Asia	and	as	America	also	had	interests	in	that	area,	it	was	only	natural	that	there	would	be	occasions	“when	our	policy	will	run	concurrently	with	that	of	the	United	States	of	America.”251		He	was	“sorry	to	think	that	when	that	happens	some	people	will	say	that	we	are	being	dragged	at	the	heels	of	the	United	States	of	America,”	and	called	on	those	who	might	say	so	to	 “produce	 the	 proof.” 252 		 He	 reiterated	 that	 “the	 fact	 that	 our	 policies	 run	concurrently	 on	 occasions	 is	 not	 in	 itself	 proof	 that	 either	 one	 or	 the	 other	 is	leading	in	any	way	at	all.”253	
	 The	Coming	of	the	Cold	War	and	Communism	in	Asia	
	
The	Coming	of	the	Cold	War		Menzies’	preference	for	alliances	with	great	powers	over	liberal	internationalism	shaped	Cold	War	politics	in	Australia	for	the	two	decades	after	Menzies’	election	in	1949.		As	Meaney	put	it,	“the	Liberal-Country	party	coalition	which	governed	Australia	from	1950	to	1972	found	it	relatively	easy	to	adapt	to	this	new	world.		British	 and	 American	 definitions	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 as	 the	 defence	 of	 ‘Western	
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Civilisation’	 or	 ‘The	 Free	 World’	 against	 Communist	 imperialism	 resonated	throughout	Australian	political	life.”254				Sitting	 comfortably	 with	 the	 conservative	 approach	 to	 Cold	War	 loyalties	 and	international	 relations,	Gorton	 preferred	 alliances	with	great	 powers	 to	 liberal	internationalism.		Expressing	views	in	his	early	speeches	that	were	popular	with	the	 anti-communists	 on	 the	 right-wing	 of	 the	 Liberal	 Party,	 Gorton	 saw	communism	as	a	monolithic	revolutionary	movement,	headquartered	in	Moscow,	that	had	as	its	goal	world	domination.		This	was	a	widely	held	view	in	Canberra,	especially	by	1951,	a	year	which	saw	the	portrayal	of	the	Soviets	as	“ideologically	driven,	remorseless,	ruthless,	patient	and	cunning	 in	 the	extreme	in	their	 long-term	quest	to	impose	communism	on	the	rest	of	the	world.”255		The	United	Nations	was	 not	 the	 appropriate	 entity	 to	 stop	 such	 a	 threat.	 	 For	 Gorton,	 the	 United	Nations	 had	 “not	 been	 able	 to	 live	 up	 to	 the	 hopes	 one	 had	 placed	 in	 it”,	 and	therefore	the	international	community	could	not	trust	it	with	the	important	task	of	preventing	the	spread	of	communism.256				A	reliance	on	great	powers	as	opposed	to	liberal	internationalism	was	a	common	tenet	of	conservative	thought	in	the	early	decades	of	the	Cold	War.	 	Indeed,	the	conservative	mistrust	of	the	United	Nations	was	indicative	of	the	bipolar	Cold	War	world	 in	 which	 Menzies’	 Liberal	 government	 was	 operating:	 in	 March	 1949	Spender	 stated	 that	 “it	 must	 never	 be	 forgotten	 that	 as	 (United	 Nations)	membership	includes	representatives	of	all	the	groups	of	the	world,	it	may	contain	those	who	are	working	 to	disrupt	 the	order	we	believe	 in.”257		Even	Evatt	had	acknowledged	 that	 the	United	Nations	offered	 “no	absolute	guarantees	against	armed	 conflict	 and	 aggression”,	 and	 that	 a	 nation	would	 have	 to	 “fall	 back	 on	
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regional	arrangements	and	ultimately	upon	its	own	defence	forces	and	those	of	its	allies”	if	collective	security	was	found	wanting.258				Seeking	 to	 resolve	 international	 disputes	 by	 means	 other	 than	 international	cooperation	 and	 negotiation	 was	 not	 necessarily	 peculiar	 to	 the	 Liberal	government.		In	the	context	of	the	Cold	War,	Labor	too	was	prepared	to	use	the	great	powers	if	it	served	their	interests	to	do	so.		Meaney	has	shown	that,	despite	Chifley	 and	Evatt’s	 ideals	 and	 promotion	of	 liberal	 internationalism,	 even	 they	were	unable	to	escape	the	great	power	politics	of	the	Cold	War	as	it	developed	in	the	late	1940s.	 	Responding	to	the	escalation	of	Cold	War	tensions	in	1948	and	1949,	 “Evatt	 allowed	 that	 in	 these	 new	 circumstances	 the	 principles	 of	 justice	upon	which	the	United	Nations	was	based	might	have	to	give	way	to	the	demands	of	 expediency.”259		 Lowe	 suggested	 the	 point	 at	which	 “Australian	 officialdom	began	 to	 speak	 the	 language	 of	 Cold	War	 polarisation	 and	 abandon	 its	 liberal	internationalism”260	may	have	been	when	Australia	provided	40	Royal	Australian	Air	 Force	 air	 crew	 to	 fly	 supply	 runs	 to	 blockaded	 Berlin.	 	 At	 this	 point	 Evatt	“seemed	 to	 shift	 ground	 on	 the	 European	 and	 global	 scene.” 261 		 Accordingly,	though	the	conservatives	were	more	explicit	in	their	preference	for	great	power	relations	as	opposed	to	liberal	internationalism,	looking	to	nations	like	Britain	to	bolster	the	protection	of	Australia	was	a	feature	of	the	Australian	outlook	across	the	political	spectrum.		It	was	Menzies’	new	government	though	that	“saw	restoration	of	good	relations	with	its	major	allies,	Britain	and	the	United	States,	as	crucial.”262		Indeed,	Spender	stated	 that	 the	 preservation	 of	 peace	was	 best	 pursued	 through	 “co-operation	with,	 in	 his	 ordering,	 Britain,	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 nations	 of	 the	 British	commonwealth,	 and	 the	 United	 Nations.” 263 		 Menzies’	 other	 External	 Affairs																																																									258	HV	Evatt	in	Meaney,	“Australia,	the	Great	Powers	and	the	Coming	of	the	Cold	War”,	op.	cit.,	p.	323.	259	Ibid.,	p.	327.	260	Lowe,	Menzies	and	the	Great	World	Struggle,	op.	cit.,	p.	30.	261	Ibid.	262	Ibid.,	p.	70.	263	Nicholas	Brown,	Governing	Prosperity:	Social	Change	and	Social	Analysis	in	
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ministers	 (Casey,	 Barwick	 and	 Hasluck)	 all	 questioned	 the	 wisdom	 of	 Evatt’s	devotion	to	the	United	Nations	too,	often	“stressing	its	‘experimental’	status,	and	by	 lumping	 it	with	 other	 intangibles	 in	 a	 ‘theory’	 versus	 ‘reality’	 dichotomy	 in	world	 affairs,”264 	and	 Nicholas	 Brown	 has	 shown	 that	 Spender	 gave	 external	affairs	“a	distinctive	realist	stamp”	as	compared	to	Evatt.265				
Communism	in	Asia		The	year	1950	is	often	seen	as	marking	the	spread	of	the	Cold	War	into	Asia.		Stalin	signed	a	30-year	treaty	of	 friendship,	alliance	and	mutual	aid	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	in	February,	pro-independence	forces	had	for	some	time	been	launching	violent	attacks	in	Malaya,	Vietnam	and	the	Philippines,	and	communist	North	Korean	 troops	 attacked	 South	Korea	 in	 June.	 	 These	 events	 brought	 the	tensions	of	 the	bipolar	European	Cold	War	to	the	Asia-Pacific	region:	“with	the	success	of	the	Communist	Revolution	in	China	and	the	outbreak	of	hostilities	in	Korea	 the	 Cold	War	was	 extended	 to	Asia.”266		 Gorton	 believed	 the	 developing	Southeast	Asian	region	to	be	most	threatened	by	communist	expansion,	and	the	part	 of	 the	world	most	 relevant	 to	 Australia’s	 interests.	 	 On	 28	 April	 1955	 he	referred	 to	 Asia,	 “fluid	 and	 in	 ferment,”	 as	 the	 place	 “where	 we	 can	 expect	Communist	 expansion	 to	 take	 place.” 267 		 Part	 of	 Southeast	 Asia	 and	 far	 from	Britain,	“the	centre	of	gravity	of	world	affairs	has	moved	closer	to	us	than	it	has	ever	been	in	our	history,	and	the	decisions	which	we	take	here	may	well	have	an	effect	on	the	future	of	this	country	greater	than	that	of	any	decisions	ever	taken	before.”268				Gorton	called	for	Australia	to	have	a	united	policy	with	America	and	Great	Britain	in	 response	 to	 China’s	 expansion	 into	 Formosa	 and	 the	 Pescadores,	 one	 that	
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involved	saying	“so	far	and	no	further”	to	China.269		Adopting	such	an	approach	was	necessary	to	avoid	the	mistakes	made	in	the	lead	up	to	World	War	Two	and	to	preserve	peace.		According	to	Gorton,	if	Australia	went	on	as	it	went	on	when	he	was	a	young	man,	“when	the	democracies	conceded	the	Rhineland,	conceded	Austria,	 and	conceded	Czechoslovakia,	we	 shall	 again	have	 to	 fight	 for	survival	under	the	worst	possible	conditions.”270		To	spare	another	war,	Gorton	believed	it	necessary	to	stop	communism	before	it	had	a	chance	to	develop	momentum	in	its	advance	into	the	Pacific.		
China		With	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 into	 Asia	 Gorton	 argued	 against	 diplomatic	recognition	of	communist	China,	asking	rhetorically,	“what	advantage	in	the	cause	of	world	peace	can	we	hope	to	get	from	recognition	of	red	China?”271		He	did	not	see	any	advantages	coming	from	the	recognition	or	acceptance	of	China:		
if	we	look	at	the	world	today	we	will	see	focal	point	after	focal	point	of	
danger	and	of	quarrelling,	and	in	almost	all	these	points	–	indeed,	in	all	
but	one	of	them	–	we	will	see	that	trouble,	the	danger	of	war	and	collision	
are	arising	because	dissension	has	been	deliberately	stirred	up	by	one	or	
other	of	the	great	Communist	countries.272				He	concluded	that	to	recognise	China	could	cause	“grave	disadvantages	to	the	free	world.”273		The	consequences	of	such	recognition	for	the	functioning	of	the	United	Nations	 and	 therefore	world	 peace	 could	 be	 dire.	 	 Though	 the	 United	 Nations	Charter	provided	that	a	country	that	was	involved	in	a	dispute	should	not	use	its	power	 of	 veto	 in	 relation	 to	 that	 dispute,	 Gorton	 had	 concerns	 about	 the	implications	 of	 China	 being	 admitted	 to	 the	 Security	 Council:	 “if	 Russia	 were	involved	in	a	dispute	in	Europe,	how	handy	it	would	be	for	it	if	China	vetoed	action																																																									269	Ibid.,	p.	129.	270	Ibid.	271	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	7	October	1953,	p.	404.	272	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	1	May	1957,	p.	524.	273	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	7	October	1953,	p.	404.	
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proposed	to	be	taken	to	counter	Russian	aggression.		And	how	handy	it	would	be	for	China,	if	Russia	vetoed	action	proposed	to	be	taken	against	Chinese	aggression	in	Asia.”274		In	discussing	the	‘advantages’	and	‘disadvantages’	that	diplomatic	recognition	of	China	 brought	 with	 it,	 Gorton	 was	 using	 language	 that	 reflected	 the	 accord	between	 his	 own	 thoughts	 and	 the	 thoughts	 of	 Menzies	 and	 his	 government.		Indeed,	the	main	reason	for	Menzies	and	Spender	deciding	to	not	follow	the	British	cabinet’s	lead	in	recognising	China	in	December	1949	was	that	Australia	was	“not	convinced	that	recognition	would	offer	Australia	any	compensating	advantages	for	what	appeared	 to	be	 certain	disadvantages.”275		 Sandra	Penrose	has	argued	that,	in	the	case	of	the	first	Menzies	ministry,	it	was	“a	question	of	circumstances	delaying	 recognition	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China,	 rather	 than	 ideological	hostility	or	dependence	preventing	it.”276		Menzies	believed	that,	since	the	Chinese	communists	had	not	given	any	 indication	they	would	 respect	 international	 law	when	 dealing	 with	 other	 nations,	 recognition	 would	 not	 encourage	 China	 to	comply	with	international	law,	that	recognition	would	not	stop	China	from	making	trouble	in	neighbouring	Asia	given	their	evident	determination	to	do	so,	and	that	recognition	would	mark	a	withdrawal	of	support	from	Chinese	Nationalist	forces	Australia	had	been	allied	with	during	World	War	Two.		Also,	he	did	not	want	to	be	quick	to	recognise	a	government	that	not	only	would	increase	representation	of	communist	states	in	the	Security	Council	and	other	United	Nations	bodies,	but	also	vote	with	the	Soviet	bloc.277		
The	Domino	Theory		The	 acceptance	 of	 the	 domino	 theory,	 a	 term	 coined	 by	 American	 President	Eisenhower	 in	 April	 1954	 to	 describe	 the	 threat	 of	 Asian	 nations	 falling	 like																																																									274	Ibid,	pp.	404-405.	275	Sandra	Penrose,	“Recognising	the	People’s	Republic	of	China:	A	Reappraisal	of	Australian	Foreign	Policy	During	the	First	Menzies	Ministry	1950-51,”	Australian	
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dominoes	 to	 communism,	 coloured	 the	 conservative	 Australian	 government’s	outlook	on	Australia’s	role	in	Asia	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.	 	After	Mao	Zedong’s	communist	 revolution	 in	China	 in	1949	and	 in	 the	 context	of	decolonisation	 in	Southeast	 Asia,	 Menzies’	 government	 came	 to	 view	 Southeast	 Asia	 as	 the	battleground	for	democracy.		As	Twomey	has	shown,	Spender’s	enunciation	of	a	kind	of	‘domino’	theory	-	a	judgement	that	was	also	held	by	Casey,	his	successor	as	Minister	 for	External	Affairs	–	was	endorsed	by	Menzies’	cabinet	 in	1954.278		The	impact	of	the	apparently	inexorable	spread	of	communism	to	Asian	nations	was	clear	for	Gorton:			
we	 have	 seen	 state	 after	 state	 throughout	 the	 world	 fall	 under	
Communist	domination.	 	Does	not	 this	happen	every	time?	 	That	state	
becomes	militarised;	 that	state	becomes	sealed	from	the	truth	or	 from	
any	 free	discussion	that	seeks	 to	 find	out	 the	truth;	 that	state	–	 this	 is	
what	concerns	us	–	always	becomes	a	base	 for	 further	expansion,	or	a	
base	for	exerting	pressure	on	neighbouring	countries	if	the	risk	of	further	
expansion	seems	too	great.279				The	consequences	of	this	expansion	were	great	for	Australia,	perhaps	greater	than	the	threat	of	Japanese	militarism	during	World	War	Two.		If,	according	to	Gorton,	Asian	 nations	 “did	 become	 Communist	 nations,	 we	 should	 be	 in	 a	 position	analogous	to	that	in	which	we	would	have	been	in	the	last	war	if	all	these	countries	had	been	allied	 to,	 friendly	with,	 and	co-operating	with,	 Japan.”280		Considering	Gorton’s	 background	 and	 the	 conservative	 understanding	 of	 communism	 as	 a	monolithic	force,	it	is	not	surprising	that	Gorton	held	such	views.						The	ready	acceptance	of	the	domino	theory	was	born	of	a	misunderstanding	of	the	exact	nature	of	revolutionary	movements	in	Southeast	Asia.		Many	politicians	did	not	 fully	 appreciate	 the	 nationalistic	 elements	 of	 revolutionary	 movements	 in	Southeast	Asia	and,	as	Murphy	has	shown,	the	amalgamation	of	nationalism	and																																																									278	Twomey,	“Munich”,	op.	cit.,	p.	185.	279	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	11	August	1954,	p.	151.	280	Ibid.	
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communism	in	the	context	of	decolonisation	in	Vietnam	was	poorly	understood	in	Australia	 in	 the	1950s,	 especially	by	 conservative	groups.281		 In	 relation	 to	 the	situation	 in	 Vietnam,	Menzies’	 focus	 on	 Cold	War	 discourse	 did	 away	with	 the	recognition	of	any	nationalist	element	of	such	movements	and	instead	focussed	on	 the	 perceived	 insidious	 influence	 of	 Communism. 282 		 Accordingly	 the	conservatives,	including	Gorton,	were	“locked	into	a	conceptual	framework	which	drew	a	haze	over	historical	reflection,	and	within	which	it	was	difficult	enough	to	accord	legitimacy	to	a	nationalist	social	movement,	and	harder	still	to	distinguish	the	unique	intertwining	of	nationalist,	patriotic	and	revolutionary	sentiments	in	Vietnamese	 decolonisation.” 283 		 Conservatives	 argued	 that	 the	 nationalist	aspirations	of	 the	Vietnamese	had	been	“captured	and	manipulated	by	external	influences;	 revolution	 was	 an	 alien	 import	 reflecting	 Soviet	 expansion	 and	subversion	rather	than	the	dynamics	of	colonial	rule	and	decolonisation.”284			This	 narrow	 interpretation	 applied	 to	 the	 whole	 of	 Southeast	 Asia	 and	 other	conflicts	 in	 the	 region,	 such	 as	 the	Malayan	Emergency	 and	Confrontation.	 	 As	Murphy	put	it,	“the	political	configuration	of	the	Cold	War	was	far	from	conducive	to	reasoned	debate	on	 issues	of	Southeast	Asian	decolonisation	and	the	role	of	nationalist	and	communist	movement	…	and	the	heavy	overlay	of	 the	domestic	Cold	War	meant	that	public	discourse	on	Asia	was	preoccupied	with	threats,	fears	and	protestations	of	loyalty.”285		As	Meaney	stated,	“the	Australian	policy	makers	saw	in	these	developments	what	Menzies	called	 ‘the	southward	thrust	of	China	between	the	Indian	and	Pacific	Oceans’.		The	whole	region	appeared	to	be	caught	up	 in	 a	 pattern	 of	 communist	 and	 communist-inspired	 aggression	 and	subversion.”286				
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In	line	with	conservative	thinking,	Gorton	regarded	the	Malayan	Emergency	not	simply	 as	 an	 example	 of	 ethnic	 Chinese	 fighting	 against	 the	 oppression	 of	colonialism,	but	rather,	the	result	of	communist	aggressors	seeking	to	overthrow	the	government.		On	28	April	1955	he	observed	that,	though	it	was	“about	seven	years	 ago	 that	 the	 Communists	 in	 Malaya	 took	 to	 the	 jungle”	 to	 embark	 on	 a	campaign	of	“ambush	and	killing,	with	the	intention	of	disrupting	the	rubber	and	tin	industries	of	Malaya,	and	finally,	by	destroying	the	economy	and	by	pouring	the	blood,	not	of	the	English	only,	but	of	the	English	and	Malays	onto	the	floor	of	Malaya,”	 by	 1955	 they	 had	 failed	 to	 obtain	 popular	 support	 from	 the	Malayan	people.287		Therefore	the	insurgency	did	not	qualify	as	a	nationalistic	movement.		The	communists	in	Malaya	did	not	represent	the	people	but,	rather,	worked	for	“their	masters	in	China.”288		The	fact	that	the	Chinese	insurgents	had	had	to	resort	to	force	against	the	local	population	 on	 several	 occasions	 demonstrated	 to	 Gorton	 how	 little	 popular	support	the	communists	had.		He	concluded	that,	“if,	from	the	native	population,	there	can	be	raised	a	force	resistant	to	insurrection	of	this	kind,	the	indication	is	that	the	insurrection	does	not	have	the	support	of	the	people	in	that	country.”289		In	 an	 article	 published	 in	 The	 Age	 on	 8	 March	 1955	 entitled	 ‘Australia’s	Responsibility	in	Malaya,’	Gorton	wrote	that	it	was	wrong	to	suggest	that	the	bulk	of	 the	 local	 population	 supported	 the	 guerrillas	 and	 that,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 the	people	 of	 Malaya	 realised	 that	 “Communist	 resort	 to	 force	 would	 have	 to	 be	resisted	 by	 force.”290		 Accordingly,	 it	 is	 hardly	 surprising	 that	 Gorton,	 an	 anti-communist	who	wanted	 to	 stop	 the	 spread	 of	 communism	by	maintaining	 the	independence	of	Southeast	Asian	nations,	believed	that	“it	would	be	completely	wrong	for	us	to	refuse	to	defend	that	country	against	small	bands	of	people	who	have	taken	to	the	jungle	with	tommy	guns.”291				
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Gorton’s	 personal	 experience	 of	 narrowly	 escaping	 Japanese	 capture	 in	 1942	instilled	in	him	a	desire,	however,	to	guard	against	a	situation	in	which	Australian	soldiers	might	be	left	stranded	on	foreign	shores.		As	Coral	Bell	suggested,	Gorton’s	experience	 of	 being	 evacuated	 from	 Singapore	 after	 many	 others	 had	 been	captured	by	the	Japanese	left	him	with	a	deep	seated	desire	to	never	again	leave	Australian	soldiers	isolated.292		As	Bell	put	it,	Gorton’s	personal	history	“created	in	him	…	a	more	than	average	sensitivity	to	the	fact	that	‘forward	defence’	could	mean	young	Australians	felt	hopelessly	exposed	at	the	ends	of	vulnerable	lines	of	communication.”293		 Though	 Gorton’s	 opposition	 to	 communist	 expansion	 and	resolve	 to	 not	 repeat	 the	mistakes	made	 in	 diplomacy	 in	 the	 1930s	 led	 to	 this	willingness	to	send	Australian	troops	abroad,	it	was	tempered	with	a	strong	desire	to	protect	Australian	servicemen	while	overseas.		 Threats	to	Australia:	Confrontation	and	Vietnam		Just	as	 it	coloured	the	conservative	 interpretation	of	the	spread	of	communism	into	Asia,	so	did	the	memory	of	World	War	Two	shape	the	approach	Gorton	and	the	 Menzies	 government	 belied	 Australia	 should	 take	 towards	 the	 two	major	conflicts	that	threatened	to	destabilise	Southeast	Asia	in	the	1960s:	Confrontation	and	Vietnam.			
Confrontation		Gorton	 believed	 Australia	 should	 play	 a	 role	 in	 protecting	 the	 newly	 created	Malaysian	 federation	 during	 Confrontation,	 especially	 considering	 that,	 in	 his	opinion,	though	the	United	Nations	would	most	likely	play	a	role	in	doing	this,	the	international	 community	 could	 not	 afford	 to	wait	 for	 it	 to	 do	 so.	 	 Though	 he	
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believed	that	an	attack	on	Malaysia	or	the	constituent	states	of	Malaysia	would	be	referred	to	the	UN	and	that	it	would	support	Malaysia,	he	asked,	“what	is	going	to	happen	in	the	meantime,	while	the	attack	is	being	brought	to	the	attention	of	the	United	Nations	and	discussed	by	 the	United	Nations?”294		Gorton	answered	his	question	by	stating	that	an	incursion	would	be	made	over	the	boundaries	of	the	new	nation,	by	use	of	force,	and	that	Australia	would	accordingly	have	to	decide	whether	 it	 is	 “proper	 and	 right”	 to	 add	 its	military	 assistance	 in	 resisting	 the	invading	force.295				Something	other	than	the	United	Nations	was	needed	to	preserve	the	peace	and	security	 that	 had	 been	 fought	 for	 in	 World	 War	 Two:	 “if	 it	 is	 necessary	 that	aggression	should	be	stopped,	should	not	be	permitted	and	should	not	be	seen	to	be	successful,	and	if	the	United	Nations	alone	cannot	stop	aggression,	other	means	of	 doing	 it	 must	 be	 found	 and	 accepted.”296 		 With	 reference	 to	 the	 failure	 of	appeasement,	Gorton	believed	that	Australia	would	have	to	be	prepared	to	send	troops	to	defend	Malaysia.297		Gorton	saw	the	present-day	issue	in	Southeast	Asia	through	the	lens	of	Europe’s	failure	to	stop	Hitler	in	the	1930s	and,	once	again,	advocated	 Australian	 involvement	 in	 stopping	 the	 spread	 of	 communism	 in	Southeast	Asia.		
Vietnam		Vietnam	elicited	a	response	from	America	and	Australia	that	clearly	demonstrated	the	 impact	 the	 appeasement	 of	 Hitler	 had	 on	 conservative	 American	 and	Australian	politicians	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.		As	Under	Secretary	George	Ball	had	it,			
we	have	…	come	 to	 realise	 from	 the	 experience	of	 the	past	 years	 that	
aggression	must	be	dealt	with	wherever	 it	occurs	and	no	matter	what	
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mask	it	may	wear	…	In	the	1930s	Manchuria	seemed	a	long	way	away	…	
Ethiopia	seemed	a	 long	way	away.	 	The	rearmament	of	 the	Rhineland	
was	regarded	as	regrettable	but	not	worth	a	shooting	war.		Yet	after	that	
came	Austria,	and	after	Austria,	Czechoslovakia.		Then	Poland.		Then	the	
Second	World	War.	 	The	 central	 issue	we	 face	 in	South	Viet-Nam	 ...	 is	
whether	a	small	state	on	the	periphery	of	Communist	power	should	be	
permitted	 to	 maintain	 its	 freedom.	 	 And	 that	 is	 an	 issue	 of	 vital	
importance	to	small	states	everywhere.298		Referring	 directly	 to	 his	 own	 experiences,	 Gorton	 used	 similar	 language	 in	describing	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	 Vietnam	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	Australian	government	should	respond	to	it.		Gorton	stated	that			
in	 my	 own	 lifetime	 we	 have	 seen	 a	 situation	 arise	 in	 which	 it	 was	
necessary	 to	 choose	 between	 a	 world	 in	 which	 there	 were	 Belsens,	
Ravensbrucks,	genocide	and	hangmen	operating	without	the	rule	of	law	
–	all	the	things	we	saw	put	into	gruesome	effect	in	Europe	–	and	a	world	
of	freedom.		I	believe	that	we	were	right	then	to	choose	war	rather	than	
to	live	in	that	kind	of	world.299				Sending	troops	to	Vietnam	for	Gorton	fell	within	the	gambit	of	Australia’s	duty	to	fight	against	aggressive	communist	expansion:	“whatever	the	judgment	of	history	may	be	on	this	move	…	I	will	be	glad	to	think	there	was	in	this	country	at	this	time	a	government	which	believes	in	this	step	to	prevent	this	aggression.”300				Even	before	America	and	Australia	became	militarily	involved	in	Vietnam,	Gorton	advocated	 supporting	 South	 Vietnam	 in	 its	 fight	 against	 what	 he	 regarded	 as	aggressive	communist	expansion	from	the	North.		On	1	May	1957	he	stated	that	“the	people	of	South	Viet	Nam	are	under	threat	by	a	completely	ruthless	power	
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with	large	divisions	and	arms	and	well-known	intentions.”301		The	consequences	of	the	spread	of	communism	in	Indochina	were	dire:	a	year	before	the	Battle	of	Dien	 Bien	 Phu	 he	 had	warned	 that,	 if	 Indochina	were	 to	 fall,	 “the	 consequent	accretion	 of	 strength	 to	 the	 Communist	 bloc	 would	 probably	 be	 of	 decisive	importance	not	only	in	Asia	but	also	throughout	the	world.”302				Unsurprisingly,	 Gorton	 publicly	 supported	 Australian	 military	 intervention	 in	Vietnam.		Though	noting	that	he	did	not	suppose	that	“when	all	history	is	written	and	finality	 is	reached	anybody	will	be	shown	to	have	been	 irrefutably	right	or	wrong	on	this	matter,”	he	declared	to	the	Senate	on	6	May	1965	that,	in	the	case	of	Vietnam,	“it	is	in	Australia’s	interests	that	we	send	our	troops	abroad.”303		In	Gorton’s	mind	it	was	far	better	to	stop	the	spread	of	aggression	in	Vietnam	before	it	 led	to	a	global	conflict.	 	What	was	 lacking	 from	Gorton’s	pronouncements	on	Australian	 involvement	 in	 Vietnam,	 then,	 was	 a	 proper	 consideration	 of	 the	specific	nature	of	that	conflict.		Even	if	his	statements	on	Vietnam	were	far	from	unequivocal,	the	memory	of	Munich	in	the	Cold	War	world	influenced	Gorton	in	such	a	way	that	any	perceived	aggression	was	best	to	be	met	with	military	combat	to	stop	it	from	developing	further	and	threatening	the	world	order.						Gorton	continued,	speaking	generally	about	Vietnam	in	the	context	of	Australia’s	need	to	play	a	role	in	the	protection	of	Southeast	Asia.		After	discussing	the	need	to	resist	aggression	generally,	he	stated	that	“though	this	departs	a	little	from	the	examination	of	whether	this	decision	by	Australia	is	right,	from	the	point	of	view	of	 a	 small	 country	 such	 as	 Australia	 it	 is	 not	 only	 right	 but	 it	 is	 also	 utterly	expedient	that	it	should	be	seen	that	a	country,	no	matter	how	small,	will	not	be	left	 to	be	 invaded	and	to	have	 imposed	upon	 it	 the	will	 of	 another	 country.”304		Gorton	may	have	danced	to	some	extent	around	the	issue	of	whether	the	specific	decision	 was	 right	 or	 wrong	 but,	 clearly,	 his	 world	 view	 led	 him	 to	 support	Australian	involvement	in	Vietnam.			
																																																								301	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	1	May	1957,	p.	526.	302	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	7	October	1953,	p.	404.	303	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	6	May	1965,	p.	664.	304	Ibid.,	p.	667.	
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	This	 way	 of	 thinking	 was	 consistent	 with	 the	 Liberal	 Party	 approach,	 which	regarded	Vietnam	not	as	a	local	civil	war	but	one	“designed	by	Communist	China	and	North	Vietnam	to	destroy	the	freedom	of	a	neighbouring	State,”	as	“the	first	phase	of	a	larger	attack	on	free	States	in	South-East	Asia	and	part	of	a	thrust	by	Communist	China	between	the	Indian	and	Pacific	Oceans,”	and	that	South	Vietnam	must	be	protected	because	“modern	history	has	shown	us	that	security	cannot	be	obtained	 by	 throwing	 a	 small	 State	 to	 the	 wolves.” 305 		 Indeed,	 as	 conditions	deteriorated	 in	 South	 Vietnam	 in	 the	 late	 1950s,	 the	 Australian	 government	believed	–	or	at	least	declared	–	that	the	war	in	Indochina	“was	inspired	and	aided	by	China;	that	North	Vietnam	was	seeking	to	conquer	and	take	over	the	South	by	guerrilla	warfare	and	terrorist	actions	against	civilians,	and	that	the	fall	of	South	Vietnam	would	lead	to	the	conquest	of	Cambodia,	Laos	and	potentially	the	rest	of	South-East	Asia.”306		Gorton’s	 approach	 to	Vietnam	again	demonstrated	 that	he	was	a	creature	of	conservative	political	culture.		Gorton	 did,	 however,	 question	 the	 escalation	 of	 Australia’s	 involvement	 in	Vietnam	by	Prime	Minister	Holt,	chiefly	because	he	did	not	necessarily	regard	an	increase	in	troop	numbers	as	being	in	Australia’s	interests.		Gorton	sent	a	letter	to	Harold	Holt	not	long	after	his	election	in	December	1966,	in	which	he	spelt	out	his	opposition	 to	 further	 increases	 to	 the	 troop	 commitment.	 	 He	 accepted	 that	Australia	should	make	a	contribution	to	the	war	effort	in	order	to	keep	hostilities	away	 from	 Australian	 shores.	 	 He	 refused	 to	 accept,	 however,	 that	 Australia	needed	to	make	a	greater	sacrifice.		While	he	acknowledged	that	“a	presence”	gave	“comfort	and	assistance”	to	the	United	States,	the	size	of	the	presence,	so	long	as	it	was	not	“contemptible”,	was	not	relevant.		According	to	Gorton	it	was	“absurd”	to	suggest	that	an	extra	few	thousand	men	would	affect	the	decision-making	of	the	present	or	a	future	American	administration.307		It	followed	that,	if	the	number	of	Australian	troops	in	Vietnam	was	not	going	to	affect	American	decision-making,	it																																																									305	Liberal	Party	Memorandum	to	All	Members	of	the	Federal	Parliamentary	Liberal	Party,	copied	to	Senator	the	Hon.	J	Gorton,	30	June	1965,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	25	MS	7984,	NLA.	306	TB	Millar,	“Vietnam”,	in	Bridge	(eds),	Munich	to	Vietnam,	op.	cit.,	p.	185.	307	Gorton	to	Holt,	16	December	1966,	Holt	Papers,	NAA:	M2684/130.	
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would	be	better	to	apply	Australian	resources	in	ways	that	“will	be	of	far	greater	benefit	to	the	progress,	safety,	and	stability	of	our	country.”308		As	Hancock	wrote,	“publicly,	John	Gorton	strongly	supported	the	increasing	Australian	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War.		Privately,	he	was	not	so	sure.”309				Doubts	such	as	these	were	not	uncommon	in	Australia;	according	to	Murphy,	“in	private,	 some	officials	 and	ministers	 could	 be	more	 skeptical,	 but	 chose	 not	 to	share	 such	 complications	 with	 the	 public.” 310 		 Indeed,	 Gorton	 stated	 in	 an	interview	with	Melanie	Pratt	 in	1977	 that,	while	he	opposed	Holt’s	decision	 to	send	a	third	battalion	to	Vietnam	in	1967	and	asked	for	that	to	be	noted	in	the	minutes	 of	 the	 Cabinet	 meeting,	 “I	 then	 went	 along	 with	 the	 thing.” 311 		 It	 is	understandable	 why	 Gorton	 may	 have	 had	 private	 doubts	 about	 Australia’s	involvement	in	Vietnam.		Firstly,	it	is	likely	that	Gorton’s	own	personal	fears	about	leaving	 Australian	 servicemen	 stranded	 in	 Southeast	 Asia	 played	 a	 role	 in	 his	opposition	 to	 the	escalation	of	Australian	 involvement	 in	Vietnam.	 	Gorton	 felt	compelled	 to	 stop	 the	 spread	 of	 communism	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Australian	experience	of	World	War	Two	but,	 likely	as	a	 result	of	his	own	experiences	 in	Singapore,	did	not	want	to	leave	Australian	soldiers	abandoned	on	foreign	shores.				Secondly,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 Gorton’s	 support	 for	Australian	 involvement	was	 the	product	of	a	somewhat	limited	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	conflict	there.		Murphy	has	shown	how	a	relatively	simplistic	approach	to	the	conflict	in	Vietnam	took	 shape	 in	 the	 conservative	 political	 outlook	 in	 the	 1960s.	 	 According	 to	Murphy,	between	1954	and	1962	Vietnam	“virtually	disappeared	from	Australian	public	view”	and	“became	a	matter	of	some	indifference”,	meaning	that	“Vietnam	was	unintelligible	when	the	balance	swung	back	to	the	(National	Liberation	Front)	in	 1963	 and	 1964.” 312 		 Even	 when	 more	 detailed	 reports	 from	 Australian	personnel	in	Saigon	came	out	from	South	Vietnam’s	capital	in	1964	and	1965	they																																																									308	Ibid.	309	Hancock,	John	Gorton,	op.	cit.,	p.101.	310	Murphy,	Harvest	of	Fear,	op.	cit.,	p.	102.	311	John	Gorton,	Oral	History	with	Mel	Pratt,	15	July	1977,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	1	MS	7984,	NLA.	312	Murphy,	Harvest	of	Fear,	op.	cit.,	p.	99.	
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were	not	dissected	 thoroughly.	 	According	 to	Murphy,	more	often	 than	not	 the	subtleties	 and	 complicating	 nuances	 of	 the	 situation	 in	 Vietnam	 were	 “lost	amongst	 the	 traditional	 Cold	War	 metaphors.”313		 Indeed,	 Murphy	 stated	 that	there	was,	by	the	early	to	mid-1960s,	a	sense	in	which	the	nuances	of	the	views	from	 Saigon	 became	 largely	 irrelevant	 to	 Australian	 planning:	 “Australia’s	Vietnam	 policy	 was	 a	 policy	 less	 about	 Vietnam	 than	 about	 broader	 regional	strategy	and	the	perceived	need	to	secure	American	 involvement	 in	 the	region.		This	meant	that	the	chief	quality	of	knowledge	about	Vietnam	was	not	so	much	that	it	was	inaccessible	but	that	it	was	unwelcome.”314		True	 to	 the	 so-called	 ‘lessons’	 of	 appeasement	 and	 his	 general	 opposition	 to	totalitarianism,	Gorton	used	 these	Cold	War	metaphors	 in	 relation	 to	Vietnam,	stating	 in	 the	 Senate	 only	 three	 months	 before	 becoming	 prime	minister	 that	Australia’s	“immediate	pre-occupation	is	in	Vietnam,”	and	that	“this	is	the	most	urgent	of	our	current	external	problems,	and	it	is	basic	to	all	our	aspirations	for	security	 in	Asia.”315		Combined	with	Gorton’s	 loathing	of	communist	aggression	and	his	belief	 in	Australia’s	need	 to	 fight	against	 it,	 the	 simplistic	 conservative	understanding	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	 Vietnam	 led	 him	 to	 support	 Australia’s	involvement	there.		Gorton,	a	man	who	felt	strongly	the	sacrifices	Australians	had	made	to	stop	totalitarian	expansion	 in	World	War	Two	–	and	who	had,	 indeed,	made	sacrifices	himself	–	saw	(at	least	some)	Australian	involvement	in	Vietnam	along	 with	 America	 as	 necessary	 to	 protecting	 Southeast	 Asia	 and	 Australian	interests	 in	 the	 region.	 	 This	 was	 not	 least	 because	 it	 saw	 close	 defence	cooperation	between	Australia	and	America,	a	goal	to	which	the	Liberal	party	had	dedicated	itself	since	the	signing	of	ANZUS	in	1951.		But	–	perhaps	also	as	a	result	of	his	own	experience	of	war	–	he	also	had	misgivings	about	the	extent	to	which	Australian	soldiers	should	be	on	the	ground	there,	and	the	value	to	be	gained	from	sending	more.				 ***																																																									313	Ibid.,	p.	102.		314	Ibid.,	p.	103.	315	Commonwealth	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	17	October	1967,	p.	134.	
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	On	17	December	1967	Prime	Minister	Harold	Holt	went	missing	after	skin	diving	in	 rough	 seas	 off	 Cheviot	 Beach	 in	 Portsea,	 Victoria.	 	 Two	 days	 later	 the	government	made	an	official	announcement	that	he	was	thought	to	be	dead.		Holt’s	presumed	 successor	 was	 Liberal	 deputy	 leader	 William	 McMahon,	 but	 on	 18	December	 the	 Country	 Party	 leader	 and	 Deputy	 Prime	Minister	 John	McEwen	announced	that	he	and	his	party	would	not	serve	under	McMahon.		Gorton	was	elected	 party	 leader	 over	 Hasluck	 on	 9	 January	 1968,	 and	 on	 10	 January	was	appointed	prime	minister.	 	Though	he	had	been	a	member	of	 the	Senate	 since	1950,	Gorton	had	only	been	in	Cabinet	for	two	years,	which	meant	that	he	had	not	been	part	of	the	group	of	senior	ministers	shaping	policies	towards	Indonesia	and	Indochina.		His	vehemently	anti-communist	views	were	more	consistent	with	the	right	wing	of	the	Liberal	Party	than	Menzies	and	the	other	senior	ministers,	and	was	concerned	that	Australia’s	forward	defence	posture	made	it	appear	to	be	too	subservient	to	America	and	Britain,	a	view	that	resonated	more	with	the	Labor	Party	than	his	own	party.316		Gorton,	therefore,	was	“hardly	the	most	obvious	replacement	for	Harold	Holt.”317		The	fact	that	Gorton	had	not	held	any	principal	Cabinet	portfolios	–	or	even	been	a	member	of	the	House	of	Representatives	–	did	little	to	strengthen	his	authority	as	 leader	of	 the	Liberal	Party.	 	 Indeed,	 the	uncertainty	 surrounding	Gorton	 the	man	and	the	anticipated	nature	of	his	prime-ministership	was	the	subject	of	much	speculation.	 	 In	 an	 article	 appearing	 in	 Nation	 on	 25	 May	 1968,	 Australian	academic	Sol	Encel	wrote	that,	since	his	assumption	of	office,	his	stance	as	prime	minister	 had	 been	 “ambiguous	 and	 a	 source	 of	 puzzlement	 to	 many	 political	observers.”318		Encel	attributed	this	chiefly	due	to	his	succession,	“with	a	larrikin	background”	to	Menzies	and	Holt	-	two	men	“so	utterly	different	from	him.”319		
																																																								316	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	193.	317	Barclay,	Friends	in	High	Places,	op.	cit.,	p.	163.	318	Solomon	Encel,	“The	Larrikin	Leaders”,	Nation,	25	May	1968,	p.	9.		I	am	grateful	to	James	Curran	for	providing	this	document.	319	Ibid.,	pp.	9-10.	
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According	to	Coral	Bell,	Gorton	never	enjoyed	a	degree	of	dominance	equal	to	that	of	Menzies	or	Fraser,	and	as	a	result	“was	not	in	a	position	intransigently	to	resist	determined	 pressures	 either	 from	 his	 Cabinet	 and	 party	 colleagues,	 or	 from	powerful	electoral	influences	such	as	the	Democratic	Labor	Party.”320		As	Edwards	had	 it,	 “Gorton’s	 sudden	 elevation	 therefore	 thrust	 him	 into	 responsibility	 for	policies	he	had	little	part	in	shaping	and,	especially,	for	a	war	about	which	he	had	long	held	major	reservations.”321		This	would	play	a	significant	role	in	defining	the	nature	of	Gorton’s	leadership:	the	unlikely	Prime	Minister	Gorton	would	be	called	on	to	manage	a	number	of	crises	that	severely	undermined	long-held	Australian	assumptions	 about	 the	 American	 alliance,	 and	 brought	 with	 them	 the	 virtual	collapse	of	Australian	Cold	War	defence	policy.																				
																																																								320	Bell,	Dependent	Ally,	op.	cit.,	pp.	96-97.	321	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	194.	
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CHAPTER	THREE:	THE	ALLIANCE	UNDER	STRAIN	–	GORTON’S	RESPONSE	TO	AN	UNCERTAIN	FUTURE		Almost	 immediately	 after	 Gorton	 became	 prime	 minister	 in	 January	 1968,	Australia’s	Southeast	Asian	defence	policy	was	rocked	by	a	series	of	crises.		Britain	announced	its	intention	to	accelerate	its	withdrawal	from	Singapore	and	Malaysia	only	 hours	 after	 Gorton	 assumed	 the	 prime-ministership,	 and	 then	 just	weeks	later	 the	Tet	Offensive	brought	about	 the	eventual	end	of	 Johnson’s	presidency	and	a	complete	turn-around	in	American	policy	towards	Vietnam.		Accordingly,	Australia’s	Cold	War	defence	policy	seemed	to	be	on	the	verge	of	collapse:	Britain’s	eventual	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 region	 was	 confirmed	 and	 hastened,	 and	uncertainly	now	surrounded	America’s	ongoing	commitment	to	Vietnam	and	the	wider	region.		Gorton,	a	new	and	untried	prime	minister	with	no	real	distinctive	ideas	about	foreign	relations	or	the	world	beyond	conservative	Cold	War	cliché,	found	himself	in	the	middle	of	this	time	of	uncertainty	and	strategic	flux.		Broader	social	changes	and	the	development	of	the	anti-war	movement	were	also	impacting	the	way	in	which	Australians	viewed	their	country’s	relationship	with	America.		Indeed,	an	article	appearing	in	The	Bulletin	in	July	1969	referred	to	1968	as	the	year	when	“troublesome	tensions	began	to	develop”	between	America	and	Australia.322		Paul	Strangio	argued	that	“change,	not	stability,	was	becoming	the	leitmotif	of	the	times,”323	in	Australian	society,	and	that	this	made	it	hard	for	prime	ministers	 following	Menzies	 –	 and	 especially	Gorton	 –	 to	maintain	 a	 degree	 of	stability	in	politics.		Indeed,	Strangio	argued	that	the	generation	gap	between	the	baby-boomers	 and	 their	 elders	 led	 to	 an	 “alliance	 between	 a	 progressive	component	of	 the	middle	class,	student	radicals	and	elements	of	 the	traditional	left”	in	the	late	1960s,	and	that	it	was	these	groups	that	were	responsible	for	“a	resurgence	 of	 left	 politics	 following	 the	 long	 post-war	 conservative	
																																																								322	“The	Alliance,”	The	Bulletin,	12	July	1969,	p.	35.		I	am	grateful	to	James	Curran	for	providing	this	document.	323	Paul	Strangio,	“Instability,	1966-82,”	in	The	Cambridge	History	of	Australia,	vol.	2	(edited	by	Alison	Bashford	and	Stuart	MacIntyre),	Cambridge	University	Press,	Port	Melbourne,	2013,	p.	135.	
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ascendancy.”324		 Gorton	 had	 to	 manage	 the	 end	 of	 that	 post-war	 conservative	ascendancy	and	try	to	transition	Australia	into	a	new	period	of	foreign	policy.		It	was	 in	 this	 context	 that	Nixon’s	 announcement	of	 the	Guam	Doctrine	 in	 July	1969	heralded	a	recalibration	of	the	American	posture	in	Southeast	Asia.		Gorton,	therefore,	was	required	to	steer	the	Australian	government	through	an	unsettling	period	that	would	see	the	traditional	basis	of	Australian	foreign	policy	–	a	strong	relationship	with	great	powers	who	were	engaged	in	Southeast	Asia	–	come	to	an	end.		Navigating	this	period	was	no	easy	task.		Influenced	by	the	legacy	of	previous	Liberal	governments’	foreign	policy	and	his	own	background	and	Cold	War	diet,	Gorton	predictably	fell	back	on	the	practices	of	the	past	and	sought	to	maintain	a	close	 relationship	with	America	 during	 this	period,	 even	 as	 its	 commitment	 to	Southeast	Asia	and	Australia	seemed	to	become	less	certain	than	it	had	been	for	Holt	and	Menzies.				This	was	demonstrated	most	notably	by	his	willingness	to	rely	on	the	rhetoric	of	the	 security	 that	 ANZUS	 provided	 to	 Australia,	 and	 his	 continuation	 of	 the	seemingly	endless	search	for	guarantees	from	Washington	as	to	the	applicability	of	 the	 treaty.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 Gorton	was	 forced	 to	 consider	 and	attempt	 to	 articulate	 a	 more	 self-reliant	 defence	 posture	 for	 Australia	 as	 its	traditional	Cold	War	foreign	policy	fell	apart.		He	may	not	have	been	able	to	do	so	with	much	 aplomb	 as	 prime	minister,	 but	 he	 did	 at	 least	 begin	 the	 process	 of	articulating	and	forming	a	new	foreign	policy	that	sought	to	balance	dependence	on	America	with	a	greater	degree	of	Australian	self-reliance.		 The	Tet	Offensive	and	its	aftermath		On	30	January	1968	the	North	Vietnamese	army	and	Viet	Cong	launched	a	series	of	co-ordinated	attacks	across	100	towns	and	cities	in	South	Vietnam.		Though	the	attacks	 failed	 in	 that	 they	 were	 quickly	 repulsed	 by	 the	 American	 and	 South	Vietnamese	forces,	media	footage	of	the	Tet	Offensive	–	especially	of	the	storming	
																																																								324	Ibid.	p.	140.	
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of	the	American	Embassy	in	Saigon	and	General	Loan’s	summary	execution	of	a	Viet	Cong	soldier	–	was	broadcast	across	the	world	and	had	the	effect	of	dividing	the	White	House	and	American	public	on	the	 issue	of	American	 involvement	 in	Vietnam.		As	John	Murphy	has	shown,	editorial	reaction	to	the	Tet	Offensive	was	“dramatic,”	and	“abruptly	punctured	confident	assurances	that	the	war	against	the	NLF	was	being	won.”325		Demoralised	by	the	seeming	ease	at	which	communist	forces	had	been	able	to	rise	up	after	having	been	assured	by	American	military	leaders	in	Vietnam	that	the	end	of	the	conflict	was	near,	Johnson	decided	to	take	the	first	steps	to	de-escalate	the	conflict:	in	his	31	March	speech	he	stated	that	he	had	 ordered	 the	 American	 air-force	 and	 navy	 to	 not	 make	 attacks	 on	 North	Vietnam	(except	for	areas	where	the	build-up	of	troops	directly	threatened	allied	forward	positions),	in	an	attempt	to	bring	about	peace	talks	to	end	the	war.326		Of	 greater	 importance	 and	 concern	 to	 Gorton’s	 new	 Australian	 government,	however,	was	 Johnson’s	 subsequent	announcement	 that	he	would	neither	 seek	nor	accept	his	party’s	nomination	to	run	for	a	second	term.		The	announcement	marked	 the	 end	 of	 the	 high	 point	 of	 alliance	 intimacy	 between	 America	 and	Australia,	 as	 Australia	 could	 no	 longer	 rely	 with	 any	 certainty	 on	 America’s	commitment	to	Vietnam.		Coming	just	under	a	year	before	the	next	presidential	election,	it	also	meant	that	the	Australian	government	would	be	forced	to	carry	out	 its	 foreign	 policy	when	 the	 future	 of	 American	 foreign	policy	was,	 for	 that	period	of	time	at	least,	“anything	but	clear.”327				This	 posed	 a	 great	 challenge	 for	 Gorton,	 given	 that	 the	 fundamental	 basis	 of	Australian	foreign	policy	depended	on	having	a	solid	understanding	of	America’s	intentions	in	relation	to	Southeast	Asia:	as	Hasluck	had	stated	in	1964,	“what	the	United	States	Government	does	at	any	time	now	or	in	the	future	is	going	to	be	of	such	profound	importance	to	Australia	that	we	must	try	to	see	the	prospects	as	clearly	and	exactly	as	is	humanly	possible.”328		The	problem	now	for	Gorton	was																																																									325	Murphy,	Harvest	of	Fear,	op.	cit.,	p	198.	326	Lyndon	Bairnes	Johnson,	quoted	in	Harpur,	War	Without	End,	op.	cit.,	p.	71.	327	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	197.	328	Communication	to	MR	Booker	by	the	Minister	for	External	Affairs,	23	September	1964,	Part	7,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	
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that	he	could	see	the	future	of	American	policy	neither	clearly	nor	exactly.		Quite	unlike	 his	 predecessor	 Holt,	 who	 had	 had	 the	 advantage	 of	 an	 ally	 that	 was	adopting	a	hawkish	approach	to	Vietnam,	Gorton	would	now	have	to	manage	the	issue	of	how	to	formulate	and	carry	out	Australian	foreign	policy	in	the	context	of	great	uncertainty	as	to	America’s	intentions.		Indeed,	determining	the	exact	nature	of	future	American	foreign	policy	was	now	something	of	an	exercise	in	guess	work.		As	Bell	had	 it,	 “the	long	 ‘lame-duck’	period	of	the	 Johnson	presidency,	almost	a	year	 from	 the	March	 speech	 to	 the	 inauguration	of	President	Nixon	 in	 January	1969,	was	for	all	the	USA’s	South-East	Asian	allies	a	period	of	living	amid	those	ruins,	waiting	for	the	new	incumbent	and	whatever	he	could	produce	in	the	way	of	a	revised	US	diplomatic	and	military	strategy.”329				Johnson’s	decision	to	halt	the	bombing	of	North	Vietnam	and	not	run	for	a	second	term	 caught	 Gorton	 by	 complete	 surprise	 and	 embarrassed	 the	 new	 prime	minister	 by	 demonstrating	 the	 lack	 of	 real	 consultation	 that	 existed	 between	America	and	Australia.	 	The	Australian	government	had	not	been	consulted	or	made	 aware	 of	 Johnson’s	 bombing	 policy	 about-turn	 before	 it	was	 announced.		The	Americans	were	yet	again	notifying	their	allies	of	key	strategic	decisions	only	after	the	decisions	had	been	made.		Indeed,	Hasluck	had	gone	as	far	as	to	publically	support	the	continued	of	bombing	of	North	Vietnam	only	a	week	before	Johnson’s	speech:	“‘what	impression	of	resolution	and	determination	would	the	allies	give	to	the	embattled,	war-torn,	suffering	people	of	South	Vietnam’,	he	asked	the	House	of	Representatives	on	26	March	1968,	‘if	the	controlled	and	selective	bombing	of	North	Vietnam	were	to	be	terminated’?”330				The	 prospect	 of	major	 shifts	 in	 American	 policy	 towards	 Vietnam	 signalled	 in	Johnson’s	31	March	speech	did	not	lead	to	Gorton	marking	any	immediate	plans	for	major	changes	to	Australian	foreign	policy.		Rather,	given	the	sudden	about-turn	in	America’s	approach	to	its	involvement	in	Vietnam,	Gorton	had	little	option	in	the	circumstances	but	to	try	to	maintain	a	close	relationship	with	America	and	prepare	for	an	uncertain	future.		Gorton	continued	to	employ	the	rhetoric	of	close																																																									329	Bell,	Dependent	Ally,	op.	cit.,	p.	102.	330	Hasluck	in	Barclay,	Friends	in	High	Places,	op.	cit.,	p.	164.	
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defence	 co-operation	 under	 the	 ANZUS	 Treaty	 and	 an	 American-Australian	alliance	 that	would	 be	 characterised	 by	 close	 consultation	 and	 communication	throughout	the	ensuing	peace	talks,331		even	though	this	close	consultation	had	been	shown	to	be	non-existent.		There	was	little	else	Gorton	could	do.		Armed	with	no	real	alternative	to	the	objective	of	forging	a	strong	relationship	with	America	in	order	to	safeguard	Australia,	Gorton	had	neither	the	experience	nor	standing	in	the	Liberal	party	to	respond	astutely	and	articulately	to	Johnson’s	announcement.				The	American	president	may	have	been	willing	to	act	on	the	realisation	that	the	Americanisation	of	 the	war	had	been,	as	 the	Washington	Post	had	 it,	 “the	great	mistake	that	will	have	to	be	corrected,”332	but	the	Australian	prime	minister	was	not.	 	 Here	 lay	Gorton’s	 dilemma	 in	 1968:	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 he	 felt	 the	 need	 to	continue	the	close	relationship	that	Menzies	and	Holt	had	developed	with	their	American	 ally	 during	 the	 height	 of	 America’s	 involvement	 in	 Vietnam;	 on	 the	other,	he	 faced	 the	 real	problem	of	 forming	a	new	and	clear	Australian	 foreign	policy	in	 the	 face	of	American	withdrawal.	 	This	led	to	both	general	statements	about	the	importance	of	ANZUS	guarantees	and	close	consultation	with	America	that	indeed	appeared	to	be	more	rhetorical	than	anything	of	great	substance,	and	equally	 general	 statements	 about	 the	 inability	 to	 make	 clear	 policy	announcements	in	the	context	of	such	uncertainty.		Indeed,	Gorton	would	continue	to	do	what	past	Liberal	governments	had	done	since	1951:	hold	the	treaty	up	as	the	basis	of	Australia’s	defence	in	the	region	while	pressing	for	guarantees	as	to	its	applicability	from	Washington.				Johnson’s	 announcement	 had	 embarrassed	 the	 Australian	 government	 and	enraged	 Gorton.	 	 According	 to	 Gorton,	 this	 was	 “no	 way	 to	 treat	 an	 ally.” 333		Publically,	 however,	 Gorton	 played	 down	 Johnson’s	 bombing	 halt	 as	 a	 logical	
																																																								331	Report	on	Gorton’s	visit	to	Washington	from	the	Australian	Embassy	in	Washington,	28	May	1968,	received	by	the	Department	of	External	Affairs	on	29	May	1968,	Part	9,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	332	Walter	Lippmann,	“The	Case	for	U.S.	Pullback	to	Australia,”	Washington	Post,	22	October	1967,	Part	9,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	333	Memorandum,	Rusk	to	Rostow,	2	May	1968,	in	James	Curran,	Unholy	Fury,	
Whitlam	and	Nixon	at	War,	Melbourne	University	Press,	Melbourne,	2015,	p.	89.	
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manifestation	 of	 American	 Vietnam	 policy,	 stating	 to	 the	 Parliamentary	 Press	Gallery	on	1	April	1968	that	the	bombing	halt	had	been	foreshadowed	in	Johnson’s	San	Antonio	speech	on	29	September	1967,	 and	 that	his	31	March	 speech	was	simply	a	“further	step”	in	what	had	been	referred	to	in	the	San	Antonio	speech	as	America’s	 long	 term	 goal	 of	 achieving	 a	 genuine	 peace	 in	 Vietnam.334		He	 also	played	down	the	apparent	lack	of	American	consultation	with	Australia,	arguing	that	Australia	had	not	been	consulted	on	the	issue	of	bombing	because	it	was	“not	anything	which	in	any	way	requires	any	increased	contributions	from	Australia”	and	that,	if	 it	had,	“I	have	no	doubt	whatever	that	full	consultations	would	take	place.”335				Gorton	continued	to	operate	as	though	little	had	changed	during	his	first	visit	to	Washington	 in	 May	 1968.	 	 Addressing	 Johnson,	 Gorton	 explained	 how	 the	protection	 ANZUS	 afforded	 Australia	 would	 allow	 it	 to	 strengthen	 its	 own	defences.		Referring	to	ANZUS	as	Australia’s	“major	shield,”	he	stated	that	“behind	that,	and	because	of	that,	we	can	the	sooner	grow	to	that	stature	we	shall	reach,	we	shall	the	sooner	reach	a	position	to	repulse	any	attack	the	future	may	hold	from	any	quarter,	and	by	any	means.”		Gorton	continued:			
because	 of	 your	 assistance,	 because	 of	 the	 ANZUS	Treaty	 and	what	 it	
implies,	 we	 can	 divert	 to	 building	 a	 future	 strength,	 resources	 which	
would	otherwise	be	now	diverted	to	defence,	to	the	future	detriment	of	
defence,	and	to	the	future	detriment	of	our	ability	to	render	as	much	help	
to	the	region	as	we	wish.		This	is	to	us	the	virtue	of	the	ANZUS	Pact.		And	
allied	to	it	is	the	sure	knowledge	that	you	–	while	providing	that	shield	–	
recognise	that	behind	it	we,	as	we	build	our	country,	are	free	to	make	and	
will	make	 our	 own	 foreign	 policy	 decisions	 subject	 only	 to	 our	 treaty	
obligations.336																																																											334	Briefing	for	Heads	of	Bureaux,	Parliamentary	Press	Gallery,	Canberra,	1	April	1968,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	9,	MS	7984,	NLA.	335	Ibid.	336	Copy	of	the	White	House	Transcript	of	the	Exchange	of	Remarks	between	Gorton	and	Johnson,	27	May	1968,	received	by	the	Department	of	External	Affairs	on	28	May	1968,	Part	9,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	
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	Gorton	 was	 well	 aware,	 however,	 of	 the	 uncertain	 future	 of	 the	 American	administration	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 future	 foreign	 policy	 changes	 that	 would	impact	Australia.		As	well	as	affirming	the	ANZUS	and	the	alliance,	Gorton	used	his	first	visit	to	Washington	as	an	opportunity	to	visit	a	number	of	candidates	for	the	presidency,	including	Vice	President	Humphrey,	Governor	Rockefeller	and	Nixon.		Though	he	was	only	able	to	have	“brief	conversations”	with	these	candidates,337	when	he	returned	to	Australia	he	claimed	that	 the	visit	had	helped	him	get	 the	background	information	that	would	help	the	government	form	its	own	decisions	as	to	what	it	could	and	should	do	in	the	region	in	the	future,	“for	our	security	in	the	 future	 is	bound	up	with,	and	cannot	be	disentangled	 from,	the	security	and	stability	of	the	whole	of	the	region	in	which	we	live.”338					Nonetheless,	Gorton	declared	to	the	House	of	Representatives	on	4	June	1968	that	“after	these	contacts,	my	own	assessment	…	is	that	I	do	not	believe,	should	any	of	these	 candidates	 be	 successful,	 that	 there	 would	 be	 any	 basic	 change	 in	 the	interest	of	the	United	States	in	this	region.		I	do	not	believe	that	there	would	be	any	retreat	to	isolationism,	and	if	this	assessment	is	true	it	is	an	important	factor	on	 which	 Australia’s	 future	 decisions	 should	 be	 based.”339		 	 It	 was,	 of	 course,	unlikely	that	any	of	these	candidates	would	have	highlighted	their	ideas	for	radical	shifts	in	American	policy	towards	Vietnam	to	a	visiting	Australian	prime	minister,	before	the	presidential	election:	Gorton	clearly	did	not	have	a	firm	basis	on	which	to	discuss	Australian	foreign	policy	and,	at	least	publically,	stated	that	Australia’s	approach	to	its	relationship	with	America	and	involvement	would	for	the	moment	proceed	as	it	had	done	previously.		Though	Gorton	may	have	wanted	Australia	to	be	able	to	form	its	own	foreign	and	defence	policy,	he	understood	and	acknowledged	that	this	depended	on	the	nature	of	American	policy:	“it	is	necessary	for	us	…	to	make	our	own	decisions	as	to	what	
																																																								337	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	197.	338	Prime	Minister’s	Visit	Abroad:	Ministerial	Statement,	from	the	‘Parliamentary	Debates’,	4	June	1968,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	5,	MS	7984,	NLA.	339	Ibid.	
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we	can	do	to	bring	about	security	and	stability	in	the	region;	but	in	making	those	decisions	we	cannot	but	be	affected	by	judgment	as	to	what	others	will	do	for	the	same	 purposes	 in	 the	 same	 area.” 340 		 This	 was	 perfectly	 reasonable	 in	 the	circumstances:	the	uncertainty	surrounding	the	nature	of	future	American	foreign	policy	 restricted	 Gorton’s	 ability	 to	 make	 clear	 policy	 announcements	 beyond	reiterating	the	standard	approach	of	maintaining	good	relations	with	America.		As	Gorton	 himself	 put	 it,	 the	 exact	 nature	 and	 details	 of	 future	Australian	 foreign	policy	 “cannot	 be	 projected	 into	 the	 future	 yet	 for	 the	 future	 is	 as	 yet	 too	unknown.”341		 Indeed,	 in	 a	 speech	 he	 later	made	 to	 the	National	 Press	 Club	 in	Canberra,	Gorton	stated	that,	given	that	recent	events	had	“so	radically	altered”,	the	assessments	on	which	Australian	foreign	policy	had	been	based	for	more	than	two	decades,	it	would	be	“irresponsible”	to	settle	long	range	military	planning.342				As	far	as	Gorton	was	concerned,	his	primary	goal	was	to	keep	his	options	open	so	as	to	be	able	to	move	according	to	future	developments	in	American	foreign	policy,	all	the	while	maintaining	publically	that	Australia	still	had	a	strong	alliance	with	America,	and	that	 this	would	guarantee	Australian	security.	 	 Indeed,	 though	he	declared	in	Parliament	on	his	return	that	he	did	not	believe	“that	there	would	be	any	basic	change	in	the	interest	of	the	United	States	in	this	region,”	or	that	“any	retreat	 to	 isolationism,” 343 	he	 then	 ordered	 a	 complete	 review	 of	 Australian	defence	policy.	 	Accordingly,	 though	Gorton	tried	to	assure	the	Parliament	that	nothing	 had	 really	 changed,	 “within	 the	 bureaucratic	 recesses	 of	 government,	efforts	were	at	this	time	put	in	hand	to	adapt	the	Australian	stance	to	the	changes	in	American	policies.”344				Following	 the	 review,	 the	 1968	 Strategic	 Basis	 of	 Australian	 Defence	 Policy	advocated	allowing	for	flexibility	in	the	circumstances:		
																																																								340	Ibid.	341	Ibid	5.		342	Speech	by	the	Prime	Minister	at	the	National	Press	Club,	Hotel	Canberra	Rex,	Canberra,	20	June	1968,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	5,	MS	7984,	NLA.	343	Prime	Minister’s	Visit	Abroad:	Ministerial	Statement,	from	the	‘Parliamentary	Debates’,	4	June,	1968,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	5,	MS	7984,	NLA.	344	Bell,	Dependent	Ally,	op.	cit.,	p.	103.	
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if	Australia’s	best	interests	are	to	be	served,	they	do	not	lie	in	our	taking	
up	any	extreme	position.		The	choices	surely	are	not	between	a	continuing	
military	 presence	 in	 Asia	 …	 and	 no	 such	 presence	 under	 any	
circumstances.		Rather	does	it	seem	we	should	be	aiming,	subject	to	the	
limits	that	SEATO	imposes,	to	achieve	a	situation	which	will	allow	us	the	
maximum	of	strategic	flexibility,	a	situation	in	which	we	would	be	able	
to	 make	 our	 judgments	 from	 time	 to	 time,	 against	 all	 relevant	
circumstances,	 as	 to	 the	 directions,	 political,	 economic	 or	military,	 in	
which	we	would	be	involved.345				Cabinet	endorsed	the	recommendation,	referring	to	it	as	“central”	to	the	future	of	defence	policy.346				As	the	policy	recommendations	suggested,	Gorton	had	little	choice	but	to	act	in	such	a	manner	that	would	allow	for	the	greatest	degree	of	flexibility.		And	though	the	review	envisaged	a	situation	whereby	Australia	would	not	necessarily	have	forces	overseas	 continuously	but	 instead	be	 “prepared	 to	have	available	 forces	that	could,	if	needs	be,	be	deployed	to	South-East	Asia	when	required,”347	Point	181	advised	that	in	the	short-term	Australia	had	“little	option	but	to	continue	to	present	the	forward	defence	posture.”		This	was	due	to	the	fact	that	Australia	was	so	heavily	committed	in	Vietnam	and	also	to	the	stationing	of	forces	in	Malaysia	and	Singapore.348				This	prevented	him	from	acting	in	a	more	decisive	fashion	in	his	first	year	as	prime	minister.		For	the	rest	of	1968	Gorton’s	attempt	to	not	take	any	extreme	position																																																									345	The	Strategic	Basis	of	Australian	Defence	Policy,	1968,	Report	by	Defence	Committee,	Canberra,	22	August	1968,	306/1968,	in	Australia	and	the	United	
Kingdom,	1960-1975,	edited	by	SR	Ashton,	Carl	Bridge	and	Stuart	Ward,	Australian	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade,	p.	287.	346	Submission	No.	306	–	The	Strategic	Basis	of	Australian	Defence	Policy,	1968,	Cabinet	Decision	No.	762,	Canberra,	19	November	and	4	December	1968,	in	ibid.,	p.	291.	347	The	Strategic	Basis	of	Australian	Defence	Policy,	1968,	op.	cit.,	p.	287.	348	Ibid.	
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manifested	itself	in	continued	support	of	Johnson’s	de-escalation	of	the	Vietnam	conflict,	even	if	he	was	not	being	consulted	on	it,	while	he	considered	what	a	more	self-reliant	 foreign	policy	might	 look	 like	 in	practice.	 	There	was	arguably	very	little	he	could	do	in	1968	other	than	employ	the	Liberal	party	rhetoric	of	the	past	in	relation	to	ANZUS	and	the	American	alliance,	continue	to	support	America	in	its	military	engagement	in	Vietnam	–	whatever	developments	took	place	there	-	and	hope	that	 those	 future	developments,	along	with	the	certainty	of	knowing	who	would	succeed	Johnson	as	President,	might	provide	a	more	certain	foundation	on	which	he	could	formulate	and	articulate	a	more	concrete	Australian	foreign	policy.		Gorton	 failed	 to	 do	 this	 convincingly,	 however,	 and	 in	 failing	 to	 do	 so	demonstrated	 the	 lack	 of	 clarity	 surrounding	ANZUS.	 	When	pressed	 as	 to	 the	applicability	of	the	treaty	to	Australian	troops	stationed	in	Malaysia-Singapore	at	a	press	conference	outside	Blair	House	 in	May	1968,	Gorton	only	managed	the	following	response:	“I	think	it	applies	in	certain	defined	areas.		But	I	would	want	to	 check	 this	with	 the	 External	 Affairs	 people	 before	 I	 was	 sure	 that	 that	was	correct.		But	by	and	large,	I	think	it	has	been,	what	shall	I	say	–	I	cannot	think	of	the	exact	words	–	a	matter	–	never	spelled	out	whether	it	applied	in	Malaysia	and	Singapore	area	or	not.”349		Whitlam	seized	the	opportunity	to	criticise	Gorton	with	an	assertion	 that	reflected	 the	 truth	of	 the	situation:	 the	government	had	been	“thrown	 into	 disarray	 by	 the	 sudden	 and	 spectacular	 collapse	 of	 policies	 and	slogans	which	have	been	their	stock	in	trade	for	a	decade.”350		Gorton	 continued	 to	 support	 Johnson	 in	 November	 of	 that	 year,	 even	 after	 he	announced	 the	 complete	 cessation	 of	 bombing	 without	 consulting	 with	 or	informing	 the	 Australian	 government.	 	 In	 a	 somewhat	 vague	 statement	 to	 the	Parliament	on	5	November	1968,	Gorton	stated	that	 the	Americans	had	shared	information	 with	 the	 Australian	 government	 that	 gave	 him	 confidence	 that	America	was	correct	in	forming	its	judgment	that	North	Vietnam	was	sufficiently	reducing	its	military	activity	as	a	result	of	the	reduction	in	American	bombing,	and	noted	 that	 he	 sincerely	 hoped	 that	 America	would	 be	 “proved	 right	 by	 future																																																									349	Gorton	in	Curran,	Unholy	Fury,	op.	cit.,	p.	94.	350	Canberra	Times,	5	June	1968	in	ibid.,	p.	95.	
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events.”351		Gorton’s	statement	 illustrated	the	extent	 to	which	he	was	bound	by	the	 legacy	 of	 previous	 Australian	 Liberal	 governments	 regarding	 America	 and	ANZUS	 as	 being	 the	 basis	 of	 Australian	 Cold	War	 defence	 policy.	 	 Though	 he	personally	may	have	wanted	to	steer	Australia	on	a	more	self-reliant	course,	for	now	he	had	little	option	but	to	continue	to	try	to	convince	the	public	that	America	was	consulting	Australia	on	important	defence	policy	in	Southeast	Asia,	and	hope	–	somewhat	vaguely	–	future	developments	in	Vietnam	would	favour	America	and	its	allies.		 The	limits	of	forward	defence:	Australia’s	commitment	to	Malaysia	and	Singapore		Uncertainty	 over	 the	 future	 of	 American	 involvement	 in	 Southeast	 Asia	compounded	 the	already	 significant	problem	of	Britain’s	decision	 to	accelerate	and	complete	its	withdrawal	East	of	Suez	by	1971.		The	problem	for	Gorton	was	twofold:	 firstly,	 Australia	 would	 now	 be	 without	 the	 protection	 of	 Britain	 in	Southeast	 Asia	 from	 1971	 onward,	 much	 sooner	 than	 previous	 Australian	governments	had	anticipated;	secondly,	in	the	aftermath	of	Johnson’s	31	March	announcements,	 the	 Australian	 government	would	 have	 to	 confirm	whether	 it	would	maintain	 its	 forward	defence	posture	by	keeping	troops	 in	Malaysia	and	Singapore,	knowing	full	well	that	Britain	was	about	to	withdraw	from	the	region	and	 that	America’s	 commitment	 to	 remain	was	 at	 best	 uncertain	 and	 at	worst	unlikely.	 	 This	 would	 leave	 Australian	 troops	 far	 from	 Australian	 shores	 in	Southeast	Asia	and	without	the	support	of	Australia’s	powerful	friends,	a	situation	Gorton	was	loath	to	accept.		Singaporean	Prime	Minister	Lee	Kuan	Yew	articulated	Gorton’s	problem:	“Australia,	he	said,	had	been	prepared	to	take	on	the	role	of	‘Deputy	Sheriff’	where	either	the	USA	or	Britain	operated	as	Sheriff.	 	But	when	Britain	 and	 the	 United	 States	 had	 retreated	 from	 Asia	 to	 their	 own	 respective	bailiwicks,	 would	 Australia	 care	 to	 be	 promoted	 to	 the	 responsibilities	 of	Sheriff?”352																																																									351	Vietnam:	Ministerial	Statement,	from	the	‘Parliamentary	Debates’,	5	November	1968,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	5,	MS	7984,	NLA.	352	Bell,	Dependent	Ally,	op.	cit.,	p.	87.	
	 94	
	Even	 before	 Britain	 announced	 its	 accelerated	 withdrawal	 the	 decision	 as	 to	whether	Australia	should	maintain	troops	in	Malaysia	and	Singapore	had	been	a	vexed	one.		In	October	1967	Hasluck	had	communicated	to	Washington	that	the	government	was	“still	examining	questions	that	will	arise	if	any	proposal	is	made	for	 a	 defence	 arrangement	 with	 us”	 in	 relation	 to	 maintaining	 a	 presence	 in	Malaysia	and	Singapore,	and	that	a	key	consideration	for	Australia	was	the	need	to	“keep	open	our	options	for	the	future.”	353		And	in	conversations	he	had	had	with	Secretary	of	Defence	Robert	McNamara,	Hasluck	had	stated	that	the	key	question	was	whether	the	ANZUS	commitment	would	apply	to	Australian	troops	stationed	in	Malaysia	and	Singapore	after	the	British	had	withdrawn.		Any	such	confirmation	of	ANZUS	applicability	was	not	forthcoming	from	McNamara.354			
	Gorton	inherited	this	problem	and	found	himself	in	a	position	in	which	he	had	to	make	a	major	policy	decision	in	the	context	of	even	greater	uncertainty.		Adding	to	the	uncertainty	surrounding	to	America’s	continuing	commitment	to	the	region	was	that,	as	Peter	Edwards	has	shown,	by	1968	many	of	the	potential	‘dominoes’	of	 the	 early	 1960s	 such	 as	 Indonesia,	 Thailand,	 the	 Philippines,	 Malaysia	 and	Singapore	 had	 become	 more	 secure	 and,	 from	 Washington’s	 perspective,	 the	replacement	 of	 Sukarno	 by	 Suharto	 as	 president	 of	 Indonesia,	 the	 end	 to	Confrontation	and	 the	elimination	of	 the	 Indonesian	Communist	Party	meant	a	transformation	in	regional	politics.355		Such	a	shift	made	it	less	likely	that	America	would	 commit	 to	 the	 region	 and	 the	ANZUS	Treaty.	 	 Defence	Minister	 Fairhall	admitted	that	“the	United	States	position	is	quite	vital	to	any	consideration	of	what																																																									353	Memorandum	on	the	Defence	of	Malaysia	by	the	Australian	Minister	for	External	Affairs,	Washington,	October	9,	1967,	attached	to	Memorandum	From	the	Assistant	Secretary	of	Defense	for	International	Security	Affairs	(Warnke)	to	the	Chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	(Wheeler),	Document	Number	I36036/67,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	Johnson	Administration,	1964-1968,	Volume	XXVII,	Mainland	Southeast	Asia;	Regional	Affairs;	Australia,	New	Zealand,	the	United	States:	ANZUS	and	the	Defence	of	Southeast	Asia,	pp.	363-364.	354	Memorandum	from	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	to	Secretary	of	Defense	McNamara,	Washington,	November	8,	1967,	Document	Number	JCSM-614-67,	ibid.,	pp.	368-371.	355	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	191.	
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we	are	likely	to	do	and	what	we	should	do	in	the	South	Pacific	area,”	and	as	Barclay	had	 it,	 “the	 Government	 quite	 obviously	 did	 not	 know	what	 the	 United	 States	position	was	going	 to	be.	 	Nor	was	 it	 apparently	 capable	of	 adopting	a	definite	stance	in	the	absence	of	such	knowledge.”356				This	was	the	crux	of	the	issue	for	Gorton:	not	wanting	to	leave	Australian	troops	stranded	in	Southeast	Asia	as	they	had	been	when	Singapore	fell	to	the	Japanese	in	 1942,	 Gorton	 wanted	 a	 guarantee	 from	 America	 that	 ANZUS	 applied	 to	Australian	 troops	 in	 the	 region	 and	 that	 America	 would	 come	 to	 Australia’s	assistance	in	a	crisis.		But	with	America	slowly	withdrawing	from	the	region	and	calling	on	its	allies	to	take	over	more	of	the	burden	of	regional	defence	–	especially	after	 the	 enunciation	 of	 the	 Nixon	 Doctrine	 -	 such	 guarantees	 would	 not	 be	forthcoming.	 	 Indeed,	 though	 Johnson	 had	 been	 made	 aware	 of	 Gorton’s	reluctance	 to	 make	 a	 commitment	 to	 Malaysia-Singapore	 without	 guarantees	before	the	prime	minister’s	visit	to	Washington	in	1968,	he	had	been	advised	to	adhere	 to	 the	American	government’s	previous	 line	 that	“we	 think	a	 continued	Australian	military	 presence	would	 be	 a	 valuable	 stabilising	 factor;	we	 realise	questions	 about	 the	 application	of	 ANZUS	might	 arise	 in	 connection	with	 such	deployments;	we	would	like	to	stay	in	close	consultation	about	the	matter;	but	we	cannot	give	a	blanket	guarantee.”357		Not	surprisingly,	the	issue	dominated	talks	between	Gorton	and	Johnson	during	their	meeting	on	27	May	1968,	with	Gorton	demonstrating	a	reluctance	to	make	a	firm	commitment	beyond	1971.		As	it	had	been	in	meetings	between	Australian	prime	 ministers	 and	 American	 presidents	 since	 1951,	 the	 crucial	 ANZUS	guarantee	was	on	the	forefront	of	Gorton’s	mind	and	drove	his	discussions	with	Johnson:	caught	between	the	desire	to	maintain	a	relationship	with	America	as	a	powerful	ally	on	the	one	hand	and	the	reality	of	the	limits	of	what	Australia	could	provide	without	any	great	certainty	as	to	the	protection	that	America	would	in	fact																																																									356	Barclay,	Friends	in	High	Places,	op.	cit.,	p.	168.	357	Memorandum	From	the	President’s	Special	Assistant	(Rostow)	to	President	Johnson,	Subject:	Visit	of	Australian	Prime	Minister	Gorton	May	27-28,	Washington,	25	May	1968,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	Johnson	Administration,	1964-1968,	op.	cit.,	p.	398.	
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provide,	Gorton	agonised	over	the	decision	as	to	whether	commit	to	Malaysia	and	Singapore	after	the	British	withdrawal.		Gorton’s	primary	concern	was	the	open-endedness	 of	 any	 commitment	 he	 might	 make	 to	 keep	 Australian	 troops	 in	Malaysia	 and	 Singapore,	 especially	 without	 a	 concrete	 guarantee	 from	Washington	 that	 ANZUS	 would	 apply.	 	 According	 to	 the	 Memorandum	 of	Conversation,	Gorton	“wondered	if	in	the	event	of	a	serious	contingency,	such	as	‘Indonesia	going	round	the	bend	again,’	Australian	ground	units	might	not	be	‘out	on	a	limb’	without	United	States	backing	under	ANZUS	such	as	was	worked	out	in	1963	during	confrontation	with	Indonesia.”358				Though	Gorton	 “foresaw	no	great	difficulty	 in	maintaining	Australian	 forces	 to	1971,”	 he	 questioned	 the	 role	 a	 modest	 Australian	 ground	 contingent	 would	perform,	pointing	to	the	fact	that	Australian	ground	units	could	be	deployed	to	the	SEATO	area	from	Australia	in	about	the	same	time	as	Malaysia	and	Singapore.359		It	was	also	the	 ‘more	 if	needed’	 aspect	 that	was	part	of	 the	problem	that	 faced	Gorton.	 	Also	referred	to	in	the	Memorandum	of	Conversation	was	the	fact	that	Gorton	“said	that	the	U.K.	has	manned	much	of	the	logistic	network	in	the	region	and	that	if	Australia	is	to	contribute	significantly	more	to	logistic	arrangements	after	1971,	many	more	Australian	troops	will	be	needed	to	maintain	a	continuing	level	of	operational	effectiveness.”360		Gorton	did	not	want	Australia	to	be	called	on	to	increase	its	commitment,	and	“wondered	why	Malaysia/Singapore	couldn’t	assume	greater	responsibility	for	the	logistics.”361					Despite	 Gorton’s	misgivings,	 America	 remained	 firm	 in	 its	 call	 for	 Australia	 to	maintain	a	presence	in	Malaysia	and	Singapore	after	1971,	especially	considering	1968	was	an	election	year	and	the	 Johnson	administration	 feared	the	domestic	implications	 of	 Australia	 not	 committing	 to	 the	 region.	 	 In	 a	meeting	 between	Gorton	and	American	Secretary	of	Defence	Clark	Clifford	on	29	May	1968,	Clifford	said	that	while	the	American	public	had	been	willing	to	support	the	current	level																																																									358	Memorandum	of	Conversation,	Subject:	Future	Australian	Role	in	Malaysia/Singapore	Security,	Washington,	27	May	1968,	ibid.,	pp.405-406.	359	Ibid.,	p.	405.	360	Ibid.,	p.	410	361	Ibid.	
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of	 American	 involvement	 in	 Vietnam,	 it	 would	 not	 accept	 “broadening	 our	responsibility	in	the	area.		In	particular,	it	would	be	very	difficult	for	the	American	public	 to	 understand	 a	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 area	 –	 such	 as	 a	 pullback	 from	Malaysia	and	Singapore	by	any	of	our	allies	–	who	actually	are	closer	to	the	area	than	we	 are.”362		 Clifford	 feared	 that	 “they	would	 ask:	 If	 Southeast	 Asia	 is	 not	important	 to	 our	 allies,	 why	 should	 it	 be	 to	 us?”363 		 America	 was	 leaning	 on	Australia	 to	 contribute	more	 to	 a	 joint	 presence	 in	 Southeast	 Asia	 as	 it	would	enable	 the	 Johnson	 administration	 to	 maintain	 public	 support	 for	 America’s	presence	in	the	region.		As	Clifford	stated,	“the	presence	of	some	Australian	forces	in	this	area	is	significant	in	U.S.	public	willingness	to	remain	in	Southeast	Asia.”364		Accordingly,	Gorton	faced	the	challenge	of	not	overcommitting	Australian	troops	to	Malaysia-Singapore	while	satisfying	an	ally	that	would	not	give	guarantees	as	to	its	intention	to	protect	those	troops	in	a	time	of	crisis.		Gorton	eventually	agreed	to	America’s	requests	 that	Australia	maintain	ground	troops	in	Malaysia-Singapore	after	the	British	withdrawal.		After	a	lengthy	address	to	the	House	of	Representatives	on	25	February	1969	about	the	implications	of	Britain’s	 withdrawal	 from	 Singapore	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 “an	 era	 had	 ended,”365	Gorton	 announced	 that	 the	 government	 was	 “prepared	 to	 maintain	 and	 (is)	planning	to	maintain	forces	of	all	arms	in	that	area	after	the	British	withdrawal	–	without	setting	any	specific	 terminal	date.”366		Though	undoubtedly	hesitant	 to	make	 such	 a	 commitment,	 Gorton	 struggled	 to	 come	 up	 with	 any	 alternative.		Instead,	at	least	publically,	he	fell	back	on	the	rhetoric	of	the	American	alliance	and	defence	 co-operation.	 	 Rejecting	 any	 consideration	 of	 a	 complete	 Australian	withdrawal	 along	 with	 the	 British,	 Gorton	 stated	 that	 such	 a	 move	 would	 be	“contrary	to	our	historical	actions	in	Korea,	in	Vietnam	and	in	the	region	of	which	
																																																								362	Memorandum	of	Conversation,	Subject:	Visit	of	Australian	Prime	Minister,	John	G.	Gorton,	Washington,	29	May	1968,	Document	Number	I-22926/68,	ibid.,	p.	416.	363	Ibid.	364	Ibid.,	p.	420.	365	Defence:	Ministerial	Statement,	from	the	‘Parliamentary	Debates’,	25	February	1969,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	6,	MS	7984,	NLA.	366	Ibid.	
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I	speak,”	as	well	as	being	“contrary	to	our	future	interests.”367		And	though	such	an	approach	may	 have	 been	more	 in	 line	with	 his	 own	way	 	 of	 thinking,	 he	 also	rejected	the	possibility	of	withdrawing	Australian	forces	but	providing	Malaysia-Singapore	 an	 assurance	 that	 Australia	 retained	 an	 interest	 in	 their	 military	security,	stating	that	the	action	of	maintaining	some	ground	presence	in	the	area	would	 speak	 louder	 than	 a	 general	 assurance:	 “it	 is	 much	 easier	 to	 despatch	ground	forces	to	an	area	if,	 in	that	area,	there	 is	a	securely	held	base	…		And	of	course,	it	is	much	easier	for	a	country	which	is	to	be	assisted	to	believe	that	it	will	be	assisted	if	forces	from	the	country	which	may	provide	such	help	are	there	and	are	visible.”368		In	 an	 attempt	 to	 make	 the	 commitment	 more	 palatable	 to	 himself	 and	 the	Australian	public,	Gorton	made	it	clear	that,	though	he	was	committing	Australian	troops	to	Malaysia-Singapore,	he	was	not	relinquishing	any	governmental	control	over	the	way	in	which	they	were	deployed.		Indeed,	the	latter	half	of	Gorton’s	25	February	 speech	 outlined	 the	 conditions	 under	which	 Australian	 forces	would	remain	and	the	exact	nature	of	the	role	they	would	play:	they	would	remain	in	the	region	only	so	long	as	their	presence	was	actively	desired	by	the	governments	of	the	 countries	 in	 which	 they	 were	 stationed	 and	 were	 not	 to	 be	 used	 for	 the	maintenance	 of	 internal	 civil	 law	 and	 order.	 	Also,	 their	 presence	 and	military	cooperation	with	Malaysia-Singapore	was	not	intended	to	be	directed	against	any	other	country	in	the	region;	rather,	“by	helping	to	strengthen	the	defence	of	one	part	of	the	region	it	is	hoped	that	they	will	indirectly	contribute	to	the	stability	of	the	whole.”369				Gorton	 also	made	 it	 clear	 that	 troops	would	 not	 be	 stationed	 in	 the	 region	 to	replace	the	indigenous	forces	or	to	take	over	their	defence	responsibility.		Instead,	the	value	of	the	Australian	presence	would	be	in	“helping	to	build	the	indigenous	defence	 capability	 of	 both	 Malaysia	 and	 Singapore”	 and	 providing	 additional	security	“while	that	indigenous	defence	capacity	is	built	up”,	and	making	it	“more																																																									367	Ibid.	368	Ibid.	369	Ibid.	
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possible	for	Malaysian	troops	to	be	assigned	to	other	parts	of	Malaysia	should	the	Malaysian	Government	so	desire.”370		Gorton	tried	to	define	the	nature	of	 the	conflict	he	envisaged	Australian	troops	being	used	to	combat,	namely	externally	promoted	Southeast	Asian	 insurgency	that	would	ultimately	expose	the	region	to	the	threat	of	communism,	and	which	was	beyond	the	capacity	of	the	forces	of	Malaysia	and	Singapore	to	handle.371		He	was	careful,	however,	to	not	commit	Australia	to	taking	on	full	responsibility	for	combatting	 such	 threats.	 	 Indeed,	 Gorton	 envisaged	 and	 provided	 for	 the	possibility	of	future	circumstances	in	which	Australia	would	have	to	call	on	the	support	 of	 allies	 outside	 the	 region.	 	 As	 Gorton	 put	 it	 to	 the	 House	 of	Representatives,		
at	some	time	in	the	future	it	could	be	possible	that	a	situation	might	arise	
when	the	scale	of	such	subversion	and	infiltration	from	outside	–	or	some	
other	organised	 threat	 to	 the	 region	at	present	unforeseen	–	could	be	
such	 that	 Australian	 resources	 alone	would	 be	 insufficient	 to	 support	
successfully	 the	 forces	 of	Malaysia	 and	 Singapore.	 	 If	 such	 a	 situation	
should	arise	we	would	have	to	look	to	the	support	of	allies	outside	the	
region	and	the	scale	of	Australia’s	continued	effort	would	 in	 that	case	
have	 to	 be	 decided	 in	 the	 light	 of	 all	 the	 circumstances	 that	 then	
prevail.372				In	sum,	Gorton	chose	to	commit	troops	to	Malaysia-Singapore	in	response	to	the	pressure	 placed	 on	 Australia	 by	 its	 American	 ally	 to	 maintain	 a	 presence	 in	Southeast	Asia	and	in	exchange	for	the	elusive	ANZUS	guarantees,	but	did	so	in	a	manner	 that	 might	 allow	 him	 to,	 as	 he	 put	 it,	 create	 a	 situation	 whereby	 the	decision	to	use	Australian	troops	would	be	“always	a	matter	for	…	the	Australian	Government,”	 and	 one	 that	would	 be	 “made	 in	 light	of	our	 judgment	of	 all	 the	
																																																								370	Ibid.	371	Ibid.	372	Ibid.
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circumstances	at	any	given	time.”373		Indeed,	as	he	said	on	30	June	1969,	“we	are	not	giving	blank	cheques	 for	 the	use	of	Australian	youth	 for	others.	 	Our	 forces	must	be	under	our	control.”374		Notwithstanding	Gorton’s	attempts	to	control	the	circumstances	 in	 which	 Australian	 troops	 in	 Malaysia-Singapore	 might	 be	deployed,	however,	his	decision	to	commit	them	to	the	region	signified	Gorton’s	inability	to	break	away	from	the	traditional	belief	in	the	need	to	make	concessions	so	as	to	ensure	American	protection	in	Southeast	Asia.		 	It	was	the	price	Gorton	believed	he	needed	to	pay	to	ensure	such	protection	for	Australia	from	its	great	and	powerful	friend.			This	 was	 most	 clearly	 evident	 when,	 having	 committed	 Australian	 troops	 to	Malaysia-Singapore,	Gorton	fell	back	yet	again	on	the	practice	of	seeking	the	usual	security	guarantees	from	new	American	president	Richard	Nixon	during	his	May	1969	visit	to	Washington.		Such	guarantees	were	not	forthcoming:	though	Gorton	may	have	reported	to	Parliament	that	any	grounds	for	questioning	the	certainty	of	ANZUS	should	“surely	now	be	removed”	after	his	meetings	with	the	president,	and	 that	 Nixon	 and	 the	 new	 Administration	 had	 “strongly	 underlined	 the	importance	 and	 significance	 which	 they	 attach	 to	 the	 treaty,” 375 	no	 specific	assurances	had	been	given,	and	Nixon	had	not	in	fact	removed	any	grounds	for	questioning	the	certainty	of	its	application.		The	difficulties	Gorton	would	have	in	getting	a	firm	guarantee	from	the	new	president	had	been	foreshadowed	by	Keith	Waller	who,	as	ambassador	to	America,	had	advised	the	Australian	government	on	 20	 March	 1969	 that	 Nixon	 had	 not	 yet	 “sketched	 out	 any	 new	 outlines	 of	American	 policy,”	 and	 that,	 after	 two	months	 in	 office,	 “both	 the	man	 and	 his	policies	 still	have	a	 somewhat	enigmatic	quality.”376		 Indeed,	 the	memorandum	provided	to	Nixon	 in	preparation	 for	Gorton’s	visit	 advised	him	 to	 “assure	him	that,	as	Australia’s	principal	ally	in	the	Pacific,	we	would	of	course	stand	ready	to																																																									373	Ibid.	374	Speech	by	the	Prime	Minister,	Mr.	John	Gorton,	Great	Synagogue	Luncheon,	Sydney,	NSW,	30	June	1969,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	6,	MS	7984,	NLA.	375	Prime	Minister’s	Visit	to	the	United	States	of	America:	Ministerial	Statement,	from	the	‘Parliamentary	Debates’,	15	May	1969,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	6,	MS	7984,	NLA.	376	Waller,	Extract	from	Washington	Telegram	1606	of	20	March	1969,	Part	10,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	
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consult	fully	and	promptly	on	what	support	we	might	give,”	but	also	to	tell	him	that	“we	cannot	know	what	those	circumstances	might	be	and,	therefore,	cannot	now	make	precise	decisions.”377		On	the	very	topic	of	ANZUS	applicability,	Nixon	was	advised	to	“avoid	raising	the	question	of	the	specific	applicability	of	ANZUS	to	Australian	forces	in	Malaysia/Singapore.”378		Gorton’s	 reassurances	 to	 the	 Australian	 public	 on	 his	 return	 that	 American	assistance	would	be	“forthcoming	either	under	the	ANZUS	Treaty	or	in	some	other	way”379	and	that	Australia	and	America’s	approach	to	Vietnam	and	Southeast	Asia	was	proceeding	as	it	had	in	the	past	were	“rudely	contradicted”	only	three	weeks	later	when	Nixon	announced	the	first	unilateral	withdrawal	of	25,000	troops.380		As	Murphy	has	demonstrated,	 “informed	opinion	was	that	 the	government	had	been	 caught	 unaware	 again,	 unable	 to	 recognise	 the	 American	 shift	 from	escalation	 to	 de-escalation.” 381 		 As	 Bruce	 Grant	 commented	 in	 The	 Age,	 “the	government	maintains	the	public	position	that	nothing	has	changed,	a	position	so	fanciful	that	it	is	impossible	to	contest	seriously.”382		Gorton	 did,	 however,	 at	 least	 suggest	 that	 there	might	 be	 scope	 for	 change	 in	approach	 for	 foreign	policy	 the	 future.	 	He	explained	any	uncertainty	as	 to	 the	application	 of	 ANZUS	 by	 referring	 generally	 to	 the	 general	 uncertainty	 of	 the	future,	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 application	 of	 the	 treaty	 to	 Australian	 troops	stationed	in	Malaysia-Singapore,	simply	stated	that	“it	would	be	misleading	of	me	to	say	that	 this	was	so	 in	all	 the	variety	of	hypothetical	situations	which	might	arise,	for	while	the	Treaty	is	quite	specific	as	to	certain	areas	it	is	not	specific	about	
																																																								377	Memorandum	for	the	President,	Subject:	Your	Meeting	with	the	Prime	Minister	of	Australia,	29	April	1969,	Richard	Nixon	Presidential	Library,	Yorba	Linda,	VIP	Visits,	Box	910.	I	am	grateful	to	James	Curran	for	providing	this	document.	378	Ibid.	379	Prime	Minister’s	Visit	to	the	United	States	of	America:	Ministerial	Statement,	from	the	‘Parliamentary	Debates’,	15	May	1969,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	6,	MS	7984,	NLA.	380	Murphy,	Harvest	of	Fear,	op.	cit.,	p.	205.	381	Ibid.,	p.	206.	382	Bruce	Grant	in	The	Age,	10	June	1969,	ibid.	
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those	of	which	I	now	speak.”383		Charting	Australia’s	foreign	policy	movements	in	the	context	of	change	and	uncertainty	was	not	an	easy	task.		Indeed,	in	his	report	to	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives	 on	 his	May	 1969	 visit	 to	Washington,	 Gorton	placed	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 and	 Nixon	 had	 made	 an	arrangement	 for	 direct	 communication	 in	 what	 he	 referred	 to	 as	 “matters	 of	concern	to	both	our	countries	during	the	formative	stages	of	policy	and	prior	to	major	policy	announcements.”384		Gorton’s	reference	to	both	countries	being	 in	the	‘formative’	stages	of	policy	and	the	fact	he	envisaged	both	countries	might	be	making	‘major	policy	announcements’	demonstrates	the	extent	to	which	Gorton	was	dealing	with	a	new	set	of	circumstances	in	1969.			Gorton’s	troop	commitment	to	Malaysia-Singapore	and	subsequent	efforts	to	seek	further	ANZUS	guarantees	did	not	demonstrate	any	sort	of	clean	break	with	past	foreign	policy	or	clear	articulation	of	new	policy	in	light	of	the	major	geopolitical	changes	 in	 the	 region.	 	 Though	 he	 may	 well	 have	 wanted	 to,	 the	 Malaysia-Singapore	commitment	demonstrated	Gorton’s	inability	to	break	away	from	the	forward	defence	stance	that	previous	Liberal	governments	had	adhered	to	as	one	of	the	key	features	of	Australian	defence	policy.		Trying	to	reconcile	the	perhaps	irreconcilable,	 Gorton	 was	 caught	 between	 a	 number	 of	 competing	 interests.		Personally,	he	was	unwilling	to	create	a	commitment	that	might	see	Australian	soldiers	 isolated	on	 foreign	shores	at	 some	point	 in	 the	 future,	 a	 fear	 that	was	exacerbated	by	Britain’s	impending	withdrawal	from	the	region.		But	the	legacy	of	previous	Liberal	governments	and	their	almost	obsessive	adherence	to	the	policy	of	forward	defence	and	great	power	relations,	along	with	his	own	beliefs	in	the	value	of	such	relations	after	his	experiences	in	the	World	War	Two	era,	prevented	Gorton	 from	 refusing	 American	 overtures	 to	 contribute	 to	 Southeast	 Asian	security	by	way	of	 committing	 troops	 to	Malaysia-Singapore	and	start	 to	 chart	Australian	foreign	policy	on	a	new	course.				
																																																								383	Prime	Minister’s	Visit	to	the	United	States	of	America:	Ministerial	Statement,	from	the	‘Parliamentary	Debates’,	15	May	1969,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	6,	MS	7984,	NLA.	384	Ibid.	
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The	Nixon	Doctrine	and	the	articulation	of	a	new	Australian	defence	policy		Though	 Gorton’s	 decision	 to	 maintain	 a	 ground	 force	 in	 Malaysia-Singapore	pleased	the	Nixon	administration	and	set	relations	between	the	prime	minister	and	 president	 on	 a	 positive	 course,	 Australia’s	 Cold	 War	 defence	 policy	 of	maintaining	 a	 close	 relationship	 with	 an	 America	 that	 was	 fully	 engaged	 in	Southeast	Asia	was	dealt	a	major	blow	when	Nixon	announced	the	Guam	Doctrine	in	July	1969.		As	Curran	put	it,	the	announcement	of	America’s	departure	not	long	after	Britain’s	created	a	“gaping	defence	void”	that	looked	“all	the	more	perilous.		A	sense	of	double	desertion	rocked	the	foreign	policy	firmament.”385		As	well	as	signalling	his	intention	to	avoid	direct	involvement	in	Southeast	Asian	conflicts,	Nixon	 also	 called	 on	 its	 allies	 in	 the	 region	 to	 take	 on	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	responsibility	for	their	own	defence.		As	Nixon	stated	in	his	report	to	Congress	in	February	1970,	in	cases	involving	aggression	(other	than	nuclear),	“we	shall	look	to	 the	 nation	 directly	 threatened	 to	 assume	 the	 primary	 responsibility	 of	providing	the	manpower	for	its	defence.”386		Nixon’s	announcement	meant	 that	America	was	now	even	 less	likely	 to	honour	ANZUS:	Nixon	stated	that	“we	will	view	new	commitments	in	the	light	of	a	careful	assessment	of	our	own	national	interests,”387	and	that,	“while	we	have	established	general	 guidelines	 on	 American	 responses	 to	 Asian	 conflicts,	 in	 practice	 the	specific	 circumstances	 of	 each	 case	 require	 careful	 study.	 	 Even	 with	 careful	planning,	we	will	always	have	to	consider	a	basic	and	delicate	choice.”388		Nixon’s	announcement	 caught	 Australia	 by	 surprise:	 only	 months	 before	 Nixon’s	 July	speech	in	Guam,	Gorton	had	returned	from	Washington	giving	the	view	that	the	Nixon	administration	had	rejected	isolationism	and	that	Australia	could	expect	no	major	 changes	 in	 American	 policy	 in	 Southeast	 Asia. 389 		 Accordingly,	 “the																																																									385	Curran,	Unholy	Fury,	op.	cit.,	p	107.	386	Richard	Nixon,	US	Foreign	Policy	for	the	1970s:	A	New	Strategy	for	Peace:	A	Report	to	Congress,	18	February	1970,	in	Harper,	“Australia	and	the	United	States,”	op.	cit.,	pp.	240.	387	Ibid.,	p.	239.	388	Ibid.,	p.	242.	389	This	is	understandable	considering	that	Nixon	had	reassured	Gorton	that	America	would	stand	by	its	ANZUS	obligations	in	the	future:	as	recorded	in	
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bluntness	 of	 Mr	 Nixon’s	 tour	 speeches	 has	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 to	 Australian	newspapers.” 390 		 This	 created	 another	 crisis	 for	 Gorton,	 who	 –	 having	 just	committed	Australian	troops	to	Malaysia-Singapore	-	was	left	to	begin	the	process	of	reassessing	ANZUS,	 the	likelihood	of	American	support	and,	 indeed,	 the	very	basis	and	future	of	Australia’s	defence	policy.				Gorton’s	reassessment	of	the	American	alliance	after	the	enunciation	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine	resulted	neither	in	the	abandonment	of	ANZUS	as	the	basis	for	Australian	foreign	 policy	 nor	 the	 strict	 adherence	 to	 it.	 	Rather,	 Gorton	 sought	 to	 chart	 a	middle	 course	 between	 the	 two	 extremes:	 while	 his	 personal	 and	 political	background	had	instilled	in	him	a	sense	of	the	benefits	to	be	gained	by	maintaining	a	strong	relationship	with	great	power	allies,	he	also	appreciated	that	America’s	new	approach	to	its	involvement	in	the	Pacific	would	require	Australia	to	take	on	more	responsibility	for	its	own	foreign	and	defence	policy.		In	a	speech	made	in	Adelaide	in	14	October	1969	Gorton	stated	that	“we	do	need,	now	that	Britain	is	withdrawing	from	our	North,	now	that	the	United	States	is	taking	more	economic	and	less	military	interest	in	areas	such	as	Malaysia/Singapore	to	our	North,	we	do	need	in	that	situation	to	help	ourselves	above	all.”391		Gorton’s	task	was	to	now	clearly	articulate	how	this	was	to	be	done	in	practice.		The	 central	 focus	 of	 governmental	 discussion	 surrounding	 future	 Australian	foreign	policy	centred	around	the	need	to	maintain	relations	with	America,	and	much	 of	 the	 discussion	 focussed	 on	 how	 this	 could	 be	 done	 by	 trying	 to	demonstrate	that	Australia	was	indeed	following	the	Nixon	Doctrine	and	taking	on	 a	 greater	 level	 of	 responsibility	 for	 its	 own	 defence.	 	 In	 his	 address	 to	 the																																																									Australian	government	notes	on	Gorton’s	meetings	with	Nixon	dated	5	July	1969	(author	unknown),	“ANZUS,	with	its	provisions	for	mutual	aid	in	developing	our	individual	and	collective	capacity	to	resist	armed	attack,	Mr.	Nixon	said,	is	of	great	importance	to	both	our	countries.	He	pointed	out	that	no	(repeat)	no	potential	aggressor	should	be	under	the	illusion	that	any	member	of	ANZUS	stands	alone	in	the	Pacific	area.”	(“Nixon-Gorton	Talks	Produce	‘Close	Understanding,’”	Government	Notes,	Part	10,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.)	390	Inward	Cablegram	from	Australian	Embassy,	Washington,	“President’s	Tour	of	Asia,	29	July	1969,	Part	10,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	391	Public	Meeting,	Town	Hall,	Adelaide	SA,	Speech	by	the	Prime	Minister,	Mr	John	Gorton,	14	October	1969,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	6,	MS	7984,	NLA.	
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American-Association	in	New	York	in	September	1969,	newly	appointed	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs	Gordon	Freeth	outlined	the	role	Australia	was	playing	in	Asia	and	 stated	 that	 “we	 fully	 agree	 with	 President	 Nixon’s	 view	 that	 a	 valuable	contribution	can	be	made	to	the	progress	of	the	region	by	co-operation	and	mutual	help	among	the	countries	in	it.”392		Freeth	continued,	stating	that	Australians	had	“no	 quarrel”	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 Nixon	 had	 emphasised	 that	 “the	 security	 of	countries	in	the	region	must	primarily	be	a	matter	for	themselves,”	and	that	“in	order	to	avoid	having	American	troops	fighting	in	future	wars	in	Asia	it	may	well	be	necessary	to	intensify	our	current	effort	towards	developing	the	self-reliance	of	the	countries	in	the	region.”393				Such	 an	 approach	 lacked	 substance	 in	 that	 it	 simply	 acknowledged	Australia’s	acceptance	of	 the	Nixon	Doctrine,	 rather	 than	outlining	what	assuming	greater	responsibility	might	look	like	in	practice,	and	was	criticised	in	the	media.	 	On	5	March	1970	The	Age	suggested	that	Cabinet	had	adopted	the	view	that	“foreign	policy	 is	 best	 ignored	 for	 as	 long	 as	 possible,”	 and	 that,	 surrounded	 by	“imponderables”	Cabinet	had	made	the	decision	to	“sit	tight	and	wait	for	things	to	sort	themselves	out.”394		As	stated	in	an	editorial	appearing	in	The	Australian	on	19	June	1969,	the	Nixon	Doctrine	was	“the	most	scathing	indictment	of	Australian	foreign	 policy	 in	 recent	 times,	 as	 it	 illustrated	 “the	 simple,	 sad	 truth”	 that	“Australia	 lacks	any	real	concept	of	an	 independent	role	 in	 international	affairs	and	is	unable	to	talk	frankly	and	freely	even	with	her	closest	friends.”395	Indeed,	Freeth	stated	in	the	same	address	that,	while	he	hoped	that	neither	America	nor	Australia	would	be	drawn	into	conflicts	like	Vietnam	in	the	future,	“we	have	not	ourselves	believed	however	that	any	of	us	can	entirely	rule	out	the	possibility	that	
																																																								392	“Address	to	American-Australian	Association,	New	York,	on	18th	September,	1969,	By	the	Minister	for	External	Affairs,	Mr	Gordon	Freeth,	MP,”	Department	of	External	Affairs,	Canberra,	19	September	1969,	Part	10,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	393	Ibid.	394	Author	unknown,	“Foreign	Policy	in	Suspense,”	published	on	5	March	1970	in	
The	Age,	Part	11,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	395	Author	Unknown,	“Double	talk	reaches	a	Dead	End”,	published	in	The	
Australian	on	19	June	1969,	Part	10,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	
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we	may	 in	 future	have	 to	give	military	 help;	 and	 our	 commitment	 to	maintain	forces	in	Malaysia	and	Singapore	demonstrates	this.”396				Then	Minister	 for	 External	 Affairs,	William	McMahon,	 articulated	 an	 even	 less	imaginative	approach	to	the	issue	of	how	Australia	should	respond	to	the	Nixon	Doctrine.	 	 Demonstrating	 an	 unwillingness	 or	 inability	 to	 deviate	 from	 the	accepted	truths	of	the	Cold	War	view	of	the	world,	at	an	ASPAC	meeting	on	18	June	1970,	McMahon	stated	that	divisions	amongst	the	American	public	in	relation	to	America’s	involvement	in	Vietnam	and	foreign	policy	were	“a	passing	phase,”	that	the	 United	 States’	 strategic	 interest	 in	 Asia	 was	 permanent,	 and	 that	 the	competition	 and	 ideological	 difference	 between	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 Soviet	Union,	 and	 Communist	 China	 “cannot	 be	wished	 away.”397		 As	 had	 Freeth	had,	McMahon	 advocated	 continued	 involvement	 in	 Asia	 as	 the	 best	 means	 of	preventing	 America	 from	 withdrawing	 from	 the	 region,	 stating	 at	 the	 ASPAC	meeting	 that	 Australia	 should	 do	 all	 it	 can	 to	 avoid	 America	 retreating	 into	isolationism.		According	to	McMahon,	“one	way	we	can	do	this	is	to	emphasise	the	direct	and	practical	implication	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine;	in	particular	the	emphasis	given	by	the	United	States	to	the	need	for	‘the	nation	directly	threatened	to	assume	the	primary	responsibility	of	providing	the	manpower	for	its	defence.’”398		What	the	 Gorton	 government	 failed	 to	 articulate	was	 a	more	 concrete	 plan	 for	 how	Australia	 would	 actually	 take	 on	 more	 responsibility	 for	 its	 own	 foreign	 and	defence	policy.			In	the	case	of	Vietnam,	Gorton	was	unable	to	extricate	Australian	forces	from	the	most	pressing	issue	of	the	time:	America’s	inevitable	withdrawal	from	Vietnam.		More	 than	 anything,	 this	 issue	 demonstrated	 the	 difficulty	 Gorton	 and	 his	government	 faced	 in	 having	 to	 transition	 away	 from	 a	 foreign	 policy	 that	 had	relied	 so	 heavily	 on	 ANZUS	 and	 America’s	 ongoing	 commitment	 to	 Vietnam.																																																										396	Address	to	American-Australian	Association,	New	York,	on	18th	September,	1969,	by	the	Minister	for	External	Affairs,	Mr	Gordon	Freeth,	Part	10,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	397	Address	to	ASPAC	on	18	June	1970,	Inward	Savingram	No,	13/70,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	Part	11,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	398	Ibid.	
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Gorton	initially	insisted	that	any	withdrawal	of	Australian	troops	from	Vietnam	would	 have	 to	 be	 phased	 into	 a	 planned	 American	 withdrawal,	 as	 there	 was	“nothing	 more	 calculated	 to	 damage	 Australia’s	 future	 security” 399 	than	withdrawing	one	battalion	at	a	time,	but	also	refused	to	consider	any	unilateral	withdrawal,	stating	that	this	would	amount	to	a	betrayal	of	Australia’s	allies.		As	Gorton	asked	rhetorically	in	a	speech	during	the	1969	Federal	election,	“what	kind	of	 effect	do	you	 think	 this	would	have	on	 the	United	States	and	on	 the	ANZUS	alliance?”400		Even	after	America	had	 signalled	 its	 intention	 to	 take	a	 step	back	from	Southeast	Asia	and	withdraw	its	troops	from	Vietnam,	the	fear	of	upsetting	a	great	power	ally	loomed	large	in	Gorton’s	mind.		Here	 lay	 the	 basis	 of	 another	 problem	 that	 frustrated	 Gorton’s	 ability	 to	manoeuvre	freely	in	relation	to	the	American	alliance.		Though	those	in	the	Labor	Party,	including	its	new	leader	Whitlam,	could	denounce	the	Liberal	government’s	vacillations	and	divisions	while	saying	little	about	the	policies	of	a	future	Labor	government,	 Gorton	 could	 not.	 	 He	may	 have	wanted	 to	 find	 a	way	 out	 of	 the	Australian	 commitment	 to	 Vietnam,	 but	 –	 given	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 he	 had	succeeded	 Holt	 and	 become	 prime	 minister	 –	 did	 not	 enjoy	 the	 support	 or	authority	to	announce	such	radical	shifts	in	policy.		This	was	especially	the	case	given	that	for	so	long	to	Liberal	government	had	held	ANZUS	and	the	American-alliance	as	the	fundamental	basis	of	Australian	foreign	policy,	and	had	expended	so	much	time	and	energy	to	create	a	set	of	circumstances	that	would	ensure	that	Washington	honoured	the	treaty.		According	to	Murphy,	one	legacy	of	the	stability	of	conservative	foreign	policy	over	the	last	two	decades	–	stability	that	Gorton	now	did	not	have	–	had	been	 “was	 that	 there	was	no	mechanism	within	 the	Liberal	Party	 for	rethinking	policy.	 	Decisions	had	been	centralised	 in	a	 few	hands	and	reflected	by	the	indolent	consensus	amongst	the	conservatives.”401		
																																																								399	Address	to	American-Australian	Association,	New	York,	on	18th	September,	1969,	by	the	Minister	for	External	Affairs,	Mr	Gordon	Freeth,	Part	10,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	400	Ibid.	401	Murphy,	Harvest	of	Fear,	op.	cit.,	p.	203.	
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At	 the	same	time	Gorton	did	not	want	to	damage	the	alliance	relationship	with	America	or	lose	electoral	preferences	from	the	Democratic	Labour	Party,	a	party	that,	 from	 its	 inception	 in	 1955,	 had	 been	 staunchly	 anti-communist.	 	 The	Democratic	Labour	Party	had	influenced	Liberal	policy	on	domestic	and	foreign	affairs	throughout	the	late	1950s	and	1960s,	especially	on	matters	that	could	be	interpreted	as	weakness	towards	communism,	and	this	was	particularly	the	case	after	the	1969	election	in	which	a	7.1	per	cent	swing	in	voting	to	Labor	saw	the	Liberal	government	gain	less	than	50	per	cent	of	the	two-party	preferred	vote	and	have	 its	 majority	 reduced	 from	 39	 to	 seven	 seats. 402 		 The	 Liberal	 party	 was	effectively	 saved	 by	 Democratic	 Labour	 Party	 preferences,	 meaning	 that	 the	government’s	freedom	of	manoeuvre	was	constrained	by	a	party	with	about	10	per	cent	of	the	vote.403		There	were	no	real	winners	from	the	1969	election,		and	the	collapse	in	government	support	“left	Gorton	prey	to	mutinous	forces	within	the	 Liberal	 Party.” 404 		 This	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 further	 restricting	 his	 ability	 to	introduce	concrete	 foreign	policy	changes,	especially	given	the	 fact	 that	he	had	already	been	regarded	as	most	unlikely	candidate	for	the	prime	ministership,	and	had	not	enjoyed	a	strong	level	of	support	since	replacing	Holt.	 	 Indeed,	he	only	“survived	uneasily”405	as	prime	minister	from	the	1969	election	until	1971	when	he	was	replaced	by	McMahon.				Another	problem	Gorton	faced	was	the	declining	support	in	Australia	for	the	war	in	Vietnam.		In	August	1969,	a	public	opinion	poll	indicated	that,	for	the	first	time,	more	Australians	wanted	the	government	to	withdraw	troops	from	Vietnam	than	wanted	 them	 to	 remain.406		While	 sections	 of	 the	 anti-war	movement	 become	more	radical	and	violent,	moderate	protesters	began	to	direct	their	attention	to	the	war	itself.	 	Protesters	continued	to	denounce	the	use	of	napalm	specifically,	and	the	media	contingent	in	Vietnam	devoted	a	great	deal	of	attention	to	real	and	alleged	atrocities.407		The	number	of	Australian	casualties	caused	by	mines	from																																																									402	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	216.	403	Ibid.,	pp.	216-217.	404	Strangio,	“Instability,	1966-82,”	op.	cit.,	p.	143.	405	Ibid.	406	Edwards,	Australia	and	the	Vietnam	War,	op.	cit.,	p.	191.	407	Ibid.,	p.	200.	
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the	 ill-conceived	Dat	Do	minefield	 turned	many	against	 the	war	 too,	 and	many	were	 concerned	 to	 hear	 that	 Australians	 were	 being	 used	 in	 American-led	operations	outside	the	Phuoc	Tuy	province.				The	issue	of	conscription	was	arguably	the	greatest	source	of	dissent,	especially	as	the	impact	of	the	National	Service	Act	became	more	widespread.		A	number	of	objectors	were	 turned	 into	 heroes	 by	 anti-conscription	 groups,	 including	 John	Zarb,	 who	 served	 ten	 months	 in	 Pentridge	 Prison	 in	 Melbourne	 and	 Simon	Townsend,	who	was	sentenced	by	a	court-martial	to	detention,	and	then	solitary	confinement	at	Holsworthy	army	base	in	Sydney.		His	treatment	–	being	restricted	to	a	diet	of	bread	and	water,	deprived	of	 a	mattress,	 and	woken	at	half-hourly	intervals	 during	 the	 night	 –	 was	 widely	 publicised	 and	 denounced. 408 		 The	breaking	 of	 the	My-Lai	massacre	 story	 in	November	 1969,	 other	 news	 reports	about	 the	true	extent	of	America’s	 incursions	 into	supposedly	neutral	Laos	and	Cambodia	and	the	American	sponsored	coup	against	the	Cambodian	government	of	 Prince	 Norodom	 Sihanouk	 in	 May	 1970	 culminated	 in	 violent	 protests	 on	several	 university	 campuses	 in	 America,	 including	 Kent	 State	 in	 Ohio,	 where	National	Guardsmen	opened	fire	on	a	student	protest	without	orders	and	without	warning,	killing	four	demonstrators.				Such	events	increased	the	intensity	of	anti-war	protests	and	led	to	the	American	and	Australian	governments	losing	the	middle	ground	of	political	opinion.409		The	decline	 in	 support	 for	 the	 war	 and	 emergence	 of	 greater	 dissent	 from	wider	sections	of	the	community	also	made	it	hard	for	the	Liberal	government	to	take	a	firm	stance	on	foreign	policy,	increasing	the	public	perception	of	policy	paralysis	and	dither.		According	to	Murphy,	politicians	were	reluctant	to	speak	on	the	war	at	public	meetings,	and	that	“the	enthusiasm	to	publically	argue	the	case,	evident	in	1965	and	1966,	had	evaporated	by	the	late	1960s.”410		Gorton	was	caught	in	the	middle	of	this:	though	he	may	have	wanted	to	challenge	the	strict	adherence	to	
																																																								408	Ibid.,	pp.	200-201.	409	Ibid.,	p.	224.	410	Murphy,	Harvest	of	Fear,	op.	cit.,	p.	204.	
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forward	defence	as	a	 foreign	policy,	he	was	prevented	 from	doing	so	with	any	great	authority	given	his	own	lack	of	standing	within	his	own	party.		Indeed,	Gorton	remained	incapable	of	making	any	firm	announcements	about	an	Australian	withdrawal.		In	a	response	to	a	question	from	Labor’s	Jim	Cairns	about	any	planned	Australian	withdrawals	 from	Vietnam	on	12	August	1969,	Gorton	stated			
I	do	not	believe	that	there	is	any	long	term	precise	or	firm	programme	
for	the	disengagement	of	Australian	troops,	of	United	States	troops,	but	
that	will	depend	on	circumstances	in	the	future	…		I	believe	that	unless	
and	until	 there	 is	continued	withdrawal	of	United	States	 troops	and	a	
programme	for	that	which	depends	upon	the	working	out	of	these	other	
conditions,	 then	 it	 is	 premature	 to	 talk	 in	 terms	 of	 Australian	 troops.		
What	will	be	necessary,	of	course,	is	that	if	–	and	this	is	a	big	‘if’	–	there	is	
to	be	on	the	part	of	the	United	States	a	specific,	definite	and	drawn-out	
plan	for	withdrawal,	then	Australian	troops	would	need	to	be	phased	into	
that	plan.411				Making	such	general	statements	about	remaining	in	Vietnam	as	long	as	America	did	little	to	suggest	to	the	public	that	Gorton	had	a	clear	and	practical	plan	for	a	new	and	more	self-reliant	foreign	policy	in	the	wake	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine.		There	was	little	that	Gorton	could	do.		As	had	been	the	case	in	relation	to	Gorton’s	management	of	the	alliance	while	Johnson	was	president,	it	the	uncertainty	of	the	new	 situation	Gorton	 had	 to	manage	 and	 the	 internal	 pressures	 he	 faced	 that	thwarted	his	ability	 to	 lay	down	a	clear	plan	as	 to	how	Australia	might	adopt	a	more	self-reliant	 foreign	policy.	 	As	Gorton	admitted	 to	Parliament	on	22	April	1970,																																																											411	Text	of	Reply	Given	by	the	Prime	Minister,	Mr	John	Gorton,	to	Question	Asked	in	the	House	of	Representatives	by	Dr	J.	F.	Cairns,	12	August	1969,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	6,	MS	7984,	NLA.	
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should	 the	 progress	 of	 pacification	 and	Vietnamisation	 succeed	 as	 the	
President	hopes	and	believes	that	it	will,	then	at	some	stage	during	the	
12-month	 period,	 we	 will	 consider	 phasing	 additional	 troops	 into	 the	
planned	withdrawal.	 	 But	 the	 future	 situation	 is	 so	 uncertain	 and	 the	
future	strategical	situation	so	unpredictable	that	it	is	impossible	to	be	any	
more	definite	than	this.412				The	fact	that	Gorton	was	never	consulted	about	being	phased	into	any	American	withdrawal	 and	 eventually	 decided	 to	 withdraw	 troops	 not	 as	 part	 of	 but	 in	response	 to	 the	 American	 withdrawal	 demonstrated	 the	 extent	 to	 which	Australia’s	 involvement	 in	 Vietnam	 had	 failed	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 kind	 of	consultation	that	Australia	sought.		Indeed,	the	task	of	orchestrating	a	withdrawal	from	Vietnam	was	not	made	any	easier	by	Nixon’s	refusal	 to	share	 information	with	many	of	his	closest	advisers,	let	alone	Gorton	and	the	Australian	government.		Even	during	the	presidential	election	campaign	in	1968,	Nixon	had	played	his	card	close	 to	 his	 chest:	 in	 October	 1968	 he	 stated	 that	 “as	 long	 as	 the	 (peace)	negotiations	in	Paris	hold	out	any	reasonable	hope	of	success,	I	will	not	indicate	what	 I	might	do	 if	 those	negotiations	 fail	because	that	will	ensure	that	 they	do	fail.”413				As	 academic	 Frank	 Knopfelmacher	 noted	 in	 his	 article	 “Why	 America	 is	 Not	Capable	of	Defending	Anyone”,	published	on	5	May	1971,	“Nixon	has,	deliberately,	adopted	a	policy	of	calculated	unpredictability.		Everybody	is	kept	guessing	what	the	giant	will	do.”414		This	placed	severe	restrictions	on	what	Gorton	could	do	as	prime	minister	in	the	realm	of	foreign	policy,	and	continued	to	do	so	throughout	the	 withdrawal	 process.	 	 Gorton	 had	 little	 option	 but	 to	 react	 to	 Nixon’s	announcements	 as	 they	 were	 made,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 appeared	 to	 be	 entirely	
																																																								412	Vietnam	(Ministerial	Statement),	From	the	‘Parliamentary	Debates,’	22	April	1970,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	6,	MS	7984,	NLA.	413	Richard	Nixon,	quoted	in	Harper,	“Australia	and	the	United	States,”	op.	cit.,	p.	301.	414	Frank	Knopfelmacher,	“Why	America	is	Not	Capable	of	Defending	Anyone,”	published	in	The	Daily	Telegraph	on	5	May	1971,	Part	12,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	
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beholden	 to	Washington	 and	 lacking	 in	 any	 proactive	 action	 in	 relation	 to	 the	withdrawal	of	Australian	troops.	
	
Forward	Defence,	Fortress	Australia,	or	Forward	Fortress?		The	impact	of	Gorton’s	lack	of	authority	in	his	position	as	prime	minister	was	most	evident	in	the	debate	surrounding	continental	versus	forward	defence.		As	prime	minister,	 Gorton	 articulated	 neither	 a	 clear	 plan	 for	 an	 Australian	withdrawal	from	Vietnam	nor	a	detailed	blueprint	for	Australian	foreign	and	defence	policy	in	the	context	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine.	His	position	as	leader	of	a	government	that	for	so	 long	 had	 regarded	 a	 close	 relationship	with	 America	 as	 the	 cornerstone	 of	Australian	foreign	policy	and	the	domestic	pressures	he	faced	prevented	him	from	doing	so,	even	if	privately	he	had	wanted	to.		He	did	in	truth	appreciate	the	limits	of	ANZUS	and	the	American	alliance	and	desire	a	more	self-reliant	foreign	policy.		Indeed,	 Gorton	 was	 moving	 towards	 a	 policy	 of	 ‘fortress	 Australia,’	 which	envisaged	 troops	being	posted	overseas	only	 for	specific	purposes,	 rather	than	permanently	stationed	in	accordance	with	the	policy	of	forward	defence.415		When	he	had	tried	to	voice	concerns	about	the	validity	of	forward	defence	and	the	need	for	a	new	foreign	policy,	his	views	were	“bitterly	opposed”	by	“influential	ministers”	 such	 as	 Hasluck	 and	 Fairhall,	 who	were	 strong	 public	 advocates	 of	forward	 defence	 and	 resistant	 to	 change,	 and	 MacMahon,	 whose	 “manifest	ambition	 …	 guaranteed	 that	 he	 opposed	 Gorton	 on	 this,	 as	 well	 as	 almost	everything	else.”416		This	had	been	the	case	since	early	1968	when	Gorton	became	prime	minister.	 	In	May	of	that	year	there	were	reports	of	the	distress	that	had	been	caused	when	Gorton	challenged	 forward	defence	as	a	government	policy;	and	 during	 a	 party	 debate	 on	 foreign	 policy	 in	 August,	 the	 result	 was	 a	 split	between	fortress	Australia	and	forward	defence	views.417		This	did	not	mean	that,	as	Party	member	Peter	Howson	noted	in	his	diary	at	the	time,	“there	is	no	policy	
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on	external	affairs	at	present;”418	rather,	it	demonstrated	the	transition	the	party	was	going	through	in	formulating	a	new	foreign	policy	in	response	to	a	new	set	of	circumstances,	 and	 the	 difficulty	 Gorton	 and	 his	 government	 was	 having	 in	forming	a	consensus	as	the	government’s	long-held-on-to	Cold	War	foreign	policy	was	falling	apart.		After	losing	the	prime	ministership	on	10	March	1971	and	becoming	Minister	for	Defence,	Gorton	set	about	discussing	how	he	envisaged	Australian	foreign	policy	in	the	future.		It	would	be	a	foreign	policy	for	an	Australia	that	would	find	itself	in	a	 new	 and	more	 complex	 world	 in	 which	 Australia’s	 relationships	with	 other	nations	would	no	longer	be	defined	by	traditional	Cold	War	allegiances	and	the	politics	 of	 alliances,	 and	 in	 which	 established	 norms	 such	 as	 the	 validity	 of	‘forward	defence’	would	 no	 longer	 be	 valid.	 	 In	 a	 speech	made	 at	 the	 Imperial	Services	Club	on	18	June	1971	Gorton	discussed	the	term	‘Fortress	Australia’,	and	in	 doing	 so	 began	 to	 articulate	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 more	 self-reliant	 foreign	 policy.		Responding	 to	 claims	 that	 Fortress	 Australia	 was	 nothing	 but	 a	 retreat	 into	isolationism,	Gorton	stated	that,	rather	than	simply	advocating	“retiring	behind	the	 moat	 of	 the	 oceans	 which	 surround	 us:	 there	 to	 wash	 our	 hands	 of	responsibility	 for	 what	 happens	 outside	 our	 continental	 limits,”	 it	 was	 the	“realisation	that	any	operations	in	areas	outside	Australia	require	that	Australia	itself	should	be	a	secure	base,	firmly	defended,	from	which	such	operations	can	be	mounted	and	sustained.”419				Comparing	 Australia	 to	 Great	 Britain,	 which	 had	 been	 able	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	overthrowing	European	 dictators	Napoleon	Bonaparte	 and	Adolf	Hitler	 from	 a	secure	island	base,	Gorton	called	for	a	more	multi-faceted	approach	to	the	defence	of	 Australia,	 including	maintaining	 an	 alliance	with	 America,	 stationing	 troops	abroad	where	 necessary,	 and	 also	 bolstering	Australia’s	 own	 national	 security	forces.420		As	Gorton	wrote	 in	an	article	appearing	 in	The	Age	on	26	 July	1971,																																																									418	Ibid.,	p.	204.	419	Speech	by	the	Minister	for	Defence,	The	Right	Honourable	J.	G.	Gorton,	at	the	Annual	Dinner	of	the	Imperial	Services	Club,	Sydney,	18	June	1971,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	7,	MS	7984,	NLA.	420	Ibid.	
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“increasingly	we	 shall	 be	 required	 to	 take	 our	 own	 independent	 initiatives,	 to	protect	 our	 interests	 and	 advance	 our	 security	 by	 our	 own	 actions.” 421		Recognising	 that	 “Australia’s	 position	 is	 changing	 in	 the	 world,”	 Gorton	highlighted	the	importance	of	making	the	implications	of	this	clear	to	Australians	and	write	that,	“in	seeking	security,	we	need	to	look	more	to	our	own	resources,	our	own	energies,	our	own	knowledge	and	judgment	about	the	course	of	future	events,	and	our	own	policies	to	meet	new	and	developing	situations.”422		In	making	 such	 comments	Gorton	 demonstrated	 a	 realistic	 appreciation	of	 the	implications	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine	for	Australia’s	relationship	with	America	and	its	broader	impact	on	Australia’s	foreign	policy.		Though	he	did	not	officially	call	for	it,	the	formation	of	such	a	foreign	policy	would	necessitate	a	reassessment	of	the	 ANZUS	 Treaty,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Australia	 could	 rely	 on	 America.		Having	lost	the	position	as	Minister	of	Defence	in	August	1971,	Gorton	began	to	reveal	his	real	beliefs	about	the	limitations	of	ANZUS.		Though	he	acknowledged	the	important	role	America	could	play	in	the	defence	of	Australia,	and	that	“it	is	well	 and	good	 to	 look	at	 the	ANZUS	 treaty	and	 to	 say	 that	 this	 is	 important	 to	Australia	and	America	is	a	great	ally”423	he	also	stated	that	“it	is	equally	necessary	to	say	America	is	going	to	be	less	and	less	interested	in	this	part	of	the	world.”424			And		during	a	speech	to	the	American	Association	on	26	November	1971	he	drew	attention	to	the	treaty’s	shortcomings,	especially	 the	 fact	 that	 it	applied	only	to	attacks	 in	 the	 Pacific,	 required	 countries	 to	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	constitutional	 processes	 before	 acting	 on	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 treaty,	 and	 that	 it	depended	 on	 the	 willingness	 of	 countries	 to	 honour	 it,	 something	 that	 might	change	over	time.425		Accordingly,	ANZUS	provided	an	important	shield	but,	as	he	put	it,	“if	we	sit	down	behind	that	shield	and	do	nothing	then	someday	that	shield	
																																																								421	John	Gorton,	“Defence,”	published	in	The	Age	on	26	July	1971,	Gorton	Papers	Box	13	MS	7984,	NLA.	422	Ibid.	423	Speech	at	the	Deakin	Electorate	Committee	by	the	Right	Honourable	J.	G.	Gorton,	20	Oct	1971,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	7,	MS	7984,	NLA.	424	Ibid.	425	Mr	Gorton,	Guest	Speaker	at	the	Australia-American	Association	Dinner,	26	November	1971,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	7,	MS	7984,	NLA.	
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may	go	–	 indeed	we	would	be	contributing	to	its	going	–	and	we	would	be	 left	defenceless	and	ripe	for	the	plucking.”426		Realising	that	“if	turmoil	develops	in	the	region	to	our	north	we	should	assume	that	there	will	be	no	United	States	involvement	in	that	area,”427	Gorton	called	for	a	new	approach	to	formulating	defence	policy.		In	a	speech	on	2	September	1971	he	 acknowledged	 that	 for	 too	 long	 the	 Australian	 government	 had	 avoided	assessing	how	it	could	best	meet	the	new	situation,	and	that	for	too	long	“we	have	been	having	arguments	…	as	to	our	Defence	Policy	which	have	been	based,	upon	the	one	hand	somebody	using	the	slogan	saying	‘we	should	have	forward	defence,’	and	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 somebody	 using	 the	 slogan	 saying	 ‘no	we	 should	 have	Fortress	Australia.’”428		Gorton	now	was	advocating	a	middle	ground	between	the	two	extremes.		As	he	put	it,	“both	of	these	concepts	as	put	forward	are	quite	wrong,	I	suggest	to	you,	and	quite	ridiculous	because	there	cannot	be	in	the	defence	of	any	country	any	real	division	between	the	concept	of	keeping	hostilities	as	far	away	as	possible	 from	our	 shores	and	 the	 concept	of	having	 in	our	 shores	a	base	 from	which	we	can	defend	ourselves.”429		Gorton	continued,	articulating	the	basis	of	a	new	foreign	policy:	one	that	blended	a	 traditional	 forward	 defence	 posture	 with	 a	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 developing	Australia’s	own	defence	 capacity.	 	As	Gorton	put	 it,	 “what	we	need	 is	 a	base	 in	Australia,	 as	 Britain	 was	 a	 base	 when	 Europe	 was	 twice	 overrun,	 a	 base	 in	Australia	able	 to	be	defended	from	Australia	and	able	 to	mount	 forward	action	against	any	enemy	in	the	region	to	which	we	belong.”	 	 	Gorton	hoped	that	 this	would	be	“the	basis	of	future	defence	discussions	rather	than	sterile	discussions	of	‘we	must	have	Forward	Defence.’”	And	defined	real	defence	policy	as	creating	the	situation	where	Australia	had	“the	capacity	 to	look	after	our	own	continent	
																																																								426	Ibid.	427	Speech	at	the	Deakin	Electorate	Committee	by	the	Right	Honourable	J.	G.	Gorton,	20	Oct	1971,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	7,	MS	7984,	NLA.	428	Transcript	of	Speech	Given	by	RT.	Hon.	J.	G.	Gorton	at	the	Lecture	Evening	of	the	Lodge	Humanitas	No	840	at	the	Masonic	Centre	of	Victoria,	2	September	1971,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	7,	MS	7984,	NLA.	429	Ibid.	
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and	a	realization	of	the	necessity	to	move	beyond	the	bounds	of	our	own	continent	to	help	those	with	whom	we	may	be	associated	in	this	area.”430				In	this	sense	Gorton	was	responding	to	the	implications	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine	and	in	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 sense	 than	 many	 of	 his	 colleagues,	 and	 laying	 the	foundations	of	a	future	Australian	defence	policy.		As	Strangio	put	it,	“Gorton	had	been	more	receptive	to	the	quickening	times.”431		In	doing	so	he	demonstrated	a	better	 understanding	 of	 what	 was	 needed	 in	 the	 future.	 	 Though	 the	 period	between	1968	and	1971	was	certainly	characterised	by	ambivalences,	doubts	and	hesitations,	it	was	during	this	period	that	changes	in	the	approach	to	the	alliance	were	first	made.		Though	the	revolution	may	have	occurred	under	Whitlam,	it	was	during	Gorton’s	time	as	prime	minister	that	“the	‘watershed’	in	policy	was	crossed,	and	the	choice	of	future	direction	implicitly	made,	to	be	confirmed	in	Whitlam’s	time.”432		The	foundations	were	being	laid	–	even	if	somewhat	inarticulately	–	for	the	revolution	to	take	place.		Gorton’s	 pronouncements	 on	 the	 limitations	 of	 ANZUS	 and	Australia’s	 need	 to	adopt	a	more	 self-reliant	 foreign	policy	demonstrated	 two	 things.	 	 Firstly,	 they	demonstrated	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Gorton	 believed	 Australian	 could	 rely	 on	America	after	the	enunciation	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine.	 	For	Gorton,	a	relationship	with	America	carried	obvious	benefits,	but	it	was	no	substitute	for	Australia’s	own	self-reliance.	 	Indeed,	it	was	a	“bonus	rather	than	a	life	insurance,”	as	had	been	argued	 by	 Australian	 academic	 Frank	 Knopfelmacher. 433 		 Secondly,	 they	demonstrated	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Gorton’s	 historical	 context	 undermined	 his	ability	to	set	Australian	foreign	policy	on	a	path	more	in	line	with	his	own	beliefs	when	prime	minister.		Though	he	may	well	have	wanted	to	have	set	Australia	on	a	more	self-reliant	path,	he	was	not	able	to	break	away	from	the	practice	of	looking	to	ANZUS	and	the	American	alliance	that	had	been	established	by	the	actions	of	previous	government	since	the	signing	of	the	treaty	in	1951.																																																									430	Ibid.	431	Strangio,	“Instability,	1966-82,”	op.	cit.,	p.	142.	432	Bell,	Dependent	Ally,	op.	cit.,	p.	88.	433	Frank	Knopfelmacher,	“Why	America	is	Not	Capable	of	Defending	Anyone,”	published	in	The	Daily	Telegraph	on	5	May	1971,	Part	12,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	
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CHAPTER	FOUR:	CONCLUSIONS		Though	a	 lack	of	decisiveness	 in	 the	 formation	of	Australian	 foreign	policy	 can	indeed	be	seen	during	Gorton’s	time	as	prime	minister,	this	thesis	has	explained	the	reasons	for	it	by	properly	placing	his	time	as	prime	minister	in	the	broader	context	of	the	Cold	War	and	American-Australian	relations.	 	In	this	sense	it	has	demonstrated	 that	 much	 previous	 scholarship 434 	on	 the	 period	 has	 been	somewhat	 narrow	 in	 its	 approach	 to	 Gorton’s	 management	 of	 the	 alliance.		Moreover,	 though	 the	 thesis	 has	 not	 denied	Gorton’s	 inability	 to	 decisively	 set	Australian	foreign	policy	on	a	new	path,	it	has	suggested	that	it	was	in	fact	during	this	period	that	the	first	steps	towards	the	articulation	and	formulation	of	a	more	self-reliant	 foreign	 policy	 were	 taken.	 	 In	 this	 sense	 it	 has	 picked	 up	 on	 the	arguments	of	Donald	Horne,	who	saw	the	time	between	Menzies	and	Whitlam	as	more	 than	 just	 an	 interregnum,	and	built	on	 the	world	of	 those	historians	and	biographers 435 	who	 have	 paid	 more	 attention	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 Gorton’s	management	of	the	American	alliance.		Since	signing	ANZUS	in	1951,	successive	Liberal	governments	had	placed	having	a	 strong	 relationship	 with	 America	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 Australian	 foreign	 policy.		Fearing	that	America	might	disregard	the	treaty	and	ignore	Australia	in	its	time	of	need,	those	governments	worked	tirelessly	to	achieve	a	sense	of	alliance	intimacy	and	cooperation	between	the	two	countries.		Having	been	brought	up	on	this	diet	of	Cold	War	great	power	politics,	Gorton	was	unable	to	completely	break	free	from	the	habit	of	seeking	assurances	and	guarantees	as	to	ANZUS	applicability	during	his	time	as	prime	minister,	even	as	these	guarantees	appeared	less	and	less	likely	to	 be	 forthcoming.	 	 Even	 though	 he	may	well	have	wanted	 to	 break	 free	 from	reliance	on	great	powers	and	follow	a	foreign	policy	that	was	more	in	keeping	with	his	so-called	‘new	nationalism’,	his	lack	of	standing	in	the	conservative	hierarchy	and	domestic	political	pressures	prevented	him	from	doing	do.			
																																																								434	Especially	Camilleri,	Millar,	Philip	Bell	and	Roger	Bell	and	Harper,	as	referred	to	in	Chapter	One.	435	Especially	Edwards,	Coral	Bell,	Barclay,	Curran,	Ward,	Trengrove	and	Hancock,	as	referred	to	in	Chapter	One.	
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	Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	 thesis	 has	 also	 demonstrated	 that	 Gorton	was	 not	 a	mere	sycophant	of	America’s	and,	to	some	extent	at	least,	took	the	first	steps	to	chart	Australian	foreign	policy	on	a	new	and	more	self-reliant	course.		He	may	not	have	been	able	 to	 translate	his	desire	 for	greater	 independence	 into	a	concrete	policy	when	he	was	prime	minister,	but	he	did	appreciate	the	implications	of	the	Nixon	Doctrine	and	signalled	the	need	for	Australia	to	take	on	a	more	self-reliant	foreign	policy	going	forward.	 	As	Robert	Duffield	wrote	in	The	Australian	on	22	June	1971,	four	days	after	Gorton’s	address	to	the	Imperial	Services	Club	in	which	he	had	outlined	his	own	understanding	of	the	term	Fortress	Australia,	“we	have	a	new	defence	philosophy	 for	Australia	–	a	Forward	Fortress	policy.”436		Duffield	recognised	that	Gorton	might	have	only	commenced	the	bringing	about	of	a	new	defence	 posture	 for	 Australia,	 and	 noted	 that	 “’Forward	 Fortress’	 may	 never	become	a	national	catch-cry;”	but	he	also	recognised	that	Gorton	had,	“in	planning	now	for	a	defence	posture	at	least	10	years	off,”	begun	to	base	future	foreign	policy	discussions	on	the	premise	that	“we	cannot	and	must	not	count	on	America	or	anyone	else	as	a	great	protector.”437		Treating	America’s	 saving	presence	 in	an	emergency	 as	 a	 bonus	 rather	 than	 a	 life	 insurance,	 Gorton	 recommended	continuing	the	alliance	with	America,	but	avoided	what	Knopfelmacher	described	in	as	“wholly	contemptible	in	its	stupidity:”	complete	reliance	on	America	as	the	basis	of	Australian	foreign	and	defence	policy.438		In	properly	analysing	Gorton	and	his	management	of	the	alliance,	the	thesis	has	also	 provided	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 nature	 and	 consequences	 of	 Australia’s	relationship	with	America	during	the	Cold	War.		The	predicament	in	which	Gorton	and	the	Liberal	party	found	itself	from	early	1968	to	1971	–	the	inability	to	form	and	announce	 foreign	policy	and	project	 a	 future	 course	 for	Australian	 foreign	policy	 -	 was	 the	 price	 Australia	 paid	 for	 relying	 on	 a	 superpower	 for	 its	 own	
																																																								436	Robert	Duffield,	“Gorton’s	defence	blueprint	for	a	forward	fortress,”	published	on	22	June	1971	in	The	Australian,	Gorton	Papers,	Box	13,	MS	7984,	NLA.	437	Ibid.	438	Frank	Knopfelmacher,	“Why	America	is	Not	Capable	of	Defending	Anyone,”	published	in	The	Daily	Telegraph	on	5	May	1971,	Part	12,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	
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national	security.		Regardless	of	the	fact	that	recent	scholarship439	has	shown	that,	far	from	being	reluctantly	dragged	into	Vietnam	by	Washington,	Australia	played	an	active	role	 in	 involving	 itself	 in	 the	conflict	 to	 further	 its	own	foreign	policy	goals,	the	Australian	government’s	problems	began	when	Washington	took	steps	to	 extricate	 itself	 from	 the	 conflict.	 	 Officials	 in	 Canberra	 had	 placed	 Australia	alongside	 America	 in	 Vietnam	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 strengthen	 the	 relationship	between	the	two	countries;	now,	Washington	was	withdrawing	those	American	troops	 and	 Canberra	 was	 left	 to	 consider	 the	 implications	 for	 the	 future	 of	Australian	foreign	policy.		As	 this	 thesis	 has	 shown,	 changing	 American	 policy	 in	 Vietnam	 significantly	undermined	 long-held	assumptions	about	 the	American	alliance	and	the	role	 it	would	play	in	the	protection	of	Australia	during	the	Cold	War.		Though	a	middle	power	like	Australia	may	sit	comfortably	when	it	and	its	great	power	protector’s	interests	 are	 aligned,	 there	 is	 little	 the	 middle	 power	 can	 do	 when	 the	superpower’s	interests	and	goals	are	unaligned	and	unclear.	 	As	Knopfelmacher	put	it	in	The	Daily	Telegraph,	“when	one	power	is	very	much	bigger	than	the	other,	it	means	a	unidirectional	chain	of	command	and	flow	of	decisions	in	matters	of	foreign	policy,	military	planning	and	intelligence,	with	a	steadily	shrinking	area	of	independence	from	the	client	State.”440		It	was	Gorton	who	felt	 this	shrinking	area	of	 independence	most	keenly,	and	 it	came	to	characterise	his	role	in	foreign	affairs	from	1968	to	1971.		Journalist	Sam	Lipski	expressed	this	point	in	a	more	colloquial	sense	in	The	Australian	in	1969.		For	 Lipski,	 it	 was	 the	 Americans’	 sense	 of	 mateship	 that	 was	 the	 source	 of	Australia’s	troubles.		Referring	to	comments	made	by	former	US	Consul-General	Frank	 Hopkins,	 Lipski	 wrote	 that	 Americans,	 not	 being	 rooted	 in	 the	 same	traditions	 of	 loyalty	 and	 support	 as	 Australians,	 “do	 not	 quite	 understand	 the	Australian	expectation	that	mates	who	have	worked	together,	played	together,	or	fought	 together	 will	 always	 put	 their	 loyalty	 to	 one	 another	 ahead	 of	 other																																																									439	Especially	Meaney,	McLean,	Sexton	and	Barclay,	as	referred	to	in	Chapter	One.	440	Frank	Knopfelmacher,	“Why	America	is	Not	Capable	of	Defending	Anyone,”	published	in	The	Daily	Telegraph	on	5	May	1971,	Part	12,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	
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relationships.”441		Quoting	Hopkins,	Lipski	argued	that	the	logical	consequence	of	this	was	 that	American	policy,	was	 “not	oriented	 towards	special	 relationships	with	other	nations,	even	when	they	share	our	language	and	ancestral	descent	…		However	much	individual	Americans	may	come	to	prefer	Aussies	to	their	other	friends	and	 relatives,	Washington	policies	are	 conducted	with	a	 certain	 cosmic	impartiality.”442		 It	 was	 Gorton	who	 took	 the	 first	 steps	 in	 setting	 the	 path	 of	Australian	foreign	policy	on	a	course	characterised	by	its	own	impartiality.																																																																																												441	Sam	Lipski,	“Americans	just	can’t	fathom	our	‘mateship’	philosophy,”	published	on	31	January	1969	in	The	Age,	Part	10,	A1838,	250/9/1,	NAA.	442	Ibid.	
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